performance of the contracts, or for the diligence and good conduct, of the others. This question is therefore presented: Where the owners of several steam-boats are not in fact partners, and own and use no property in common, and there is no community of profits, but they allow their boats to be advertised as forming a line under a common name, and have a common agent, who advertises and solicits custom and transacts business for all, is every boat and owner jointly liable with the other boats and their owners for their contracts and torts? We are of opinion that this question should be answered in the negative. In support of' this view the following authorities are in point: St. Louw 1m. co.v. St. Louis, etc., R. (h., 104 U. S. 146; Irvin v. Railway (h., 92 Ill. 103; Briggs v. Vanderbilt, 19 Barb. 222; Bcmsteel v. Vanderbilt, 21 Barb. 26. There can be no well-founded contention in this case that the libelants, or those under whom they claim, were deceived, for the bills of lading issued by the Henry C. Yeager were made out in her own name, and amounted to notice to the shippers, and was a contract with them, that the Henry C. Yeager and her owners, the H. C. Y Transportation Company, were alone bound. We are therefore of opinion that there was no joint liability of' the respondents,or of any of them, and that the libel should be dismissed.
MAGEE". THE LYNDHURST.
(Df.mict Oourt. S. D. New York.
January U, 18112.)
L REPAt1Ul AWD SUPPLIBS-FoREIGN VESSBLS-LIENS-BOlU FroE PUBCBJ.8EBB-
Supplies being furnished to a vessel known to belong in anotber state; and tbe libel not·being filed until the last day of the year after the supplies were furnisbed; andtbe vessel having been in the mean time twice sold to bona fide purchasers for full value, without notil'e, from six to eight months after the supplies were ful'nisbed, though they made special efforts to learn of any existing liens; and the vendor becoming in the mean time insolvent; and the vessel being all the time amenable to process daily: B;eld that, as against the bona fide purchasers, the maritime lien was lost, through laches.
STATE LIENS-CoNSTRUOTION-NOT ApPLICABLE TO FOREIGN VESSELS-ADUIRnJrY LAW NOT CoNTROLLED BY STATE LEGISLATION.
The law of the state of New York allowing a lien for supplies furnished to any vessel upon filing a notice within 80 days intbe county clerk's ollice, the lien to continue "for one year," held, (1) following The Ohusan, 2 Story, 455. that the statute was not applicable to foreign vessels on which a maritime lien existed for the snme supplies; and, (2) if the statute was applicable at all to foreign vessels, that state legislation was incompetent to change the rules of decision in admiralty as respects the scope, effect, or priority of liens as regards other Henors or bona . fide purchasers. or to impart to such state liens any superior qualities or attributes over maritime liens; that botb are subject to the same limitationll, as respects laches; and on both grounds the libel was dismiSsed.
Libel for repairs.
.CUrp.®ter &: Mosher, for Alexander &: Ash. for claimant.
.,>Bj:tow:N,J. In July, 1890, the libelant furnished materials to the value of $70.44 for the repair of the steam-tug Lyndhurst, at Athens, Green county, within this state,on which $24.44 were paid on account, leaving a balance of $50, to recover which the abqve libel was filed. On the 18th of August following a, notice was filed in the county clerk's office of Green county, pursuant to la,w,elaiming a lien under the state statute. The owner of the tug residecl in New Jersey, and the tug beat Hoboken. The evidence shows that the libelant had notice facts when the materials furnished. In November, 1890, the. Qwper not being able to pay a mortgage which had become due upon the mortgagee, who was also. a resident of New Jersey, took possession ·of her. In December sl;lewas arrested under numerous claims which the mortgagee go;t released by filing bonds therefor; and I'll; of January, 1891, he sold her to F. and J. Russell, bona fide purchasers, without notice of the claim, for $6,500, her full value, which was paid in cash. On the 28th of March following she was sold 8p,d;.cpl1veyed by them bonafide.a,nd for a full consideration to the NewCompany, which i1,3 the claimant defen(lant,and of which the Messrs. Russell were then and are now managing officers. Before the sale to Messrs. Russell was consummated, searches and careful inquiries were made for any outstanding liens. None were heard of except those which had been bonded. The libelant's lien was not among those claims, and no notice of it was,disc<;Nered by the purchasers or their attorneys, nor was there anything to put them upon inquiry in Greene county. This libel was filed on July 18, 1891. The tug was engaged in the ordinary towing business of this port, and was amenable to process daily from the time when the repairs were made. The .lien in this case was a maritime lien. As against a bona fide purchaser who makes all reasonable efforts to discover incumbrances, and fails to find any, such a lien, after· a delay of nearly a year to take any steps to enforce it, where the vessel has been all the time within easy reach of process, and the vendor, meantime, as in this case, has become insolvent, is lost through laches. After such ample opportunity to enforce the lien, the loss should fall upon the lienor, and not on the bona vendee. The period of limitation of liens in admiralty, as against a bona fide purchaser, is "a reasonable opportunity to enforce them." The Ohusan, 2 Story, 455; The Utility, Bl. & H. 218; The Eliza Jane, 1 Spr. 152; The Lillie Mills, rd. 307; The Bristol. 11 Fed. Rep. 156. 163. In affirming the decision of this court in the ease last cited, W AI,LACE, J., says, (20 Fed. Rep. 800:) "Admiralty denies the privilege of enforcing a lien which has been suffered to lie dormant without excuse until the tights of innocent third persons would be prejudiced if it should be recognized." In the present case there was no good reason for the long delay.
The libelant, however, claims that his lien continues for a year under the express provisi'on of the state statute. Itis unreasonable, however, to suppose that the design of the state statute was to provide a lien for supplies in cases already covered by the maritime law; that is to say, to create twoindependent liens for the same thing. Judge STORY in the case of The Oh'usan, 2 Story, 455', referring to' a similar claim under the New York statute, held that the statute was not applicable to vessels.; and I have not been referred to any different decisiQIl. This should b,e followed until overruled by higher authority. Even if the Btatute could be held to refer to foreign vessels at all, I doubt whether it is competent for state legislation to change the maritime law, or the rules of, deCision to be applied by courts of admiralty in the administration of that law; further than by the mere establishment and llDnexing of a lien to marine or torts, which liel1scourtsof admiralty alone may recoghiz:e imd enforce. See the J. F. Warner, 22 Fed. Rep. 342, 345; lIolmea Railway Co. t 5 Fed. Rep. 75; The Garland, Id. 924; Brookman v. 43 N. Y. 554; Vose v. 00ckcroft,44 N. Y. 415; Poole v.Kermit, 59 N. Y: 554. In The Ohusan, supr(L, STORY, J., held that state legislation could not abolish a maritime lien. The maritime law deals largely with state and ihternatiomtl rights and relations: The constitution, in con: ferring ' ripon the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty maritime Causes, manifestly' designed to provide for a single harmonfousnationd sYBtem of maritime law. To aCCOm plish this it confined administration to the national tribunals alone. The Lottawdnna, 21 Wall: 558,575; In re Long Island, etc., TraMp. 00., 5 Fed. Rep. 599,619; TM Manhaisett, 18 Fed. 922., No such national system could exisUf its principles and rules of decision were subject to the legislation of 44 different states. Instead of one system, we should have 44 or more state systems; and no strictly maritime law at all, save what each state might choose to leave standing. Such a condition would be one of chaos in our international relations, and full of confusion and complexity as between the states. The inference is that the constitution designed to avoid precisely these difficulties. Nor is it reasonable to suppose that the constitution designed to permit state legislatures to prescribe the rules of law by which the federal courts should adjudge causeR in'rem, when it expressly withdrew from the state courts all cognizance of such causes. In the case of The Guiding Btar, 18 Fed. Rep. 263,268, Mr. Justice MA'ITHEWS says:
"In enforcing the statutory lien in maritime causes, admiralty courts do not adopt the statute itself, or the construction placed upon it by the courts of common law or of eqUity, "'han they apply it. Everything required by tbestatute as a condition on which the lien arises and vests must, of course, be regarded by courts of admiralty; for they can only act in enforcing a· lien when the statute has. according to its terms, conferred it; but beyondi'tbat the statute, as such, does not furnish the rule for governing the decision of the cause in .admiralty, as between conflicting claims and liens. The maritime law treats the lien, because conferred upon a maritime contract by the
FEDERAL REPORTER, voL 48.
Jltatute,ll-81t it had been conferred by itself, and consequently upon the same footing as 'all, maritime liens; the order of payment between them being detertniMbleupon its own principles."
in the case of The Madrid, 40 Fed. Rep. 677, 681, Mr. Justice LAMAR observes. that" this lien given by the local statute * * * is itself in the na.ture of a maritime lien;" that is, as the context shows, as respects and scope. See, also, The Wyoming, 35 Fed. Rep. 548, 550; The Menominie, 36 Fed. Rep. 197, 204; The N01ih Cambria, 40 Fed. Rep: 656. By anexceptionlll stated by Mr. Justice BRADLEY in The Lotfawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 580. to be anomalous, but founded upon colonial usage, the' authority of state legislation to establish a lien in rem for. the satisfaction of maritime contracts, or maritime torts, is recognized, (The J.1'. Warner, 22 Fed: Rep. 342,.345, and cases there and see Manchester v. MaBBaChmett8, 139 U., S: 240, 11 Sup, Ct. Rep. 559. But and anomalous is not to he extended beyond the mere allowance of alien, when (lonferred. The Sylvan Glen, 9 Fed. Repe 3&6. Amid .Bomewhatconflicting decisions, the weight of authority is, ltllink, to treat state liens, in respect to their 8tatus, scope, and effect, the same 8Sstrictly m/l.ritime liens, (The Madrid. BUpraj) and in effect, as Mr. Justice LAMAR observes, "in the nature of a maritime lien itself." While having, therefore,., similar .attributes and privileges,they must be to the sanle /¥l regards and the rights of lianoTS or bona fide as those maritime,liensw'hich they most resemble, to· any superior qualities or attributes sought to be imparted to them by state legislation. See cases. above On both the libel mnst be dismissed, with costa.
",... ·· j . . . . . ., . , ' .. "
THE ELEANOR et aZ.
17. THE THOMAS
(Distrtct CQ14r4D. South CwroZina. J8.Ilu1l1715i 1892.)
'A.choonar worth N5;OOO,with a.cargo worth15,OOO"bouod from New York to Geol'getown, S.C., off FryingcPan. shoals, discovered an apparently aban.,,:,doned v.essel, water,.19ggeq, \loud witQ.ber cargo of Washing about her deck. . · ' .The Bchoonllr lay by' het .all night,. and, thll next day her to Georgetown. ..·. 'bar. Finding that shecauld not crosB: the bar, the llJa.&terof the schooner procuredtwo.tugs wenton:tlle lumber vessel with a orew, and had her towed to ,Charleston. Neither life ,llor Property of salvora was in any danger. The vessel Was sold for her ca1'go;to.r .1,1I0Q. Hetd, that the barborexpen.ses, pUotage,barbor towagel wharfage, etc.; be charged to the ship, the layage . and expense of disoharglDgtbe cargo to'theoargo; and .that 8900 sbouldbe allowed " 'as salvage. , .""