KELLEY 11. CENTRAL RAILROAD OF IOWA..
KELLEY 11.' CENTRA.:L'·RAIDlIDAD OF'
D. JOOJa, C. D.' October,l118S.) ,
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-l\!lEASUnE OF DAMAGES·
.In an action forwrongftil death under the Iowa statute the recovery 1s to be measured by the amount which would prdbably have, been saved to decedent's estate if he had taking. iDto QOnsideratloD occupation, age, health, habits as to industry,'sobriety, aDd' economy, 'the lJ,mount his property, and the probablo duration of his life. I '
SAME-PAIN AND SUlI'I!'ERINll.
. No damages can be given for tile pain and suffering of the deceased, nor the wounded feelings or grief of his relatives. ! . ,
At ::Law. Action by Mary Kelley, administratrix of the estate of 'Nicholas Kelley, for damagesiJicausing the death of her intestate. The main question determined in this was as to the meas,ureM <lamages,and the report was limited to that part of the judge's charge to the jury which bears upon this subject. McClain's Code Iowa,§ 2525, provides that" aU causes of action shall survivei ind may be brought nOtwithstanding the death of the personentitledodiable to the same." 2526 provides, among other things, that "when a wrongful act :produceS death, the damages shall be disposed of as personal property belonging to the estate of the deoeased,6xcept that, if ,the deceased leaves:a,.husl>and, wife.:, child,:or parent, it shall, not be liable for the payment of debts. It a. H. Gutch, for plaintiff. Blair k Daly, for defendant.
MCCRARY, J., (orally charging jury.) If you find for the plaintifiyon will assess her daml1gcs, at such just" and reasortli.ble sum as will compensate the estate of the deceased for the ]oss occasioned by his death. In determining what this amount shall be, 'in case you come to the question of damages, you will consider the circumstances of the hll.bits as to llldustry all<t aeon:. -omr; the amount of his property, ifany, and the probable duration of apd these determine what Msannual income during life would probably have been which would have been .saved to his estate, and,. ,not expended, llu(1. a gross sum have produced a like income at illterestwill be a proper sum to be .allowed as damages. I do not say that you are obliged to find the amount by this process. You may exercise your discretion as the mode of arriving at the value of the life of the deceased to ,his estate, b'Utthat value, when ascertained and fixed by you, niust be the sum of your verdict. This mode is suggested as a convenient one, which you can :adopt if you ohoose. ':, In a of this 0haracter you are not to take into account the pain of the'deeeased, nor thewoundedfeeliJigs or grief of his J!elatives, in fixing the damages. What you are:to ascertain and by ,your verdict decide; ifyou CODle to the question, is what,accordiq.g:to
. FEDERAL REPORTER,
the evidence, would have been the probable pecuniary benefit to the estate of the deceased from the 'COt1tinuance of bislife. This you are not expected to determine with accuracy, as that would be impossible; but you are to fix, to your best judgment in the light of the evidence, what the amount would probably have been. Reasonable in sucb a case. No arbitrary probability is all tbat can be rule can be· laid down. The elements which enter into the question of .the value of a life to the estate of the dece.ased are so various that the matter' 'must be left, under proper instructions from thR court, to the so;un4 of the jury. The purpose of the statute under which this suit is brought is compensation. .It is not the loss of the deceased, but the loss of the estate, which is to be estimated. The purpose of thestatuter'is'to make good to the heil'S OJ; representatives oLthe person killed.thatwhich they ·have probably lOst by his death. 'To ascertain this itris· of course necessary to take into view all the facts and circ.umstaIiceswhich bear upon the question what his accumulations would probnb.ly. ,have. been. Among. thp.questions proper to be considered in light\bf the evidence are the following: Had the decea..<red, previoustG :his death, saved his earnings? Had he contributed to his motherl.s:support? Washe a sjJber, industrious man, or was he habitually Was he economical, or was he a spendthrift? From all the faets 'amdcircumstll,nces, if he had lived, what sum,' if any, would he probably have acculnulated in thl:l course of an ordinary life-time,to. be left to his heirs?
(CirouU. Court, D. Iowa. May, 1880.)
ReV'.'St.U;'l:!. SlSl28 providing that any-conveyance by a debtor in contemplation of Insolvency, and with Intent to prefer any creditor, shall be void If made . ,.within WQnths before the,filing of a petition ill bankruptcy, does not apply to . , a chattel mortgage made with such Intent before the four months, but, by agree;, ment, kept from record untUwithin that time.
. PI" CREDITOR-CHATTEL MORTGAGB·
' . The giving of a chattel mortgage with'intent to create " when itladewithl,n the four'months. ' .
a preference is Invalid
In Bankruptcy. On appeal from the decree of the district court. J. W. Shields, for plaintiff. Shira8"Van.Duzee Henderaon, for defendants.
MCCRARY, J. This is on appeal from the decree of the district court in a prooeeding in bankruptcy. The suit was brought by plaintiff, as. 8Bsigneeof one Jorgenson, a bankrupt, to set aside II. chattel mortgage executlldby the;bankrupt'to defendants, and to recover the value of theproperty conveyed thereby, upon the ground that the BRme was fraudu-