STATES t. AYRES.
we have covered all the points argued and submitted, as we understand them. In the brief of plaintiff we are asked to permit a supplemental bill to be filed. We find in the record a motion to file it. But we did not understand, at the hearing, that this motion was submitted. At all events, the proposed bill is not on file, and since we do not know its contents, we cannot determine upon the propriety of allowing it to be filed, as the matter now stands. V\T e do not therefore, pass upon that question but leave it, with leave to renew the motion upon filing as a part of the moving papers the proposed snpplemental and amended bill. Upon these views, the motion of plaintiffs for an order upon the state court, to trll,nsmit the record, and of the defendant to strike the transcript from the record, must be denied, and it is so ordered.
UNITED STATES v. AYRES.
(Dis1Jrict Court, D. South, Dakota. June, 1891.)
LAW, A direotion by the court in the t,en1,re for a grand jury, that the jury shall be summoned from a certain part of the district, as allowed by Rev. St. U. S. § 802, is not in conflict with Const. U. S. Amend. 6, which provides that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed."
At Law. Motion to quash indictment, on the ground that the grand jury finding and returning the same was not a legal grand jnry, for the reason that the venire issued by the court directed that the requisite number of jurors should be summoned from a named part of the district. W. B. Stl'!l'ling, Dist. Atty. Winsor & Kittridge, for defendant. Before SHIRAS and EDGERTON,JJ. SHIRAS, J. The motion to quash the indictment is based upon tHe claim thatitis not within the power of the court to cause a grand jury to be surrimoned from a certain portion or division of the district, and that, if such limitation is made in the venire, a jury summoned in accordance with its provisions would not bell, legal grand jury, and therelore indictments returned by such a body would not be valid. In support of the motion, reference is made to the sixth amendment to the constitution. of the United States, which provides that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by .an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been cotillnitted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,1' . Even if 'the construction of this ainendment is admissible that would hold it applicable to grand juries, it does not bear the meaning
to be given it, for its purpose wa:s to prevent the evil of a person :charged with a criu1iqaloffense bei,ng t.aken for trial. to SOUle dititant place. The burden. caused to litigants in being compelled to follow the king's progresses throughout England had become so great at an early day that itcalled for correction in Magnet Clw?'ta, by the provisions of which the court of common pleas was fixed at Westminster, and assizes were. required to be held in the different counties. Indeed it became a recogniied principle of the common law that one accused of crime was to a trial before a jury of the vicinage. When the constitution of the United States was adopted, the need of extending proper pro. tection in this particular was at Ollce perceived, and the sixth amendment was, with others, submitted to the states by the first congress assembling after its adoption, to-wit, in September, 1789. This same congress, in adopting the judiciary act, approved September 24, 1789, by section 29 thereof enacted: "That, in cases pnnishable with death, the trial shall be had in the county where the offense was committed, or, when that cannot be done without great inconvenience, twelve petit jurors, at least, shall be summoned from thence, and jurors in all cases to serve in the courts of the United States shall be designated by lot 01' otherwise in each stale, respectively, according to the mode of forming juries therein now practiced, *. * * and shall be returned, as there shall be occasion for them, from such parts of the district, from time to time, as the court shall direct, so as shall be most favorable to an impartial trial,and so as not to incul' an unnecessary expense, or unduly to burthen the citizens of any part of the district with such services." It cannot be for one moment supposed that in framing the act which was to form the foundation for the judicial system of the country congressintentionally incorporated therein provisions which were deemed to be so iniquitous and unjust to the citizens as to call for the adoption of an amendment to the constitution to protect the citizen therefrom in the future. It cannot be possible that in framii1g the sixth amendment congress intended thereby to secure a cOllstitutional enactment requiring juries to be summoned from an entire state or district, and at the same time, by the provisions of the judiciary act, declared that the courts should have the power to direct the juries to be summoned from parts only of the district. The constitutional provision was intended to fix the maximum limit with,in which the citizen charged with a criminal offense could be put upon his trial; but it is notto be construed to be a requirement to the eff'ectthat the jury must be surp.moned from the entire district, regardless extent, or of the burden and expense that would be thus caused toihe government and the jurors alike. This provision of statute, authorizing the court to direct what parts of the district a given jury, grand or petit, shall be summoned from, has remained a part of the law since its adoption in 1789, and now formssec,tiop. 802 of the Revised Statutes; and I have no doubt that it has l,lPQl1 inall,·or nearly all, the districts of' the Union. Its constitutiona.Iitycannot he;successfully impeached at this late day, and, .if constitutional, it. cannot .be questioned that its provisions fully sustain the action·of ,the court in directing that the graqd jury summoned for
IN RE KELLY.
the term at Sioux Falls, and which found the present indictment, should be drawn from the parts of the district named in the venire. The purposeof the court in directing the jury to be summoned from a part only of the district was to save unnecessary expense to the government, and to limit the burden upon thb citizens who should be selected for jury duty; and, in so doing, the court simply performed the duty which the statute places upon tl;w court, and which the court is required to perform. This question has been discussed in the cases of U. S. v. Dixon, 44 Fed. Rep. 401, and at' U. S. v. Wan Lee, Id. 707, and the conclusions reached are not in accord. The view taken by Judge HOFFMAN in the former case, ad verse to the conclusion we have reached, was dou btless largely affected by the form of the indictment in the case before him, in which it was recited that the indictment was found" by the grand jurors of the United States of America for the northern division of the district of Washington." In the case now under consideration the indictment properly recites that it was found by the grand jurors for the district of South Dakota. The legal name of the court is the" District Court in and for the District of South Dakota," and a grand jury, when summoned, although from a part only of the district, becomes, when impaneled and sworn, a grand jury of the district court in and for the district of South Dakota. No question therefore arises on the form of the indictment in this case in this particular; the motion to quash being based upon the fact that the venire directed the jurors to be summoned from a part only of the district. Upon this question we entertain no doubt that the action of the court was not only strictly legal, but that it was imperatively demanded of the court in fairly carrying out the true meaning of section 802 of the Revised Statutes. The motion to quash the indictment is therefore overruled.
J. I concurs.
(Circuit Court. D. Oregon.
DESIGNATION OF CIlIME IN COMMITMENT.
It is a sufficient designation in a commitment of the crime of inveigling a person, with the intent to cause him to be sent out of the state against his will, if it states that the party· has been held to answer for" the crime of enticing and inveigling Alfred Armstrong and William Kelly to leave the state of Oregon against their will;" for from this statement it must be implied that the inveiglement was "with the intent" that they should so leave the state. To inveigle another by false and fraudulent representations. or otherwise, with intent that such other should be thereby induced to leave the state of his apparent free will, is equivalent to causing him to be sent out of the state againstbis will, contrary to sectiOD 1746 of the Laws of OregoD, (Compilation 1887.)
INVEIGLEMENT WITH INTENT TO CAUSE ONE TO BE SENT OUT OF THE STATE.