wascll:lsed, to that there was' a at the place of collision at the time it occurred, and that this fact materially affected the duties of the parties by enhancing the care and caution required of them in speed, by the steamer and in makinga'nd .distingnishing the' signals whistles; a degree Of care and caution whiCh the colliding parties on both But all thewitriesses who were present and witsides failed to nessM the disaster agree that, while the weather was somewhat thick and hazy, there was not sufficient fog to prevent a clear view of vessels and objects a mile or two away I and that the Holberg was distinctly seen and noted from the tug Rnd bark when she was half a mile off. Drifts of fog were coming in from the sea about that time, and some vessels were enveloped in fog banks occasionally, which made it necessary for them to slow 'Up and make fog signals. But. at the place where the collision occurred; and when it occurred,there was no material obstruction to the view. .This is testified to not only by the master and mate of the tug, bu, by the dozen witnesses who were on the bark, and wel'e produced by the owner, the respondent Stafford. I am of opinion that the tug Leonard Richards was not in fault, and that a decree to that effect should be made in favor of her and her owners against the respondents, discharging them from all liability for loss occasioned by the collision in question.
(Oirauit GO'Urt, S. D. New York.
STEAQRS-FAILURB TO ANSWER SIGNAL-DuTY TO STOP-':-CROSIlo
'..'he steam-Ughter I., going up the East river near the New York shore, came in collision, Ilear dock, with the ferry.boat R., bound from Hunter's point to slip, and having the right of way. The R. three times gave .. signal of one whistle, when offrJ'hirteenth street, Twelfth street, and Eleventh street, wnen she received a signal of. two whistles from the L, which attempted to go neilr tbe shore; and the two collided port bow to port bow. Beld, both in fault; the L' for crossing the R.'s course, and keeping to the left near the shore, without reasoQ; the R. for not soone!). under inspector's rule 5, or as soon as the L'. intent was made known. A1lirming.lll:S Fed. Rep. 856.
In Admiralty. Appeal from district court. Rice & BijUf, for appellant. Anabn Beebe Stewart, for appellee. Circuit Judge.
Decision of district court affirmed, with
LEHIGH ZINC & IRON CO. V. NEW ,JERSEY ZINC & IRON CO.
NEW JERSEY ZINC
(Oircuit Oourt, D. New Jersey. September 28,1890.)
For the purpose of determining the jurisdictional amount in a bill to quiet title, the whole value of the property, the possession or enjoyment of which is threa." ened by defendant, is the measure of the value of the matters in controversy.
A bill alleged that complainant's title to certain ores claimed by it had been so thoroughly adjudicated that further litigation would be vexatious, and prayed that defendant might be enjoined from taking any proceedings to take said ores, or from disturbing complainant's title thereto. In another portion of the bill complainant claimed a statutory right to require the title or claim of defendant to the ores to be .. now" set up. tried, and finally determined. Held, that the bill was multifarious.
In Equity. Charles D. Thompson, Richard Wayne Pa1ker, and George Northrop, for
complainant. John R. Emery and Thomas N. McCarter, for defendant.
GREEN,J. This matter comes before the court upon demurrer interposed by the defendant to the bill of complaint filed by the complainaut. The demurrer is general, and the following causes were assigned as its justification:
.. First. That the said bill is a bill filed in a circuit court of the United States, held in and for the district of New Jersey, and the complainant has not by its said bill shown tbe jurisdiction of the court, in that it has not averred or shown that the matterin dispute exceeds, exclusi ve of interest and costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars. Second. That the complainant in and by its said bill claims under two distinct and inconsistent rights, Which cannot be joined in a single bill of complaint, and the discovery and relief sOllghtby said bill relate to two several, distinct, and inconsistent rights, which cannot be joined in one bill; and especially that the complainant in and by one portion of its said bill alleges and claims that the title and rights of the complainant to the ores (llaimed by it in said bill have been finally settled and determined by the decrees, judgments, suits, proceedings, and acts mentioned in said bill, and that by virtue thereof the defendant is preclUded and barred from setti ng up or asserting any right or claim to the said ores claimed by the complain.ant, and prays tha.t the defendant may be perpetually restrained and enjoined from taking any action, suit, or proceedings in law or equity to take from it said ores, or from disturbing complainant's title thereto, and may be restrained from attempting to obtain possession of the said premises, or removing the ores. metals, and minerals claimed by the complainant. And, by another portion of said bill. the said complainant relies upon and sets up another, and a different, distinct, and inconsistent, equitable right or tiLle, under the statute of the state of New Jersey, entitled ·An act to compel the determination of claims to real estate, and to quiet title to thesatne,' approved March 2, 1870, under which the complainant claims the right to require the title or claim of the defendant to said ores, claimed by the complainant, to be now set up, tried, and finally determined under said act, in this suit, and prays such distinct and inconsistent relief. And this defendant says that complainant's supposed right, based on the allegations that its right and title to said ores claimed by ithath been already finally settled and. deter-