(Oircuit douri D. Verinont. April 7, 1891.) ,
C\lllg. Oct. I, 1890"it provided that tb,e on imported .' llltcjWd be reduced from two dollars to one dollar pedl., !mt that, If any country ;,' 8lbMd'imposean export duty on logs for this country, the duty 'on lumber should ,T. fromCana.. dlaWe.asrem. Y.ed. .. The lumber In question was imp\lrted .September 27th, and deposited In bond. It .'WWu not'withdrawn until Octoberi18tll. '. Held, that under the provl!lon of section , I: M,tllat maY be withdrawn within three years from tlie date of the orlglnallmportatloll- npon the payment of the duties and charges to ",I 'which it may be lltlhjeot by law at the time of its withdrawal, it should have been ,,i omy qlla jlqijal' per thoul!lPtlJ.4- " '. ,
i ", :'''.
:return, of the ,)P,rior to OLOct9perl, the duty on PUle two dqlJarf!! per l\J. 22, St.&Ol,Schedule D. Hickok imported 'su(lh)u!11per SeptePJ-per 27th, at Burlington, and deposJbppd. ,By, that act the .dpty was fixed at ope: dollar per M., i( an on logs for this cOlln,tljy JUlllher iql:R9rtedfrom £!houJd remain duty on logs froUl Camtda was, to take effect .. withdrawn frOlUbQnd !'tnd entered for Gon,s9w,ptiQn .octobe.r 16th. .!. oftwodol1ars pel';M. was assessed upon, the hadnotbeell informed ffQD1, the. treasury dethe expoJ;t duty on logf! hlldbeen removed by Canada·. This asseSSInElllt. appears been affi,rweq by the general.appraisers because have been imported after October 13th. But the lumber,diq"not by secti9P" 54.of that t'ct. any "may be withdra}Vnfor ,consUD}pijon, withio;tllree years froD) ,the date of original paYIIIeJ,lt ,of the dutillfl and charges to whicb it may be subject at the time of sucb . This lumber was subject duty·Qfone dollar per ¥.oply at the timepf its withdrawal. importers seemtohll-ve had the right to withdraw payment of that ,Hartra,njt v. Oliver, 125 U. s. . 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 95S" Judgment that entrY he liquidated at one M.· : :
J. , 'f.,q.ilf matterhJla been heard upon,
UNITED STATES V. BOYD.
UNITED STATES V.BOYD
(Oirouit Oourt. W. D. Arka'lUtQ;s. October 28.1890.) L
WHAT CONSTITUTES MURDER.
The statutes of the United providing for the punishment of the crimes of murder and manslaughter. do not aefine murder, but do manslaugbter. We must tberefore RO to the common law to ascertain the definition of murder. Under the law of the United States there can be but two crimes growing out of the taking of human life-murder ormanslaughtOr. To constitutO murder the killing mUllt be done willfully, and with malice aforethought.
SAME-WILLFULLY. WITH :MALICE AFORETHOUGHT.
Aside from the acts of violence which produce a deadly result these acts must be . executed willfully, and with malice aforethought. The word "willful" and the phrase "malice aforethought" have a technical legal meaning which should always be clearly given by the coun to the jury. The word "willful, " as used in connection with a homicide, means a killing that is intentional, and not accidental An accident as recognized in law is somethUlg' that occurs after the exercise of the care required by the law to prevent its occurrence.
. The law fastens intent to every act tbat is not an accident. Every act that produces death that is outside of the definition cif ·the word "accident" is intentional in the law, whether it grows out of a specific design to take life, or of gross carelessness,' or it arises from a condition of mind. that prompts tlie possessor of that mind to be engaged in some wrongful or criminal act which from its nature, or the way it is executed, may reasonably or probably produce death. That the 116t producing death was intentiOlial may be 'found from the nature of the act done, and the way it is done, tbe character of the weapon used. the way it was used, IPld tbe result produced by such use. This is. upon the principle that every man by the law' is held to' intend the natural, reasonable, ordinary, and probable consequences of his act. . The peculiar distinguishing trait of mUrder. the grand criterion which distinguishes it from other homicides, is malice aforethought. ,Malice atorethought means an intention to do such bodily harm as may produce death in the absence of mitigating facts or justifying circumstances, or a formed design to do such mischief as may endanger life, or it is an intent of the mind and heart which prompts the doing of a wrongful act without just or excuse. or in the absence of that which jnstifies the act, or which reduces the grade of tbe crime. The. f'¥Jt tbat an act is willful, aud done. with malice aforetbougbt, is necessarily a circumstantial fact, for they areof the mind and heart. and there never can be presented to tbe jury direct or positive evidence of what was tbe intent of a man's heart at .the .time of doing an act. TlJese e1emllnts of murder must al· ways be establisbed by circumstantial.evidence.
TO COMMIT FELONY.
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If a nUJDber of persons enter into an agreement to commit a criminal act, and proceed to execute such conllpiracy, and .in the execution of. it a person is killed by one' 01 such conspirators, aU who have entered upon tbe commission of the criminal act, and coutinue in the execution of it up to the time of the killing, are guilty of the crime of murder, pro:vide\l tbe act agreed to be done is one whicb from its nature; 0'1' the way it is to be executed, may jeopardize, or is dangerous to. life, or homicidal· in cbaractercThis is' because aUperaons must, he held to intend the necessat;Yl/.nd natural consequences of thlilir acts. An agreement to commit a robberY'ie'l/.nagreement to'do such an act that if a person is killed in the execution of .it alj. w.l!o in the oonspir.aoy to rob; ,and are aiding in executing it at the time of the are guilty of murder, for the of robbery is homicidal in its acter; . '; , " . , .
Wl;leu, the llolawful act be done is not of a dangerous or homicidal character, .llfo' does. not. necessarily or probably require the use ofsu«h force oil as. may naturally or probably, produce death, and a pe'rsOo'is killlid