ant. These certificates were duly and regularly issued, and the purchasers paid to the state thereon 20 per cent. of the purchase price, and one year's interest on the balance; but no further payments have been made. Neithel' the state of California, nor complainant, nor any of his grantors or predecessors in interest, have received the rents or profits of the premises, or of any part thereof, at any time within the space of 10 years preceding the commencement of this suit, and said state has never since issuing the patents to Hewlett asserted or claimed any title to or interest in thQ. premises. The amended answer sets up these facts, and also alleges that the right or title claimed by complainant did not accrue to the state, or to complainant, or to any of his grantors or predecessors in interest within 10 years before the commencement of the suit. and also pleads in bar of the action sections 315 and 316 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California, _which-read asioBows: "Sec. 315. The people of this state will not sue any person for or in respect to any real prop-erty, or the-issues or profits thereof, byreason of the right or title of the people to the same, unless (1) such right or title shall have accrued within ten years before. any action Or other proceeding for the same ill oommeneed; or'(2) the people, or t110se from whom they claim. shall have received the rents and profits of su'ch real property, or of some part thereof, within the space of ten years. - Sec. 316. No action can be brought for or in respect to real property by any person claiming under letters patents or grants from this slate, unless lhesame might have been commenced by the people, as herein specified in case such patent had ilOt been issued or grant made." Applying these provisions of the statute to the conceded facts of the case; it does not seem to me to admit of doubt that the suit is barred. Unless the state could have commenced the suit had no grant been made 'by it, the complainant is barred by the provisions of section 316, and whether or not the state could have done so must be determined by refto section-315. By that section the legislature declared that the -people should-not sue any person for or in respect to any real property by reason of-their right or title 'to the same unless such right or title shall have accrued within 10 years before the commencement of the suit, PI' the people, or those from whom they claim, shall 'have received the rents and profits of such real property, or of some part thereof, within the space of 10 years. It isa conceded fact that neither the people of the state nor thosfl from whom -they claim have received the rents or profits of the land in controversy, or of any part of it, within the space of 10 years next preceding the bringing of this suit. Did their right or title accrue within 10 years next bE-fore its commencement? Manifestly I the right and title of the people to the property accrued at least as early as the grant from the general government became complete and absolute, which is conceded to have been August 6, 1855. But, of course, until there was some interference with that right or title no cause of action could accrue. The complainant contends that the suit in question is not within the statute because it is i10t brought by reason or his right or title to the prbpertY,'but by reason of the adverse claim of the defendants. Clearly '!ihis is not so. ,Neither of those things alone, in this case or in
DOYLE ".SAN DIEGO LAND & TOWN CO.
Rny other case, could constitute a cause of action.
In every case that must necessarily consist of at least two things: the right of the complainfngparty, and the wrong committed against .that right by the other party. In this case the cause of action arose upon the entry of the defendants upon the premises April 17, 1874, which was an invasion of the right flowing from the title to the property, and the suit, not having been commenced within 10 years from that time, is barred by the provisions of the section in question. Wliber v. OommWsioners, 18 Wall. 70, 71; People v. Center, 66 Cal. 564, 5 Pac. Rep. 263, and 6 Pac. Rep. 481; Peoplf, v. Arnold, 4 N. Y. 508. There must be judgment for defendantsdismissing the bill, with costs.
DOYLE 'IJ. SAN DIEGO LAND
(Circuit Oourt, S. D. Oalifornia.
August 8, 18110.)
In an action against a corporation and its officers, in which relief is sought against the corporation and discovery from the officers, the latter are not merely nominal parties. '
In Equity. On demurrer to bill. Deakin &Btory, for complainant. Luce, McDonald & Torrance, for defendants. R6ss; J. "'The defendants to the bill in this case are a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Kansas and four indi;' vidllaJs,' two ,of whom are alleged to be officers, and the other two stockholders, or'the corporation. The complainant and the individual defendantaare all citizens and residents of this state. If it be true, as contended by counsel for complainant, that the individual defendants are merely nominal parties, the fact that they are made defendants to the bill would not oust the court of jurisdiction. But are they nominal The bill is one for relief against the corporation, and, parties as incidental to that relief, for discovery against the. individual defendants. To such a bill I do not see how the parties from whom the discovery igsought can be said to be nominal defendants. If the whole scope of the suit was against the corporation alone the mere fact that the officers of the corporation were made parties would be unimportant, because a corporation acts and is made to act through its ofIieers, and they are therefore bound in their official capacity by any valid judgment against it. To such a suit such officers would not only not be necessary, but they would not be proper, parties; and, if made such, would not be rea], but nomin!ll,partiesonly. Hawh v. Ra.ilroad Co., 6 Blatchf. 114, f\,S said by Ju.dge BLATCHFORD in the case cited i where the officer is "made a party defendant, jointly with the corporation of