THE CH1USTOBAL COLON.
same question wasIDll.de inU. B. v. Wight, 38 lJIed.Rep.l06j U. S.v. DOTsey, 40 Fed. Rep. 752j and U. S. v. Whittier; 5 DilL 35,-and an opposite conclusion reached. A careful consideration of the sections in question satisfies me that those two sections cover every package which has come into the hands of a postal employe, "intended to be conveyed by mail;" and, if he deals unlawfully with it, he cannot be excused because it cannot be delivered to the person to whom it is addressed. I concur with cases in Dillon, 38 and 40 Fed. Rep., and dismisll the Illotion. See, also, U. B.v. F01I6, 1 Curt. 364.
THE CHRISTOBAL COLON. CAVALIER'll. THE CHRISTOBAL COLON.
(DlBtrlct Court, E. D. Lou1.8iana. December 26, 1890.)
llutITIME LIENS-DAMAGE FOR TORTS.
A person injured by the negligence of the master and owners, while employed in loading coai upon a foreign vessel sa a supply, has a lien upon the vessel for his damages.
In Admiralty. Percy Roberts and Alfred Goldthwaite, for libelant. Bayne, Denegre &: Bayne, for claimant.
BILLINGS, J. This cause is submitted on the exception that no cause of action is shown in the libel against the vessel. It is not denied that there would be admiralty jurisdiction in an action in personam. The question presented is whether the libelant, upon the alleged facts. has So lien upon the vessel. The facts alleged in the libel are that the Christobal Colon was a vessel engaged ·in foreign commerce, (the claim filed by the respondent shows that she is a foreign vessel, her owners residing in Barcelona, Spain;) that she was taking on coal for a voyage; that the libelant was employed to aid in loading the coal; that while so employed, through the negligence of the master and owners in not closing certain sections of the' hatchway, he fell through the same and was injured, and thereby has suffered damage in the amount of $10,000. The question then is whether a person injured by the negligence of the master and owners, while employed in loading coal supplied for a voyage upon a foreign steam vessel, for the damage which he has suffered has a lien upon the vessel. Those who supplied the coal have a lien. It is difficult to see why those who were employed in loading the coal should not also have a lien. In several cases in this court judgments have been given against the vessel for injuries suffered by employes through the negligence of the own· ers. On appeal to the circuit conrt the libelants also recovered. It is true that no question was made in these cases as to the lien·. ' See,2'M
FEDERAl, REPORTER, vol. 44.
FJ:Dplortll', 20 Fed. Rep. 1.85, and The Ma'fldalay.l In OJpe v. Valldte DryDock, 10 Fed. Rep. 144, this court gives a brief summary of the doctrine of maritime liens and their origin, and the measure or test as to their existence, as follows:
"The reason of this precise discrimination is that. with the exception of derelict and things found, and the ship, her cargo, and freight, there could be no basis in I'eason for a lien which must exist in order to support a libel in rem. The ship and all things which pertain to it. are, in the Iaw of admiralty, clothed with personality, so far as responsibility goes. Those who repair or loan upon her, or equip or man her, and those who deal with her, and those who are injured by her, and those who save her, look to her. The reaSOH of this is that she was often far distant from her home and owners, and commerce was vastly facilitated by the law thus endowing her with the attributes of a person. This is the origin of the doctrine of liens in the maritime law, and by this it is to be measured."
Applying this test, it is clear that it is in the interests of vessels as essential that they should, when in foreign ports, have the capacity to become indebted as things, for damage suffered by those who load a necessary supply as for the supply itself,and that it is essential in both cases, the reason being that without such a capacity it might be impossible for ships to get supplies or procure their being loaded where, as here, the, owners lived in remote foreign lands. In Ex parte Easton, 95 U. S. 68, after a most elaborate discussion of all the law upon the question whether wharfage carries a lien, the court held that it does, on the ground that,(page 68) "such a contract being one made exclusively for the benefit of the ship or vessel, a maritime lien arises." In The Max MorriB, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 29, (Morrig v. Curry,) a case in which Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD rendered the opinion of the supreme court at the present term, November 7, 1890, the case as stated by him is precisely this case,-" that of a libelant employed to load coal by a stevedore having a contract for loading coal, and who' fell from a bridge to the deck while on the vessel, in consequence of the negligence of those in charge of her." This case was tried in the district court, and an able opinion given by Judge BHowN in rendering judgment for libelant. 24 Fed. Rep. 860. On appeal to the circuit court a difference of opinion was certified to by the circuit judges as to the propriety of dividing the damages in such a case of tort, (other than collision,) and the case was very fully considered, and the decree against the vessel for damages affirmed. 28 Fed. Rep. 881. Neither in the district nor circuit nor supreme court was -any question made as to the lien, and the propriety of the consequent proceeding in rem.' I think that the authorities, so far as they bear upon the question, as well as the reason of the lien for supplies, viz., that the ship may. in the absence of foreign owners, upon its own credit, obtain supplies, and thus be able to continue her navigation without interruption or delay, lead to the conclusion that the libelant upon the case stated in the libel, and as is shown in the claim, has a lien upon the vessel, and that the suit in rem is properly brought. The exception is therefore overruled.
RANSTEAD 11. FAHEY.
RANSTEAD 'V. FAHEY.
(Distr£ct Oourt, D. Maryland. February 7, 1891.)
WIU.RVEs--OVERLAPPING VESSEL-AMOUNT OF WBARPAGE.
Held, as was decided in The Wm. H. Brinsfield, 39 Fed. Rep. 215, that where a vessel lying on a private dock overlapped on to the adJoining wharf, the owner of such adjoining wharf could recover a pro rata proportIOn of the customary charge for wharfage on the vessel, but that, when no part of the cargo wasloatled or unloaded over the adjoining wharf, the owner could not recover any part of the customary wharfage charged in respect of the cargo.
Held that, where the purchaser of the cargo was bound to furnish a wharf free of expense to the vessel, and ordered the vessel to discharge at his own wharf. where she necess8,rily overlapped on to the adjoining wharf, and notice was given him that wharfage would be charged, there was an implied contract to pay such amount of wharfage 8S was legally collectible, and that the owner coul!'! sue him in personam in admiralty. (Syllabus by the Court.)
In Admiralty. Robert H. Smith, for liLelant. Wm. H. Cowan, for respondent.
MORRIS, J. This libel for wharfage arises out of disputes between the same adjoining wharf-owners and with reference to the same adjoining wharves which were involved in the case of Ranstead v. The Wm. H. Brinsfield, decided in this court, and reported in 39 Fed. Rep. 215. The defendant, Fahey, is lhe proprietor of a wharf fronting 85 feet on a private dockopening into the Patapsco river, and the libelant, Ranstead, is the owner of the next adjoining wharf. Fahey is a dealer in coal, wood, and sand, and the vessels which discharge the cargoes purchased by him at his wharf are of such length that they overlap on to Ranstead's wharf. The libelant claims to recover in. this case not only a pro mta proportion of the customary wharfage charge for a large number of vessels loaded with wood, which by overlapping made use of a berth along-side a portion of his wharf, but also to recover a pro rata of the customary wharfage charge for the cargoes which were discharged from the vessels, although all the discharging was onto Fahey's wharf, and none onto the libelant's. It was held in the case of The Wm. H. Brin8field that vessels at Fahey's wharf, so overlapping, were liable to pay to Ranstead his pro rata proportion of the customary charge for the whole berth furnished the vessel, and that, the Wm. H. Brinsfield being a foreign vessel, it was held that there was a maritime lien. This case presents two other questions: First, whether in addition to the proportion of the customary charge for the vessel, which is rated by her nage, the adjoining wharf-owner is also entitled to a proportion of the customary rate of wharfage charged for discharging the cargo, which is rated by the quantity of cargo discharged, and which with respect to wood is reckoned as so much per cord. The second question is whether the defendant in this case, as the purchasers of the cargoes, by whose direction they were sent, to this wharf, is personally liable for either tho