THE J4\MES H' SRRIGLEY:.;
,LAWSON C/o THE ,JAMES H.,'SHRIGLEYo
(DfstrWt; Oour.t, N.' V.New" Yor1G.: " AprlI22i 1899.)
' O n tlxe:eVidence, held, 'th!'t the libelant, who W'aHhe wlfebf tbe cook 011 ','steam ba.Ege."'ad\:leenengagedby'tbe m.ter of ,the barge. second cook, and w. ento reco,ver wages for hel' term ohervice.
COOK-WIPl! OF FmSTCOOK.",
1.n Ad,n:iiraftY,.Spit, to;
wages. ·' for respondents.
CoXJj:, Distript Jv,dge. "I.quisaA. Lawson brings this libel against the wages assaCQnd cook, at the steam ,;barge :James ,H. Shrigley rate: month from ¥ay 3,1891, to August18, 1891, in all $54, qnqer made)Yith the: master of the barge. That the libellU!t. tl).e Quties of!lecond cookfaithfuUy and well and that her ,reasonably the sum demanded is not disputed. The that no agreement wllsmade with the libelant, but that an defense agreementB;as made with her llUsband bY'whichheagl'eed to do the cooking for tIle barge, wi,th hiE;! wife, as ,assistant, fQI the sum of $60 a month. 1 The only question .oimct is whether the contract was ,wade as alleged the libel. The libelant and her QUEjpand both swear in unqualified terpla,that the agreed to pay Iter $11;> per month. This agreement iadenied by, the Wl\ster. Thr4:\e witnesses were called Jorthe wlwtestified, ofthelibelant, and her ,hlUlband their The shipping articles of the barge weTe introduced in which, after the name of the libelant's husband, appear tpe worp.s "cook and, wife" and On the three payrolls signed by her ,appear,notinbis pandwriting, however, the words "L. wife, cooks.", The libelantdiil not draw her wages when her husband drew his and npthing was said on the subject by either of t\1em were leav.e the barge. facts, certainly, that the contract was as tend, ,'i'Q,r:t;<:>porate' the testip::10XlY of stated by him. In an ordinary action between llltln and -man the presumptions arising from facts like these would be persuasive and, perhaps, controlling, but in a case of mariners' wages, and that, too, where the libelant is a woman, a somewhat different rule obtains. It should be remembered that there are few claims so highly favored and studiously protected as the claims of mariners for their wages. They are regarded as the wards of the court and every shield and safeguard which the law can give is thrown around them, both by legislative enactment and judicial decision. Their usefulness and importance on the one hand and their proverbial improvidence and recklessness on the other have made them the objects of solicitude in all commercial nations. They
are recognized as a thoughtless, imprudent, rash and impulsive class, ignorant of their rights and easily imposed upon by sharp and designing men. Admiralty courts which do not 10llow the harsh and unyielding rules of the common but sit:rather as courts of equity, are vigilant to protect them and hold as void and as of no effect all contracts and stipulations made by them,which are in derogation or relinquishment of any of their general rights and privileges. It is the aim of the law to sllield them,frpm;'oppressionand take care of their rights and interestsby protecting them, not only against the master, but also against themselves. In the light of these well-known rules it is thought that the libelant is entitled to recover, and for the following reasons: 1. The preponderance of direct testimony is with' her on the main issue. The three witnesses to the principal transaction were interested, but the libelant and her husbandligree as to 'the terms of the contract. They are contradicted by the master alone. . 2. The contract as testified to by the libelant \Vas !inequitable and natural one. The shipping articles show that ouforrner trips the cook on this barge received as high as $75 per month and never less than $60, and that the second Cook, on one trip, received $25 per month. It is conceded by the respondents that the Bum of $60 a lbonth for both firSt and second cook was low wages. As this was the lowest sum theretofore paid to the cook alone it is hardly probable that the libelant's services wereto'becou,ntedas nothing, especiaBy when it is conceded that she was a competent cook and discharged her duties faithfully. 3. Thecharactet Of two of the Witnesses called to contradict the libelant and' 'herhusbanddbes not comlilend them to the favor of the court. Their testifuooy was evidently dictated by a hostile animus. ' 4.,'rhe1 mariner. She was part of the 1ibelimt was, in' <Jrew. ;It Was the duty of the master to have the agreement, even if it were as stated by him, reduced to writing and signed by her. Rev. St. §§ 4520,452.01: If he bad cibtllinM'Rcontractas advantageous as the one he says was made, a contract clearly understood by all parties, is it not probable that he would sO signed? His faHu're to 9.0 so, if it has no"other effect, at least,tends to strengthen the position of the libelant tha:jthecontract was asstll.t'ed'bY her. .' ,It is thought that the action can be maintained by the libelant in its present form and that she is entitled 'to a decree for the sum demanded in the libel with costs. '
TAYLOR 11. FRANKLIN SAV. BA.NL
TAYLOR et' al. 11. FRANKLIN SAV. BANL
(Circuit Court, N. D. IUi7lO'll. AUgUst 10, 189L)
'l'aV8'l'l-m.ul'l' BBNBFICIA.Bms-FoRBOLOSUBE-BILL OJ' REVIEw.
Landwu conveyed to a trustee by deed of trust, which provided that no lien, Incumbrance,' or oharge should be created. The record of such trust deed having been destroyed by fire, II decree was entered in II proceeding under the burnt reoord act. establishing the trust deed without the provision aforesaid, but witb II olause authorizing the trustee to create lienl. After entry of this decree the trusiee gave a mortgage and allowed II lDechanlo's lien to be created. under which the land was IOld. BOlDe of the C68tuiB qui trustent who were infants when the decrees of foreolosure and the decree restoring the trust deed were rendered, but Who had appeared therein by guardian ad litem, filed a bill to review the foreclosure suits. Held that., as to them, the mortgages and the mechanic's lien were invalid since the record of the trust deed, though destroyed, gave the mortgagee and lieD holder DOtice of the inability of the trustee to incumber the propel1.7.
In Equity. R. B. Kenda,U and Mr. Pope, for complainants. Swift, ChmpbeU &: J&YIe8, for Franklin Sav. Bank.
BLODGETT, District Judge. This is a bill to review, reverse, and eat aside a decree of foreclosure, entered in this court on the 30th of April, 1880, under which defendant claims title to lots, 1,4, and 5 of the subdivision of lot 4, in block 16, in Bushnell's addition to the city of ChicagOj and also to set aside a sale made July 15, 1881, under a decree for a mechanic's lien, in favor of Gilsdorf and others, entered in the superior court of Cook county July 20, 1874. The original bill of review was filed by Robert C., Katharine, and Margaret Taylor, children of Frank C. and Louisa Taylor. And the cross bill was filed by Frank C. Taylor, Jr., and Maria Louisa Taylor, Jr., Josephine S. Taylor, and Alexander Taylor, infants, and older children of Frank C. and Louisa Taylor, Sr. The facts, as they appear from the proof, and which are not disputed,are that on the 13th of June, 1871, Maria Louisa Tay1or, being seised in fee of all of lot 4, in block 16, Bushnell's addition to Chicago, joined with her husband, FrankC. Taylor, in the execution of a deed of said premises to Ira Scott, to hold upon certain trusts inthe deed set forth, which trusts, so far as it is necessary to state them for the purposes of this case, were that the property was to be held for the benefit of Mrs. Taylor and the children of the marriage between Frank C. Taylor, her husband, and herself, except that, in the event of the dea.th of Mrs. Taylor, and of the children, before the youngest child had reached the age of 21 years, Mr. 'l'aylor or his heirs should become entitled to the remainder of the estate. The deed of trust contained an express provision "that no lien, incumbrance, or charge shall be created on said premises," and, although there was a provision in the trust deed that the trustee might sell some portion of the premises for the purpose of improving that which was unsold, yet that provision was so guarded as to prohibit the creation of any lien, incumbrance, or charge upon the unsold portion of said premises. At the time the deed was I:Qade there v.oOF.no.4-19