Norwich, 118 U. S. 468, 490,6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1150. The general purpose of both isthe same. The objeotof both was to encourage ship-building and commerce, and to enable persons having a moderate capital to engage in commerce without becoming liable for an indefinite amount beyond what was invested in the enterprise, through ,the faults or contracts of others. This principle becoming, early in the middle ages, a rule of the maritime law, secured, to a considerable extent, for persons in commerce, the same beneficent results that the municipal law educed by other means; namely, by the formation of corporations, and, inore latterly, by ations by which individuals may engage intmde without ing liable beyond the amount of invested capital.' Construing the acts oft 884 and 1851 in the light of these decisions, and of the general maritime law whicb it was their purpose to introduce into our jurisprudence, I must hold that the decree set up in ,the answer, limiting, the liability of the respondents, ,as a decree 'based on claims growing out of a subsequent: voyage, does not affect tbelibelant's 'prior demand, and that this prior demand was from the first a personalliability oNhe respondents, and not subject to limitation at all; and that, if it ,were; it eould only be thus limited upon the surrender of thEivessel, or her value and the freight as they stood at the end of that voyagel'free from all demands or liens growing out of. any' oCher other voyages pnor or- subsequent. ' " ' · for libelants, with costs.,
LAGONDA. 1 ,
THE JAMFilA. GARFIELD.
Court, E. D. New York. ,
recovered for the detention of a 'yacht, caused by a. act, at the market rate (If such craft, though the yacht was never let for hire, atld no was employed during the time of lIuch de,tention. .
SAME-AMOUNT Oil' DEMURB4GII-EXPERT TESTIMONY..
Theli.mount of demurrage to be recovered by a pleasure yacht may be shown by the testimony of those chartering yachts, as to what, iIi their opinioD, t¥ could haye obtained for her use the period of detention.
In· Admiralty. On exceptions 'to, commissioner's report. ,,;S:&942 Fed; Rep: 304. R.'D. Benedict, for libelant. · i., Goodrich, Deady &: Goodrich, for claimant.
J. This case comes before the court upon etcepti01i8, to the comtnissioner's report. The action isbtought ,to recover
by EdwardG. Benedict, Esq., of the NewYark'bar.
ages sustained by the libelant by reason of injuries done to the steam yaeM:Lagonda, in a collision between that yacht and the'tug James A. Gameld. An interlocutory decree in favor of the libelant was entered, and the case referred to a commissioner, to ascertain and report the amount of the libelant's damages. The commissioner, among other thiI)gs, reported that the yacht had been detained eight days, while undergoing repairs made necessary by the collision, and allowed the sum of $48 for such detention; being interest for eight days on $36,000, the cost of the. yacbt. To this the libelant excepts. It appeared before the commissioner that the Lagonda was a pleasure boat, kept for the personal use of the owner,and without any intention to use her for profit; .that the yacht was in commission at the time of the collision; that she was detained .eight days,while repairing the damages caused by the collision. No evadence was introduced to show that the owner desired or sought a substitute for the yacht durin'g that period. Upon the evidence·before him, the cOmmissioner found that there was no market rate fQf the use of yachts of the size and character of the Lagonda, and accordingly .he allowed as damages for the detention of. the yacht eight days' interest .onthe amount she cost the Qwner. It cannot be doubted that delllurrage is recoverable for the detention of a yacht'caused by a fulact·. ' caseof'2'he WtJUer W. Pharo,! Low. 437 ,Judge LOWELL gave demurrage for a yacht kept, as this one was, for pleasure, and never let for hire. It was there said: "It is' no concern of the respondents what use the libelant chose to put his vessel to. He had the right to change his mind at any moment." So here, although it may be that the owner of this yacht at the time she was run into had no intention of chartering her, or employing her for profit, still he was at liberty to Death, sickness, loss of fortune, mere charter her at any whim, might have impelled him to put her to some profitable use. If it appears, therefore, that the yacht could have been chartered by her owner during the time of the detention in question, then any sum he could have realized by chartering her may be recovered by him from the wrong-doer W'ho caused her detention. '. The evidence taken by the commissioner was sufficient to show that 'this yacht could have been chartered for hire at the time she was run into. For instance, one witness called by the claimant, in answer to the "What is theniarket demand for yachts of this class in this SlJ,ys: "The demand is greater than the supply. There is no trouble about chartering." The testimony of other witnesses was to the Same ,effect. r I cannot doubt. upon the evidence if the owner of this yacht had concluded to charter her for hire, he could have done so, and I judge from the testimony that it would have been possible to charter her for eight days only. But that fact. is not necessary to a recovery. It was open to the owner to charter his yacht for the month or for the ,sufficientt(),entitle him to recover for her detention, if it fromher hire during the period of her detentIon. The ground upon which the commissioner seems to found his isapl3ence of prQof of an established rate at which
MERRITT V. ONA.
yachts were chartered, and evidence that the rate in every instance depends upon the personal inclination of the owner; and so he allowed the libelant eight days' interest on the cost of the yacht, and this, although it is manifest that the owner had no intention of realizing interest on his investment. But proof of a rate established by custom, or by repeated similar transactions, cannot be required in a case of this description. If it appears that the yacht could have been chartered for hire, the amount lost to her owner by being deprived of ability to charter her may be shown by the testimony of those engaged in chartering yachts, as to what, in their opinion, the owner could have obtained for her use for eight days in case she had been chattered. The testimony of the witness Manning seems to me to justify the conclusion that this yacht could have been chartered by her owner for a season of three months for the sum of$6,OOO, the owner furnishing the crew. Under such a charter, the vessel would have earned for her owner in eight days the sum of $552, and that sum libelant is, in my opinion, entitled to recover for her detention. The first exception on the part of the libelant is therefore allowed. All other exceptions are overruled.
et 01. 1
(DlBtrl.ct Court, E. D. PennB1/wania. November 1', 1890.)
A contract provided that merchants should have, to load a vessel, 20 (lays, "counting from the day of readiness until the day of dispatch. It Held that, as the contraot was not one by which a present interest was vested, the "day of dispatch It and" day of l'eadiness" were to 'be excluded.
In Admiralty. Libel by John Merritt, master of the bark John R. Pearson, against Nora Ona & Co., respondents, and S. & J. Welsh, garnishees. The case turned on the construction of the following clause in the charterparty: "Twenty running lay days, Sundays excepted, are to be allowed the said merchants for loading the vessel, counting from the da)' the vessel shall have been in readiness for cargo, the captain haVing given timely notice to that effect, until her day of dispatch." Ourti8 Tilton and John F. Lewi8, for libelant. "From a day" does not necessarily exclude the day. Lysle v. Williams, 15 Sergo & R. 137. The day a vessel is in readiness is always counted. Gronstadt v. Willhoff. 15 Fed. Rep. 271. "Lay days begin to run when the vessel has, arrived." .AylwQ.1'd v. Smith, 2 Low. 192; Hodgdon v. Rail1'oad Co., 46 Conn.. 277; The 6mfton, Olcott, 49; lrzo V. Perkins. 10 Fed. Rep. 779. Technical rules of construction are nut to be applied to a charter-party. Lowber v. Bangs, 2 Wall. 738.
by Mark Wilkes Collett, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar.