Rep. 112, that decision must be accepted as settling the law in this circuit. Its principles lire as applicable to causes wnich are removed as to those which are not. It would be absurd to hold that proceedings in a state court were void on the theory that such court acquired no jurisdiction o.f the party because its attempted service of process was abhorrent to natural justice and international law, and at the same time to hold that a federal court could administer justice under such a service after the cause had been removed to its forum. Nor does removal and special appearance by the defendant waive its right to avail of a defectservice. Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476; Miner v. Markham, 28 Fed. Rep. 395. The only question, 'therefore, which is left for decision upon this application is whether the corporation defendant was at the till)e of service of the summons engaged in business in this state. That question must be determined by what it had done, or was doing, at that time, rather than by what it might do thereafter. That it will ably hereafter provide a regular agency in this state for the continuous transaction of the business of registration and transfer of its bonds and payment of the interest on the coupons during the continuance· of the mottg!tg4;l is immaterial. The only business which it had done up to the 18th July was the borrowing of money upon its bond and mortgage, and the obtaining from the stock exchange of the privilege of having such' bonds called on the list of securities dealt in on its floor. It could appaJ:'Emtly have secured this privilege, anti could have sold its bonds by cOlTespondence. It kept no office here. It did not continuously, or even for a period of some duration, carryon here the business which it was organized to carryon, and by the regular transaction of which it gave evidence of its continued existence. It cannot, therefore, be held. under the authorities that the defendant was, at the time when Tyler WllS served, engaged in business in this state so as to make service of the sum..; mons on him efficient to bind the corporation. U. S. v. American BeU Tel. Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 37; Good Hape Co. v. Railway B. F. 00.,22 Fed; Rep. 635; Hunter v. Irnprovem,ent 00., 26 Fed. Rep. 299; St. Louis WireMiU Co. v. Consolidated Barb- Wire 00., 32 Fed Rep. 802; Carpenter 'V. 00., Id. 434. Motion granted.
ISAACS 1.1. McNEIL et
(O"'cuit Oourt, S. D. Washington. November 10, 1890.)
Damages cannot be recovered in an action against election officers, for deprivation of plaintiff's right, under the laws of Washington Territory, to vote, (if such right eXisted,) where the decision of the board as to her right to vote was controlled by and followed a previous decision of the supreme court of the territory, which decision had not been reversed or overruled, and where no rudeness or malicious conduct on the part of the defendants is charged. (S1/Uabua bll the Oourt.)
JllLll:OTIVB FRANOHISB-DENIAL 011' RIGHT-STARE DEOISIS.
At Law. On demurrer to complaint. J. L. Sharpstein and Laura De Force Gordon, for plainti,ff. D. J. Crowley, for defendants.
HANFORD, J. This is an action against the inspector and judges of election of a precinct to recover damages for depriving plaintiff of a right which she claims of voting at the general election held in the territory of Washington on the 1st day of October, 1889. The complaint does not charge the defendants with having insulted her, or with any rudeness or malicious conduct. The injury, if any, was committed by the mere refusal of the board to receive and count the plaintifrs ballot. The question as to the right of women to vote in Washington Territory, at the said election, depends upon the validity of an act of the territorial legislature, which the supreme court of the territory has held to· be void, because in conflict with an act of congress, and this court has jurisdiction of the case only by reason of the fact that this question involves the construction of said act of congress. The court cannot, however, pass upon that question in this case, for, even if plaintifFs right to vote at said election be conceded, she cannot maintain the present action. The decision of the supreme court of the territory in the case of Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. T. 599, 19 Pac. Rep. 135, was rendered prior to tile election at which the plaintiff was denied the right to vote, of which she co'nplains. In that decision the court held that women were not lawfu:Jy entitled to vote; and as the laws were not thereafter, and prior to the election of October, 1889, changed, and as that decision had not been reversed 6r overruled, it must have controlled the defendants in this case in giving their decision as to the plaintiff's right to vote at said election, and they cannot be held liable in an action for damages merely because they followed it. If the decision be erroneous, the supreme courtis responsible for the error; and as the law shields the judges of that court from an attack of this nature, it follows, of course, and is a rule of common sense and natural justice, that the members of au inferior and humbler tribunal, which of necessity accepted, their decision, and followed it, are protected by the same shield. The authorities, as well as reason, so declare. Mechem, Pub. Off. §§ 638, 639, 695; Gordon v. Farrar, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 409; Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich. 228; Cooley, Torts, p. 413; Jenkins· v. Waldron, 6 Amer. Dec. 359. The demurrer is sustained. v.44F.no.1-3
FULLER 11. FLETCHER
(Oircuit Oourt, D. Rhode Islana. October 18,1890.)
SAME-PRESUMPTION OF D E E D . ,
Where the question is whether a deed is to be presumed from long possession and claim of title, evide/lce that the claim of the adverse qlaimant was notorious in the community, and that, more than 60 years after the deed, if there was a deed, was given, such claimant Was too poor to sue, is irrelevant.
The attempt by a defendant in ejectment to prove that the will urider which the plaintiff claims is invalid does not prevent him, on a sedond trial of the cause, to set up the defense of a presumption of a deed to his grantor.
There is no absolute bar against the presumption of a grant within a period short of the statute of limitations. ; ' : ,
· . .. .'
interruptionsof possession during the period necessary to create a 'title by' adverse possession, which do not impair the use to which the occupant sub-' property, and for whiCh it is chiefly valuable, will not necessarily defeat the presll.mption of a grant. . It iii sufll.cient ground for the presumption of a grant to show that, by legal pos-". sibility, a grant might have issued, though the probability of its existence is not established.
T,he facts that defendants and those from wbom they derive title have claimed the land for more tha.n 100 years; that during that time they have paid taxes on it; that for along period of time they exeroised acts of ownership over it; and that for more than 20 .years tp.ey have actually used the land,-ate 8Ufll.cient to justify the presuml,ltion of a deed.
S. NEW TRIAL-MISCONDUCT OF JURY. The fact that two of the jurors during the trial of a cause read the opinion of the court, rendered on appeal from a former judgment of the cause, is not ground for a new trial, where it clearly appears that the opinion was not furnished by or at the instigation of the 8uccessful'party, and that the opinion was not taken into the jury-room or laid before the jury. . 9. SAME-AFFIDAVITS OF JURORS. AfIl.davits of jurors are admissible, on motion for new trial, to prove, in support of the. that a paper was DOt laid before the jury or read by them.
.At LB.W. On motion llew trial. , Jas. d. CoUi:Tl8, LivingstOn Bt;oU, and Elisha '0. Mou.TY, for plaintiff. James Tillinghast and Wm. H. Greene, for defendants. Before GRAY, Justice, and COLT, J.
GRAY, Justice. This was an action of ejectment. brought by Nathan Fuller, in his own right and as trustee, to recover 27 undivided 28 parts of a lot of land, containing about 14 acres, and situated in the town of Lincoln, formerly Smithfield, in the state of Rhode Island. The defendants pleaded the general issue and 20 years' possession under the statute of possessions of Rhode Island, and upon these pleas issues were joined. Both parties claimed title under Francis Richardson, who acquired a tract of land, including the lot in dispute, in 1750, died in