and the property was not liabM to execu'Hon and sale for the debts of the city. By the comprom.ise the city and the wharf company, and the confirmatory act bf the legislature, a sale of this property so'held'by the city fol'! public use to a private corporation Was authorized and confirmed. The legislature, by the same act, 'directed thattheproceeds oft.besllle should be held by the city on the same trust, substantially, as the property sold, namely, for the use of the present and future inhabitants of the city of Galveston, and should not beliable for its debts. In my judgment, the city holds as a trustee, and for that reason the trust property cannot be sold for its debts. The legislature has, in effect, said that it should not be sold for the city's debts, and this is another reason why it cannot be sold on execution against the city. The same reasoning applies to the dividends declared upon the stock. They are not the property of the city, nor liable for its debts. ,The city. isa trustee of the dividends, as of the stock itself. It ,would ,be a futile thing for the legislature to say that the stock should not ,be :}iablefor the debts of the city, if aHits fruits and profits could be seized as'they accrued, and subjected to the payment of the city's debts. It seems, therefore, to be the dlity of the court to refuse any decree or judgJ;Deot directing the sale oOhis or a of its dividends; ami it is so ordered. , :· '
hy conseht CJt the legislature,
(Otf'cuUCO'Urt of Appeal8, Ninth Circuit. April 18, 1892.)
This act bl!oving been passed' I[lubject to the ratification of a treaty then Panding , between 'the -United States and the emperor of China, which was never ratified, 18 -not infoI'ce, except'section 13, thereof. . ..: "
APPEAL TO THE DISTRIC'l: JUDGE.
. ,:I'1Ie phrase "distriptjudge of the district, in section 18 of act of September 18,1888, construed, and held as the equivalent of the court of the district, " and a writ of error will lie from thIs court to the judgment thereof.' '
A Cliinesemerchant domiciled In the United States, on his return thereto from a tempoI'ary absence therefrom, Is.not required to produClilthe certificate provided for in the act Of .July 5, 1884, in the case of persons1lrst comUii' into the U,D1ted States. ' . 48 Fed. Rep. 825, am.rmed. ' (Synabus' by the Oourt.)
Error to the District Court of Washington. At Law. Patrick H. Winston, for plaintiff in error. Charles L. Weller, (Wm. H. White, of counsel,) for defendant in 'Before,'GILBERT, Circuit Judge, and DEADY and HAWLEY, District Judges.' . DEADY, District Jp:dge. On October 7, 1891, Gee Lee,aliaa Lee Hoy, was arrested and brought before a commissioner of the circuit court ()f
FEDERA,L REPOBTER, vol.
the United States, under section lSof the act of September 13, 1888, (25 St. p. 479,) and charged with unlawfully entering the United States. · On the hearing the commissioner found the accused to be a native of China, who had entered the United States from the port of Victoria without a certificate showing that he was a person entitled to enter the United States, and ordered him deported ·. Gee Lee appealed from the order of the commissioner to the district judge. On March.S, 1892, the judge filed the following findings of fact: ",The defendant. Gee.Lee. alias Lee Hoy. is a native of China; that he came to the Upited States.from China in ,the year 1880. and has made his home in this country ever since. ,For the first e\ght years after his arrival he belonged to the Jaboringclasses, and was as a cook. . .. At the end of eight years he cease4 topursne the avocation of a cook, chased a stock of merchandise. and for npwards of three years last past he has been a merchant at Port in this state. He has frequently "isited relatives at Victoria, B.C., but has never been out of the United States since hIs 11rst .arrivaJ.be1!6 in lS80, except for the purpose of making said visits, be alwaystraveJed by the regular passenger steamboats. and always landed, .on return,ng," ",ith the knowll'ldge and consent of the col1ector of customs,at Port 'foWhsedd:" There is no·que8ti'on llS to his identity. He is as well known at Port Angeles, the community in which he lives, as any other merchant there. In the month of September, 1891, he went to Victoria, B. C., to visit a sick relative. On the 1st day of October, 1891, he returned from Victoria as a passenger on the regUlar passenger steamer Geo. E. Starr, and was permitted to land by the collector of customs, partly upon certificates of his identity and occupation as.a;merchant,Hvlng at Port Angeles, given him by weHknown citizens of that place, but chiefly upon his own personal recognition of the man, ll>nd knOWledge as to his residence and business at Port Angeles, as aforesaid. After the landing he was allowed to go to Port Angeles, and was not molested for aperiod of tw.oweeks, when he was arrested upon the o:neing aChineiSe,person186t lawfully entitled to lJe or remain in the United States. That at the time he entered ,the United States from the foreign country of British to wit, October I, 1891, he had no certifi'cate, 8S providea by the sixth section of the restriction act, as amended by .the act QfJ uly a, ,1884. "Theconrt concluded from these premises-' (1) That thedefendant is not jn, foot oneof the class of persons notlawfully entitled to remain in the United Sti\tes; I understand th$t htl was lawfully entitled to 80 remain.] ...... "'(2) '.rMt,tlavln'g 'been permitted by a collector of customs to land, after a temporary absence from the United States. withollt fraud on his part, the defendant cannot be lawfully sent out of the United Atates because of a mere error in a collector in not exacting legal evidence of the facts as to his identity and the nature of his business. "In ,my opinion, the law does not authorize, but forbids, the execution of the warrant issued by the commissioner in this case. It is the judgment of this court, therefqre, that the order and ,of the commissioner be reversed.,'" )pthe opinicmofthe court the findings of fact and conclusions oflaw the court appears to have assumed that section 12 of the act of September 13,1888, is in force, and that consequently the action of the collector in adrnitting Gee Lee was final, and not reviewable by the court., i
UNITED S'l'ATES V. GEE LEJD.
But we are of opinion that such section never went into force. It occurs in a statute entitled "An act to prohibit the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States," the taking effect of which so far is made to depend upon the ratification of a treaty then pending between the United States and the emperor of China, which ratification had never . taken place. Particular provisions of'the act may be in force, as not being the purview thereof, as declared in section 1, as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any Chinese person, whether a subject of China or any other power, to enter the United States except as hereinafter provided." Such is section 13 of the act, which provides for the arrest and deporta.tion of "any Chinese person * * * found unlawfully in the United States," and under which this proceeding was instituted. It follows that section 12 oftha statute, which is wholly taken up with the future landing or excluding of Chinese passengers by the collector, is not in force, and his act in admitting or refusing Gee Lee to enter the United States is not final; but the truth of the matter may be inquired into in any appropriate judicial proceeding, of which habeas corpus and arrest for being unlawfully in the United States are two. Section 13 of the act of 1888 contains this clause: "But any such a commissioner of a United States court, Chinese person, convicted may, within ten days from such conviction, appeal to the judge of the district court for the district." No express provision is Qlade for ail appeal from the judgment of the districtjudge in such a case; Section 6 of the act of 1891, creating this court, provides that it" shall exercise appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal or by writ of error final decision in the district court * * * in all cases other than those provided for in the preceding section" of the act. If, under the circumstances, the words "the judge of the district court for the district "can be held equivalent to the words" the district court for the district," a writ of error will lie from this court to review the judgment. We are of the opinion that the statute should be so read. The learned judge of the district court, from the allowance by him of the writ of error, evidently so thought. ;Every argument of convenience and utility favors this conclu!lion. Uniformity of decision in a very important matter will thus be secured. "Judge of the district court" and "district court" are not, strictly speaking, convertible terms. But they are so in a popUlar sense, and it is safe to aSSllme that congress, in the use of the former phrase, in this connection, intended to give the party an appeal to the district court of the . Since the decision in the court below, the Ca8e of Lau Ow Bew, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 517, has been decided by the supreme court, in which it is held that the certificate required by section 6 of the act of May 6, 1882, as am.ended by the act of July 5, 1884, does riot apply toChinese domiciled in the United States, who, having left the country v.50F.no.3-18
business homeil,' and to "Chil)ese resjqiQg:inChina, or some. other foreigncountry,and /l.bQutto come for .the first; into the United· travel or.bp.ainc&s, or take \lp ,thei,!( .' " , . " r., The claim that a Chinese merchant, long domiciled in, the United to,r&.@Wr the same. after a temporary absence, should be reqlljred to prodllce <;crtificate ofth& Chinese go.vernment, concerning.factso£;whichsuch government in the. nature of things, be expected tQ havellOY ,knowledge, ·iIl fitly characterized by the ohief j usticelJ,8 f'upreasp,nable anq. Itbsurd," .The in LauQw Dew g()verns this case. The. decision of the district court, though ,givepon a :ground in which we do not concur, is corrwli, Jl.nd must beaffirJ.Ued; Itnd itjs'so Q:\'dered.
it: Qn,thl:irl ra-
OF CITY OF: BALTIMORE. April 27, 1899.)
LPA'l'EN1'\; :POx 'i:NVENTIONS:"'UNCERTAIN'l'i' 'oW CLAIM-,WATER' HBA.TB1t POR FlaB GINES. , .
9. Snrn-'Co1.t8INATION. Construing the tank as part of the heating apparatus, the claim cannot be said to ,only, an of parts, since is a joint andoo.:6peratlnR' aC,taon between the heater and the boller, and the action of each influences the action of the otber. '
Llltters No. 81,1811, 8, J868, to William ,A. Brickill, cover a heater oonnected Witli"tbe boirer of a steam fire' engine' by two detachable pipes, one carrying the cold water to the beatet: andtbe other returning it, heated, to the boiler, thus "maintai,ning.a free. ciroulation ,between.the boiler and beater," and'keeping the wate.r in 'tbe' boiler always hot, so as to expedite tbe generation of ,stea,m on a 1i,re calL Pipes oontrolled by 0Ocksconnecttbe heater with a water lIoJ;lq the engine is away is estaplished and main·taliiedbetween the heater altd the tank, "tl1e obJect being to preserve the coil or heater." The claim is "comoina1-ion"witha steam fire engine, ofa heating Sl,l;bl:!tantially a,s described, for the purposes fully setforth., .. Heta.'tbat it sufficiently appears that the tank is e. rart of the heater, 'and not .a of the oolllpination, andibe patent lSnot void on ita face for'un·.. -J '.
Law:, by William' and others against the mayor and city council"of Baltimore for damages for infringement of letters pat_ent No. 81,132,)ssued tQ plaintift' AtJ,gust 8, 1868, fOr an improvement in'.'feed-watel:' fOl:: ,Heard on" demurrer to the declaration. " The descr;ibe, substantially, a water heater connected with the boiler of a steam fire engine by two detachable pipes, one car.rying·the aJ;lcUhe other retutningit heated to the boHer; thqs "maintnJ.ni,Jjlg afree circulation betweentbe boiler and heater," nnd keepiqg 'Y!1ter in the ,boiler always hot'so as to, expedite the afire call. ',Pipes co,ntrolled .by.cocks conthe engine is8iway, the