Nothing more is needed. In the case of Jifilli v. Railroad 00.,37 Fed. Rep. 65, it was said "If the plaintiff in the case at bar were a citizen of this state, and a resident effect service here, where of this districtt.b.e, collld no its principal omcets located, although it is a citizen of Pennsylvania, and so much of its railroad as is located in this state lies within the northern district." , This exactly covers the present case. See,also, Fales v. v. Railway Co., 3i3)j'ed. Rep. 114; St. LouiJrR.a,.v. Terre ,Haute R.Co., ld. 385; Rawleyv.Railway'Co., ld. Qo.,Id.,353; Bank v. Avciy,34 Fed. Rep.S1; Wilsonv. Telegraph Co., ld. 561; Hillsv. Railway 00.,37 Fed. Rep. 660. The plea is overruled. 'rhe defendant may answer within 20 days.
· f '
MOtrN'l'AIN COKE' &: 'COAL' CO.
(Circuit Court,Af.D. Tennessee. October 18, 1890.)
Where'the material allegations of a bill1l.1ed by the l1nlted States agaInst various , coal companles,undell Dong. July 2, 1890, to enjoin theircomblnation inrestl'aint oftrlide,al'e denied affidavits, a preliminary will, not be gr.anted ' as plaintiff givei ntiindemnif,ying bOndlD case the injunction should tie,aisso1 " ved. ,,
In Equity., .' '.. . , This oase, arose on ,8 bill by the United States, under the act of congress approved "An act to protect trade and, COmmerce agaipllt,\;mlawfutrestraillts and All the coal companies doing husint:lss in the city of Nashville, as, members of the coal. hearing a exchange, were I))ade parties defendant. On the temporary injunction was,refulled. , , ' W. H. ,B., Miller, Wm. H. Tajt,Acting Atty. Gen., and John R-uhm, U:.'S. Atty. G. N. Tillman, and W. L.(banbery, for
This is· an' application for apre1imipary injunction only, and it appearll to the coqrt, betterto await the hearing, and determine upon plen6,rypr.oof.ofthe exact facts those grave questions which have beel,l suggested, than to decide, the')llnow: \.lpon the bare statements of bill w4ich are so.general in their Qbaracter, and quite too barren of any aVElrments;Qfsp!3oitic facts ,to, Elnable the court the, true, particularlyjn view of the important of them; and ip this view-it: isunnecesaaryto,hear any counter-afIidJwite, :. The court iethe, more to thill course since the bill is. not that .of a private States citizen, complaining of an injury to him, but
BRUSH ELECTRIO CO; tl. BALL ELEctRIC LIGHT CO.
on behalf of the public,and :in pursuance of a public policy of enforcing
.tI. recent act of congress to prevent combinations ill festraintof trade and commerce. It is manifest fuat-the'act is new,and this a mostimportant application of it. It would more injure the defendants togrant this preliminary injunction if, on the hearing, it should turn out that the case
does not fall within the act. ,than it would injure the public to withhold the injunction until the final hearing; and the more since the United States gives no bond to protect the defendants against that injury, as a private suitor WQ,uld be compelled to do. When ,this is the situation of the parties the rule is to refuse the preliminary injunction, and abide the hearing.';The court ,reserves allexptession of /)l)i'Oion on the subject-matter of the bill until that time, as the best for all concerned.
17. BALL ELECTRIC LIGHT
oourt.8. D. New Yor1c. No;vember 8, 1890.)
In e.·bill,for infringement of letters patent, to have been issued In 1879, and assigned to1ihe complainaJ!.t. in 1880, an averment. of an infringement of the latter's rights" since the date of said patent "will be construed .as me8.lling after or subsequent to the date of the patent, and not ever since that time, and the bill ill Dot subject to demurrer for laches ot complainant in his rights.
POR INFRINGBMENT-DEMURRER FOR LACHES.·
On Demurrer.' Henry A. Seyrrwuf, for complainant. Philip J. O'Reilly, for defendant. COXE, J. This is' an equity action for infringement of letters pateflt granted to Charles F. Brush, September 2,1879, and now owned by the complainant. The action was commenced February 25, 1890. The usual relief is demanded. The bill alleges that the defendant has "since the date of said patent, since September 2,1879, at New York, within said district," infringed upon the complainant's rights. The demurrer is aimed at the language quoted. the contention being that the defendant is there. charged with a continuous infringement silice the, date of the patent, and that equity will not aid a complainant guilty of such laches in asserting his rights. That the language is open to the construction contended for by the defendant is not denied, but it is equally true that it can be so construed as to sustain the bill, and that such a construction is the more natural one. "Since September 2, 1879," does not necessarily mean ever since September 2, 1879. It may mean after, or subsequently to; September 2, 1879. Engraving Co. v. Hoke, 30 Fed. Rep. 444; KiUl.e v. De GraaJ, ld. 689. That the word "since" wRsused in the latter senseis evident from the fact that it is alleged elsewhere in tbebillthatthe patent was not assigned to the complainant untilSep-: tember,1880. "It cannot be said, therefore, that the pleader intended.