31 La. Ann. 729, is authority. There the act showed no mortgage. but did show that. the purchase price was due which carried the vendor's privilege. Here the act shows, in connection with the original mortgage, a mortgage claimed to be peJ'empted, but an admittedlyexisting and assumed privilege. That such an assumption continues, as ,against the new purchaser and, upon the property sold, a vendor's privilege, which outranks that even of the second vendor. is abundantly settled by the decisions of our supreme court. and was not questioned in the argument. As'concernSMrs. Goode, the citizenship of herself and Calder is such that the court has jurisdiction over the ,cause and the-r.e8,-the mortgaged premises. This is true of Schwabacher, who is Missouri.. So far as the Home Insurance Company and the Crescent Insumnce Company are concerned, they are citizens of this state,:al}ddh,erefore,.of the sanJe state as Calder; bUt ,they are citizens of another state than that of Mrs; Goode. They could not have instituted the s\],\t in the United States circuit court, nor can they have original process. But, the court being in possession of a 'res, in a proceeding ovell Which it had,jurisdiction. they have properly intervened to asserttheir.lligpJs in the res. In this respect they are like people claiming in an admiralty court liens which spring from state statutes. They cannot bring the res into the court, but may assert their privileges after it brQ!1ght there by those having' admiralty Jiens; The injuncSO far as relates to Mrs. Goode, Schwabacher, and the tion marshal, and is allowed so far as relates to the independent executory Crescent Insurance Companies, leaving them process. of the Home full right to enforce whatever rights they have as interveners in this case.
(OCrcu1toourt, D. DeZaware. January 88, 1811a.)
.$. a contract dissolving a partnership alleged that, while plaIntUr was confined to his 'bouse by illness, his two copartners insisted upon a settlement, and as a basis therefo):"llresented a statement, in which the year's profits were es· timated, attliO 000.. 7'lie.actual profits werl') over $100,000; and plaintiff's bookkeeper testified' that before the settlenient be had made a statement, on request of one of tbedefendants, shoWing profits of about that amount. It appeared, howafter the settlement he made a statement showing profits of $60,ever, that 000, and ciefendants both testified that the statement showing $100,000 profits was made at a stilUater dater that no statement was made' before the settlement, and tbat the estimate Was bona fide. HeZa, that tbe charge of fraud was not made out.
BAME-FALSE' STATEMENTS NOT RELIED ON.
Plaintiff pQssessed ·an intimate knowledge of the firlXl's affairs, and testified tbat when the elltir;nate was presented he felt satisfied that it was much too low. but that heacoepted it because of his critical physical condition, and upon the advice even if the estimate was knowof his pbyslo18n to give up business. HeZd. ingly false, be was entitled to no relief, 8S he was not in fact deceived.
&. SAMB-MI800N;t>VCT OF PLAINTIFF.
Where a partner raised money on the firm paper to purchase a rival concern for his own benefit, enticed away valued employes, and, under tbreats of liquidation
by legal proceedlngs,sought to enforce a sale to himself, he has no equity whioh will support a bill to set aside a oontract.of dissolution. made at the instanoe of his copartners upon discovering his wrongful use of the ftrIX1's credit. '
Where a bill to set aside an alleged fraudulent contract states that the facts con· cerning the fraud were communicated to the plaintil! nearly three years prior thereto. and it appears that in the mean time, at intervalil of every three months, he had a.coepted payment on a series of notes given under the contract, the fa fatal to ,his right to equitable relief.
InEquity. Anthony Higgins and S. S. HoUingmorth, for complainant. George (}ray and Benjamin Nieldil, for defendants. ACHESON, .Circuit Judge. In the year 1869 the plaintiff, Charles Richardson, and the defendants, Ephraim T. Walton and Francis N. Buck, entered into copartnership in the business of manufacturinp; superphosphate at Wilmington, Del., under the firm Walton, Whann & Co. By their written agreement the term of the partnership was limited to five years, but, without any formal or express renewal or extension thereof, they continued in the business until July 13, 1885, when they executed articles of dissolution, whereby the plaintiff sold and agreed to convey to the detEmdants aU his interest in the partnership business and property (except in certain scheduled claims and accounts) for the sum or price of 8123,436.74, payable as follows: 823,436.74 in cash; $60,000 in the defendants' 12 proUlissory notes, all dated July 6, 1885, each for $5,000, and payable, with interest, the first in three months, and the others respectively at the end of each consecutive three months thereafter; and the balance or sUUlof $40,000 on July 6,1890, with interest, payabJe semi-annually, secured by a bond and mortgage upon real estate. Accordingly thEldefendants, about, the date oOhe articles of dissolution, paid and delivered to the plaintiff the hand-money and the securities, and he executed a conveyance to them. The and alsp the defendants paiq. all their promissory ,no.tes as they semi-annual interest installments upon the mortgage, down to the filing of the bill in this case, on October 12, 1888. , ' The substantial purpose of the bill is to put a valuation upon thEl firm assets beyond the accepted value in the settlement, and to compel the defendants to pay the, plaintiff a larger sum for his interest in the firm than the agreed price. The first and principal prayer is as follows:
"(1) That the said articles of dissolution be declared to have been procured by fraud and duress, and that the same be. reformed in accordance with the real value of the firm's assets at the time of said dissolution."
The bill charges in substance that in the month of June, 1885, while the plaintiff was ill, and confined to his house, unable personally to attend to business, and at a time when he was "threatened with financial ruin if he was unable to arrange for meeting" commercial paper on which hEl was indorser, the defendants pressed upon him the dissolution of the copartnership; that in the negotiations which followed between the tiff, acting through his counsel, w.e. Spruance. Esq., and the defend-