of$180 per annum from the 30th of April, 1880, to.ruly 1,1890, inclusive, should be charged against the Kentucky Mills, but without interestuntil after June 30, The repairs, etc.,amoupting to $532.33, is to be allowed as a credit, but not the whole amount thereof;--::-only the balance due after applying the rent which accrued and was applied by the sinking fund commissioners, and which belonged to them. This was the between July 1,1878, and April 30, 1880. This balance, I understand the district attorney to consent should be credited. The payment by the Kentucky River Mills in September, 1884, to the commissioners of the sinking fund, was not a payment which will bind the plaintiffs, because at that time the rent was due the plaintiffs, by virtue of the acts of January and March, 1880, and the acceptance of them by the United States. The defendant had at that time actual notice of these acts, and the acceptance of them, and the fact that no previous claim or dAmand had been made by the United States did not authorize the niill company to pay the rent accruing after AprU30, 1880, to the state' of Kentucky, or the commissioners of the sinki1'lg fund. This fact, 'hOWever, withthesurroul1ding circumstances, prevents, I think, the plaintiffs recovering interest prior to April 30, 1888/ A judgment should be 'entered as indicated, and it is so ordered. '
et al. v.
(Circuit Court, N. D. F/,ortda. February 24, 1891.)
FEDERAL COURTS-J'URISDIOTIONAL AMOUNT,-PRESUMPTION.
In an injunction suit to restrain the of a judgment rendereil20 years before, it will not be presumed that the amount involved was not within the JU1'isdiction of the circuit court, where the declaration contained several counts which together claimed a greater amount, though the' judgment rendered was for less than the jurisdictional amount.
SERVIOE OJ!' PROOE.Ss-RET1JJlN.
Where there is personal service on defendant, a return in the name of a special deputy-marshal, instead of in the name, of the marshal, is a mere irregularity, to which objection cannot be raised by strangers to the judgment.
Where defendant was In possession of land at the time when jU:dgment,was ren'dered against him, and ,for two years after, the lien of such judgment'is superior to a tax-deed for such land executed before judgment, but not acknowledged and proved for record as required by law, as such deed, though spread bn the l'eCOfds, was not constructive notice to subsequent creditors or purchasers. ' Adve1'se possession for seven years, the statutory period in Florida, cannot defeat a judgment lien. " The holders of a are not estopped to enforce It bllcause of the land after it was entered have made, improvements, where sucb:' were bound to know that such judgment was unsatisfied, and that the tat-deed underwhioh t1;ley claim was not dUly recorded., " '
. , , ' · , " POSSESSION. , ' ,
EQUITY-LAOHES-DBLAY IN ENFOROING
A delay'ot' 20 years in proceeding to enforce a judgment against land' does not render ,the thereof guilty of laohes. where there were prior that were liens ,on the land for more than its value, some of which a p1,lrol;l1lser of the land had bouRbt,and was holding against " "" ,., '
HILL V. GORDON.
In Equity; Application for injunction. Hampden k Oocper k Cocper, for complainli.nts. E. P. Axtell, for defendants. J. The complainants in this cause seek, by bill in equitYl enjoin the sale of certain real estate levied upon by virtue of an exe· cution issued upon a judgment in favor of the defendants herein against vile John T. Matthews, said property being levied upon as the property ofsaid defendant in execution. The material allegations of the bill are follows: (1) That this court did not have jurisdiction over the subJect-matter, nor the person of the defendant in the suit at law. (2) That the judgment and execution were illegal and void. because the judgment did not set forth the names of the parties composing the firm of Gordon, Fellows & McMillan, plaintiffs in execution, and because the execution varies from the judgment, in that the names of the parties plaintiff are fully set out. (3) That the complainants claim the prop· erty in question under an independent title, and not through or under the defendant in execution. (4) That the complainants, and der whom they claim, have been in adverse possession of said property for more than seven years prior to the levy under said execution. -(5) That the defendants (plaintiffs in execution) are estopped from enforcing their judgment lien , because the complainants have USed and improved the property for many years, and because of the laches of defendants in failing to execute their judgment at an earlier date. The defendants having filed their answer, and the testimony having been taken, the <lase is before the court upon a final hearing. 1. It appears that the defendants herein brought their suit at common law in this court on the 10th day of August, 1869, against John T. Matthews, the defendant in' execution, by filing a prl£Cipe for summons ad respondendum, laying their damages at $1,000, the writ issued setting forth damages to that amount, and was serted upon the defendant. On the same day the plaintiffs in execution (defendants herein) filed their declaration in a88Umpsit, containing three counts, to-wit: (1) That de. fendant was indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $500 for goods sold and .delivered; (2) and in the sum of $500 upon an account stated; (3) and in the sum of $500, money had and received. The addendum clause of the declaration lays the damages at $1,000. The matter in dispute is t.he amount claimed by the plaintiff iDhis declaration, taken in Hon with the damages alleged. In Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How. 207, the court says: "The words ·matter in dispute' do not refer to disputes in the country, or -the intentions or expectations of tbe parties concerning tbem, but to tbe ·4;llaims presented on the record to the legal consideration of tbe court. 'What the plaintiff tbus. claims is ,.matter In dispute,' though the claim may be l:1capable of proof, or only in part well founded." In West v. Wooda, '18 Fed. Rep. 665, the court says: .. It is tbe settled doctrine that, so far as concerns coutts of the first in:stance, tbe declaration or pleadings of the vlaintitf, presenting his claim, is .t1}e sole test by which the.jurisdlction is to be decided, so far as the matterin·
dispute is concerned. The jurisdlctlon;''Ybim dependent upon the amount in dispute in case of appeal or writ ofep-or, is determined by a differentstatldard., There the test is the amount in dispute at the time the appeal is taken. Where the declaration shows tbe requisite amount is demanded, this court bas jurisdiction. "