within the record. It was the duty of the defendant, if he desired consideration ofthat patent" have this Inotion at that time. Instead of 80 doing, he appealed from the decision' of the court. After a delay of six mol1tbs,heconc1uded to'disrniss his and to resort Nor is it excusable)aches. It to this motion. That is not "ith of justice. be; allowed to parties to withhold evidence in their poss6ssion;aeenl:eti"Inaterial, to decl'ee, and therein failing; or becoming satisfied of the correctness of the decree, to seek a rehearing. upeney,idence in ,their ,possession" and w,hich should hav,e be(orethe appeal,aIldwithin a rea-. sonable time after its discovery. The validity of the complainants' patents is here for the first time adjudicated. It is therefore, that all evidence material to their validity should not have, been presented toaDdTcoD13idereq, ' We cannot, llowever. allow this application without establishing a bad practice. The motion is overruled.. ' "
((U'/'CUCt CoUn, B. D. Iowa. C; 'D. March 21, 1899.)
A bUl to quiet title in an Iowa court, and, after answeringtbe same, defendant flied a cross:l>iI1;showing title'in himself, and IIsking that the same be quieted plaintuf. "C<>mpla.inant dismissed the bill, but afterwaros ftled answer to the cross-bill t and also filed a Retitlon, as defendant to the cross-bill, to remove the cause to a Iec.eral court, whioh was denied by both the state and the federal cOUc\18·, , After a:hearing on the,cross-pill,and aJ;lswer thereto, the state court rendered, a dllcree tor defendant, which was affirmed by the state supreme court; after'tally deciding that theoross-bill and answer were sufficient to sustain the decreeund"r the,8tatl:!statUtes and pl'a,ctice. Beldt,tblltthe decree constituted a complete liar to a Buit in a federal oourt upon the same allegations contained in the original bIll, even though the cross-bUr and answer would be insut11cient under the rule.. pertaining to equity pleadings in the federal courts.
J;I'1'ATJIl CoUllTS-EQUITY l'J,BAI>INCJ.
. InEquity. Suit &00.. against Newton Lamb to quiet title lands. De<:ree dismissipg the bill, and quieting title to defendant on cross-bill. , . ,, . . Cole, ¥c Veyk Oheahire, for complainant. W. G. Harvison, for defendant.
WOOLBON, District Judge. The cotppJainant, Itussell & Co., an Ohio corporation, ,brings for the qancellationof ,a sheriff's deed for cerlp,in in Iowll., held by defendant, Lamb. The alleges various grounds for the relief prayed, including sale parcels, in violatiopof the statutes of illegally made of by the sheriff after the judgment, unIowa, and that, the sale der ",hose proceeded, had been fully satisfied. And complainant avers title in itself t9 said real estate through sheriff's deed, un-
der certain judgments set out. Defendant, Lalllb,fully answers the various specific grounds of attlick made by clllIl'plahl\lnt's .bill on his title, and pleads in bar, as. rtfBjltdicata,' the judgment and decree of the district court of Polk county, Iowa, in. three several actions. '. Defendant also files his cross.:bill herein, 'averring ownership; through sheriff's deed,of the real estate in controversy herein, and praying decree establishirig, confirming, and quieting this title in By agreement of counsel andconse1'lt of court, this cause ",as heard,and is now submitted on the plea alone. It is agreed by both parties that, if the plea is sustained, decree toust be entered for defendant; but, i'fthe plea is not sustained, the case will proceed to hearing upon the other issues involved. The pleadings herein, with the exhibits, are voluminous. I have deemed . it proper to examine fully the several pleas in bar presented by defendant. But, finding the one last pleaded in the answer and cross-bill to be decisive of the case, it becomes unnecessary to consider, in this decision, the two first pleaded. This plea of defendant avers that complainant, Russell & Co., instituted in the district court of Polk county, Iowa, an action in equity against defendant, Lamb, wherein are set out as the cause of action the identical grounds set out in the bill herein, and the same relief is prayed which is herein prayed; that defendant, Lamb, in said action filed his answer and cross-bill, claiming title in himself, and asking same be quieted; and that on the issues joined on said crossbill the cause was tried on its merits, and decree entered against complainant. Russell & Co., and establishing and quieting in defendant the title to said real estate. The law of reB judicata appears to be well settled. In Hahn v. Miller, 68 Iowa, 745, 28 N. W. Rep. 51, the supreme court of Iowa declare: "The general rule Is that the judgment of a competent court Is conclusive between the parties upon all questions directly involved in the issues, and necessarily determined by It. to This is 8Qbstantially the rule announced in various decisions of the supreme court of the United States. StockUm v. Ford, 18 How. 418; Packet Cb. v. Siclde8, 5 Wall. 580; lJromwell v. Sac Co., 94 U. S.851; Bryan v. Kennett, 113 U. S. 179,5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 407. In Doe v. Oaryenter, 18 How. 297, the language of the supreme court is as follows: "The general rule is that the judgments of courts of concurre.nt jurisdiction are inadmIssible in a subsequtlnt suit, unll'ss they are upon the same matter, and directly in point. When the same matter Is dirt'ctly in question, and the judgment in the forl'going suit is upon the point, it will then be, as a plea, a bar, or as evidence, conclusive between the parties. So a juogment is conclusive upon a matter legitimately Within the issue, and necessarily involved in the decision." I find from the evidence submitted that complainant, Russell & Co., instituted against defendant, Lamb, in the district court of Polk county, Iowa, in April, 1887, an action in equity; that the petition and amendments filed thereto contain averments, as grounds for relief, identical with the bill herein; that the same relief is therein prayed, and thattb-
prayer expressly asks the cancellation of same deed from the sheriff to defendant t Lamb, and with reference to ,the same real estate, as in bill herein prayed; that defendant t La01b t filed therein his answer t fully traversing said petition aa to the facts, av,erred other than those appearing of record; that said defendant therein set out the facts claimed by hiOl 'W constitute his title to said real estate t aver,red his ownership thereof in fee-simple, and by cross-bill prayed affirmative judgment estli.blishing and quieting his title, to the real estate in controversy therein t which is the real in controversy in the action now pending in this court; that complainant, Russell' & Co. ,filed its answer to. said crossbill,; th!it Russell & Co. dismissed its said action in said Polk district eourt,and thereupon, said court proceeded to try the issues joined on and answer, and rendered decree therein t which decree said. the following: ; "The court. after the introduction of, the proofs and listening to the arguments ()f the respectiv,e counsel, being pow fully advised in the premises. the allegatioJis in said cross-petitlon contained' are true, and that the equities of this cause are with the defendant, Lamb. It is therefore hereby ordered.ctmsidered, adjudged. and decreed that. as against the said Russell & said Newton Lamb is the absolute owner iniee of the premises in controversy, [describing them,] and that his title thereto is, paramount and superior to any interest the said Russell & Co. may have in the said premises; and. that the ,title to said premises be. and the same hereby is. established. quiete\l. and confirmed in the said Newton Lamb, as against the said Russell & CO.... etc. ' But counsel for complainant in argument contend that since in said action t in.Polkdistrict court, Russell & Co. dismissed its action t there remainednothing upon which said COUt;t could act and said decree be based·. This argumeo;t proceeds on the theory that defendaIj.t'!l (Lamb's) in said action feU with plaintiff's dismissl\I of itsactiQu, and that thereafter no basis remained for affirmative action and decree in the state court. But in that action. Russell & Co. filed an answer. An answer to what? ..' 1'<> did Russell, & its allegations should respond'f ''rna answer withdrawn, but remained, and still re-: mains t ' as it part of the pleadings in. that action. After Russell & Co. had dismissed theactioIi, so far as able to effect such dismissal, and filed an& Co. formally filed therein a petition for removal swer of the action to the federal court. In the opinion of Russell & Co., there remained at .that time sufficient action for a removal thereof to this court. The of this petition for removal are instructive as to the then considered statua of the pleadings in that action: "The petition of Russell & Co., of the state of Ohio, respectfully shows that your petitionerdsthe soledeiendant interested in this Buit as it now stands; they haVing dismissed his cause of action, and filed an answer to the cross.. And your petitioner further respectfully shows that bill of Newton the said Newton Lamb inhia cross-bill asks to quiet the title to certain lands in Polk county, Iowa, which lands are of the value of more tlJan $5.000. .And your petitioner further respectfUlly shows that· they claim to be the lands situated in Polk ,county, Iowa. and they have a deed owners that this cause hall Dot yet been tried, but that the same is pending
RUSSELL &: CO. 11. LAMB.
for trial; and that your petitioner desires to remOve this snit before the tdal ete. The petition for removal was denied by the state court. (It may be proper to here state that this court concurreq· in that denial, by remanding to the state court the same case which .was attempted to be brought here by the filing by Russell & Co. of certified transcript of the files and record from the state court.) And thus, after dismissal of tion by Russell & Co., there remained in said action only the cross-bill of Lamb, and answer of Russell & Co. The petition for removal, formal] ypresented to that court by Russell & Co., this as the state of the pleadings. Upon those pleadings trial was had, and decree passed against Russell & Co.jwho may not now be heard to say in this court that there was no cross-bill as a basis for such decree. It may also be instructive to examine a motion for continuance which appears in the files in theperiding action, and in which, under date of May 16, 1890, Russell:& Co. ask a continuance of this action until the decision of the appeal then pending in the supreme court of Iowa which said Russell & Co. had taken from decree of the Polk district court. After stating that the action in said Polk district court" was tried by the district court on defendant's answer and cross-bill," the application proceeds: "The complainant says that the defendant herein has pleaded adjudication in the state court, and that the questions involved in this case have· been passed uPo.u by the state court, who it is alleged have jurisdiction of the same, and that the question of the rights of the parties are now in the supreme court of Iowa on appeal, and that one of the questions involved in said appeal is wpether or not the answer or cross-bill, so called, of the defendant, in the distriet conrt, was such a cross-bill as could entitle him t.o proceed thereon, and that this case should not tried until the case (appeal)ln the court has been disposed of, and that this cau'se should stand over and wait the decision of the court." Turning to 48 N. W. Rep. 939, (RU88ell, v. Lamb,) I find that the IoWlt supreme court have formally and fully passed upon the questionwhethet said answer and cross-bill, under the statutes of Iowa, and under the practice of the courts of the state, was a sufficient cross-bill to sustain said decree, and sustained the same as sufficient, and affirmed the decree of t11e district court; and that this decision is abundantly supported by the geneialliI1e of decisions of said supreme court. This must end the controversy as to whether, in the Iowa courts, said answer and crossbill was a good and sufficient cross-bill. now urgethat thisanswerand cross-bill, so filed in said But Polk district court, would have bepn held insufficient if filed in this c!lurt in an action here pending; and that because of its insufficiency, when tested by the rule.. pertaining to equity pleadings in the federal courts; such anSwer and cross-bill, although it may have been good in the state court, will not be regarded by this court as sufficient to sustain the plea of reB judicata as to the judgment and decree in said state court rendered thereon. But the action was not pending here. The pleading was filed in the state cOlirt, and under the state statutes. Whether the pleading was
<:ourtto ,prQcQed,kl:trlaUhereoo, and,to graotrelief, tQUSt' be determined under the Iowa statutes. Of the subject-matter of the action the Pdlk had, jUrisdietion. And .all, the parties to filed in the action and COW!lse} taking .part.intliltt trial. The,colilrt had jurisdiQtion oethe parof the Iowa . statutes, as to the force and effect ties·. of pjeading& 'In action, is pecuU",rl,:the province of the Iowa courts. given tpthestatut(' by the highest court of the state (IThe should-be followed, qy thill' court." Moore8 v. Bank,: 104 U. S. 625. "The cODstruction given to a statuteof.a state by the highest tribunal of the statute, and is upon of 8uchstate is regard:ed (:purts of the UnitedStates."!4fingweU v. Warren,2 Black, 599. And when, as in this case, the decision is supported by the unbroken line of decillions of the state supreme court, the federal courts would ae:capt stateconstructiou, even though that might conflict with the defederal90urts had made in cases before it, wherein a like poipt of was involved. Bucher v. Railroad 125 i U. S. 5P91 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 974. Attdeven upon ma.tters of general ,law, such as the cons.truction of commercial law and like matters, not of state legislation, the federal courts hesitate to adopt :directly the with reference to actions brought before them from any 'a state, r construction would have, within that state, a differeut ,effect from that flowing from the construction adopted' by the state court. ,"Even in such cases, for the sake ofharmolly aud to avoid confusion, Ithe federal. courts wil11ean towar(ls anagreemellt of views with the state question seems to them balanced with doubt." Burgess v. court, if [Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 2 Snp. Ct. Rep. 10. I find that the plea in 1 bar is in point. It is w.ell taken and fully sustained by the evidence. Let decr.ee be ent.ered .herein diEitnissing complainant's bill, and, on defendaut's cross-bill, defendant's title to the real estate in ; and quieting tbe title in him.
NASRVA & L. R. CORP, t1. nOSToN & L. R,CoRP. d aL (ccrcuu Court, D. Ma88achiUetts., Haroh 16,1892.)
L JrLuTBu m es.N01IlRY-T,AIONG,AN ACCOt/NT-L,AW 01' THB «;JABD. When a question as to the date from which interest shalll'l1u has been decided by the court after fnll hearing, on a for final decree, such deoision Is binding on a speo'i$l xQallter to whom the cause is subsequently referred to take an account. and cannot be again raised by exceptions to 'his report.
SAMB-RBPOBT-EPFBQT.. OP PBIOB SUPRllilllE COURT DlliOISJON.
,tty, the D;I&ster's report in tespeot thereto is not subject to e:cception because it
When the supreme court has decided that. plaintiff Is entitled to a full accounting in i'espeOt to a given senesof transactions, upon definite principles of liabU-
awards a sum exceeding the amount named in the bill, and it 1s Imm.aterial whether the bill Is amended. ,
In Equity. Suit by the Nashua &; Lowell Railroad Corporation against the Boston .& Lowell Railroad Corporation and others for au ae-