the awlitation.for insurance is made. The contentibrior; the plaititiff in el'l'o.ris:thatthe enactinent of 'the act of 1887, regulating the mode of'doingbusi'dess on theasses!ltnent plan; and pa.'rticularly the last clause ,of section: 10 of the act, to wit, 11 that contained sho:!l subject any corporation doing business under this Itct to any other provisions or requirements of the general insurance laws of this state, exeept as distinctly herein set forth," takes the defendant company out from under the binding effect ofl!section 5982; It is, however, noi made to appearin l any way that the defendant company has ever complied with the provisions of the act of 1887, ·or that it isdqingbnsiness in Missouri under the liabilities imposed by that act, and therefore it does not appear that it is';entitled to the benefits of the last clause of section 10, which areexpresaly limited to "corporations doing business under this, act, "-that is, the act of 1887. The purpose of the act' is made still more clear in this regard by section 13 of the act, whichdein this act shall be so construed as to impair or in any manner interfere with any of the rights or privileges of any corporation, association, or organization doing life or casualty insurance business in this state under the laws as they now exist." In our judgment, therefore, the provisions of the actM 1887 cannot be made applicable to this case. Thecontl'act of insurance upon the:1ife of John B. Berry was made long before the enactment of that statute. It does not appear that £he company has ever complied with, the requirements of that act, or half ever transacted business under its provisions, and it cannot be made the criterion for determining the rights of the parties to this action. In ourjudgment, the court below'ruled correctly in holding that the policy sued on was a contmct made in Missouri, and, as such, that the provisions of section 5982 are applicable thereto; and therefore the judgment' is affirmed, at costs of plaintiff in .error.
RUSSELL fl. BRADLEY.
(Cwouit Oourt, B. D. NtIfD Yorl:. MaY 28, 1892.)
MALIOfOtrll PROSECUTION-PUNITORY DAMAGES"';P.ROVINCB OJ' JURY.
In I'D action for maHci(lUB prosecution,the amount of punitory damages Is pecul. iarly a matter for the jury; and a verdict tor the Bum of $12,500 will not be set aside 011 remitted in part, in the absence of, prejudice, perversensss, or corruption, it was larger than it should have \leen. merely because the judge
At Law. Action by Mary E. Russell against James A. Bradley for malicious prosecution. There was a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant moved for a new trial on the ground of excessive damages. Motion qenied. Thaddeus B. Wakeman, for plaintiff. Chauncey Shaffer, for defendant.
;Tuqge.. ,,ThiflJs a. motion by the defendant for a new.. theabove.,entit:led;lWtion, for malicious prosecution, upon the gropnds that the vl;l,:diQtQf 812,500 for the plaintiff was contrary to the!'lyjd,enpe and c<mtl'$ry, to law; that the damages. were excessive; and exceptiqnst9 the. :rulingsof the· court upon objection to were wellt4kllu. A new trial cannot be granted upon the. grQtln4 .that a ver<iict ·fo,r the plaintiff was· contrary to the evidence. of the testirpony Upon the question whether the defendant The instigated tqe prosecutiolh,/londupon the facts which were in dispute qfpr.obl}l;>le :cause, was such as. -required that the pe .s1,lbmitW4 to the .jury. They were justified by the teatimopyipfinding for .the .plaintiff, although there was no positive and ,testimony that. 00 .personally caused the second prosecution or direc.ted that it should be commenced. I do not unto ,meant by.thea.verment that the verdict was contrary l/io:W. fpr,;nQ exception. was, taken to the instructions in regard to to the law.\'f.lli(}h. were given. by the court·. Nothing need be said upon (l:X.ceptions to.:the,admission of· testimony. So far as the' has been the defendant's brief to these exceptions, not important upon a motion for a they are .pf ne,w and troublesome point is that the ,exoesshe. They were mainly punitory, and were'pai3edl the alleged actual malice of the defendant; andit is defendant.OOdjby his conduct, particu]arly·in the true paper, pf:w4iph bee, wits furnished evidence from which the in rthEl!existence.o.f malice. I baverecently had consider the.rsubject of punitory damages in actions for that in actions for libel the amount of damages is peculiarly a for the jury, and is almost entirely within their discretion, because there can be no fixed or mathematical rule upon the subject, as in actions upon contract; so that it is laid down that courts will not interfere with verdicts in libel suits upon the ground of excessive damages, unless they are satisfied that the verdict was the result of gross error. prejudice, perverseness, or corruption. The rule in regard to excessiV'e'punitolydamages in actions for malicious dass of actions, the prosecution is substantially the same; for, in punitory character of the Verdict 'is'based upon the malice of the defendant, and the aggravated circumstances which surround or characterize magtiitl1de. of the verdict clearly ,sbowsthat the jury the case. acted .under.. Undue motIVes, it will be set aside; but this should not be done merely 'because the C:otlrt thinks that it was larger than it ought to have been. There wll.s, in this case, no error upon a matter of principle, andtieftherperverstlnessnor corruption. The verdict is so large as cause me'tofear or to think that, during the trial, the jury may have conceived an undue against the defendant.· Notwithstanding this fear, I should not be justified in granting a new trial on account of excessive damages. The court should be satisfied' that the verdict was the result of prejudice, and I am not satisfied with that conclusion. I
have queried whether I ought not .to grant a new trial unless the plaintiff would remit a specified, sum, and thus give her an opportunity, rather than risk another trial) to bring the verdict down to an amount which is more satisfactory to my own mind. But such a result requires the conclusion that there ought to be a new trial, and I am not prepared .to say that the' amount of the verdict, though larger than it ought ta have been, shows to my mind that prejudice had caused the minds of the jury to depart from a true equipoise. The motion is denied.
In re HERMAN.
Court, D.WasMngton, E. D. April 8O,18ll9.)
ATTORNEY-DISMISSAL BY RECEIVER·.
The receiver of an insolvent bank may at any time dismiss an attorney employetl by him, regularly or otherwise, to prosecute claims of the bank, and employanothedn his place, whom the court will, by order, substitute in the place of the dismissed attorney, except as to such cases as the latter may have commenced and finished. A contract having been entered into between the receiver and the attorney that the latter should receive the attorney's fees provided for in the notes he was ployed to collect, the court will Dot direct the substitution of another attorney in uufinis):led cases, until the receiver deposits the amount of the attorney's fees reserved 'in the notes as a security to the dismissed attorney for such services as he may have,rendered.
SA.ME-SUCURITY FOR SERVICES RENDERED.
At Law. Petition by Herman L. Chase, receiver of the Spokane National Ba!lk, to change attorneys. The application was resisted bY' HenrJ'n-L Herman, the original attorney. Granted in part and denied in part. F. T. Poot, for petitioner. H. ,M. HeNnan, 'in pro. per. HANFORD, District Judge. The petitioner, Herman L. Chase,as receiver of the Spokane National Bank, is the plaintiff in a number of actions cpmmenced in this court for the collection of moneys due to said bank, ill all of which cases Henry M. Herman appears as the attorney of record for said plaintiff. The court is now asked to exclude him from further appearing in said cases, and to substitute F. T. Post as the attorney for the plaintiff, and also to require said Herman to surrender to the petitioner all the notes and securities and money which he has obtained possession of by means of his position as an attorney of this court assuming to represent the plaintiff in said cases. In his petition the receiver alleges that Herman has not been employed by him, and that he ,does not desire said attorney to represent him, and sets forth a telegram from Hon. E. S. Lacey, comptroller of the currency of the United States, saying that,he (the comptroller) is not willing to recognize IIerman as an attorneyf0r the receiver, and that he has not been em-