FEDERAL REPORTER I
with this language is to give ita strict and reasoriable interpretation, that· its meaning may be ascertained. When such interpretation is so given it, we must be convinced that it is sufficiently clear and explicit to evince the purpose of the legislature of the state to domesticate the defendant <lorporation by adoption; that its action, as affecting defendant company from its8tatits when its act was passed, is something more than a mere license to defendant to do business in the state. The legislature having the power to do this, it being conceded that defendant has filed its charter with the secretary of state, and the legislature by apt and appropriate words having shown an intent to make defendant a domestic corporation, we must conclude that to be its 8tatu8. This being so, the effect is to make it a citizen of Arkansas, and a resident of this judicial district, and, the plaintiff being a citizen of Missouri, the requisite citizenship to enable the plaintiff to maintain this suit in this jurisdiction exists. The position that the act of the legislature was in conflict with article 12, § 11, of the state constitution, is not, in my judgment, well taken. The demurrer to the juri$diction will therefore be overruled.
et al v.
Co. et al.
January Term, 1891.)
CCircuitCourt, S. D. lIfississippi, W. D.
Where several suits by the same firm against different insurance companies, to recover for a fire loss, are by agreement submitted to referees to fix the value of the property destroyed, and to render a final award, and the referees give judgment against the insurance companies for a certain amount and costs, it is proper to allow as costs an attorney's fee of $20 in each of the original cases, under the statute allowing such fees to be taxed in each case tried by a jury or submitted to referees.
At Law. Miller, Smith <to Hir8h, for plaintiffs. M. Marshall and Harry H. Hall, for insurance companies.
HILL, J. The questions presented for decision arise upon defendants' motion to retax the attorney's fees as part of the costs in these causes. The facts out ofwhich this controversy arises are as follows: The plaintiffs are merchants doing business in the city of Vicksburg, and were carrying a large and valuable stock of dry goodsintihe year 1889. To provide flgainst accident by fire, they applied for and obtained policies from said companies, 11 in number. On the 24th day of December,' 1889, all of tl1e stock of merchandise so insured was accidentally destroyed or damaged by fire without any fault on their part. Plaintiffs' made out and delivered proof of loss as required by the policies. Plaintiffs and defendants severally disagreed as to the amount of loss, andde-' fendants severally refused to pay the sums demanded. Whereupon
SWITZER V. HOME INS. CO.
plaintiffs brought suit against defendant companies severally, in this court, triable at the present term. On the first day of the term the parties entered into a written agreement, by which the question as to the value of the property destroyed and injured by fire was submitted to three referee", including the presiding judge of the court, to whom all questions of law and of the admissibility of testimony was alone referred, and whose decision was to be final. The referees heard a large number of witnesses and other testimony, with extended arguments of counsel on both sides, and made, in writing, an award, fixing the loss so sustained at $83,000; which it was agreed should be final, and should be distributed between the said defendant companies according to the amount of the respective policies, and judgment shoUld be rendered against them, with costs, respectively, which was done. The clerk, in taxing the costs, taxed £20 in each case as attorney's fees. The were all heard together, but defendants contend-First, that as the one tax should be allowed against all the defendants, to be taxed against them pro rata.; ,'!econd, that, if this is not so, yet only $10 should be taxed against each defendant, and then $20 should be prorateu between them. There has been some want of uniformity in the rulings of the different courts on the al),Jwance of attorney's fees, but, as there is no case to which I have been referred in which the facts are similar to those in this case, they need not be considered, under the view I take of this question, as presented in relation to the facts in this case. These suits were altogether separate and distinct until the agreement of reference was made, and which was necessary, in order to ascertain the amount of the judgment to be entered against each defendant company. The Revised Statutes of the United States allows an attorney tax fee of $20 in each action at law tried by a jury or submitted to referees, and $10 on each judgment had without a trial by a jury, or found by the award of referees. In this case the judgments, respectively, were had upon the award of thereferees, the submission to the referees, and their award, or a verdict by a jury, being necessary to ascertain the amount of the judgment to be entered in each case. The contention of defendants is that there was but one hearing and one award, and that consequently but one counsel fee should be taxed. I am of the opinion that the agreement was for the purpose of saying time and labor on the part of the parties, counsel, and court; also to save costs of witnesses and other costs, and not attorney's fees; and also to make the award final and conclusive. All the cases were before the referees, and the parties received the same benefit from the award that they would have done had the question as to the amount of the lo"s been considered separately. This is a different case from one in which there is no finding by the jury or referees, and then an after-agreement that other cases should be regulated by it. Without further comment, I am satisfied that an attorney's fee of should be taxed in each case, as it is no more than would have been properly taxed had each case been separately submitted. The motipn of defeJldants is overruled.
(Circuit Court, W. D. A1,7cansas.
February Term, 1891.)
Application for Habeas Corpus. Clayton, Brizzolara & Forrester, for petitioners. R. E. Jackson, for respondent.
PARKBm,J. The facts as set up in this complaint, and not denied, are that on the 11th day of November, 1890, Amanda Marqnandt was brought before Judge MURPHY, as police judge of the city of Ft. Smith, Ark., and fined in the sum of $5 for misdemeanor, and costs amounting to $1.50 were assessed against her; that at the time of her conviction no commitment6r process of law was issued for her, and that no formal sentence against her was entered of record at that time; that on the evening of November 11, 1890, before, as alleged in this complaint, process of commitment had been issued, Mr. Baker, mayor of the City,ordtlred