rights, could bti set 'atriaught:The'power: of congress over mitioril11 electioDs is no longer in 'question. ' This beings national election of 'general <:haracterj it is clearly "Hthin the scope of the national laws. "rThe supreme court of the United States has held that congress can by)awprotectthe act of voting fOT' members of congress, and the perseJnsvotingatsuch election from violence or intimidation, and the election itself from fraud and corruption. Ex pmte Yarbrough, nou. S. 651,4 Sup. Ct. Ex parte Siabold, 100 U. S. 371. In the latter case, the court declares "the exercise of such power can collision of regulations or jurisdiotion, because the aUproperly cause thority ofoongressover the subject is paramount, and any regulations it may make necessarily supersede inconsistent regulations of the state." It follows, therefore;ithat since the federal law requires uniformity in the prerequisites of the ' l:ight to vote as affecting the citizen, otherwise entitled to vote, at the national eleotion, and further requires that each citizen shall have an equal opportunity to do the act made a prerequisite to the right of voting, varying and inconsistent registration enactments making different prerequisites,and denying equal opportunities to perform them, are contrary to the federal statute, and nugatory, The power of the state ofGeorgia toena,ct a general and uniform registration law is not questioned. The power is undoubted, and its exercise might well lead to· the most salutary results, to the fairness and regularity ofelections. To conform, however, both to the state constitution and the national laws, it must have a uniform effect upon all electors, and we hold that such a registration law has not yet been enacted. For the reasons above· enumerated, the court feels obliged to disregard the objections presented by the representatives of the Young Men's and will proceed with the performance ofthe duties assigned, in accordance with the statutes of the United States.
LEMON 'V. PULLMAN PALACE CAR
(Circuit Court, S. D. Mi88isB1.ppi.
SL1!lBPING CAR COMfANY-NoT COMMON CARRIlllR.
A sleeping car company Is not a common carrier. Its cars are under the control of the railroad company, except as to furnishing lodging to those who may pay for it; and the agents of the railrolld company are entitled to determine who shall occupy the sleeping cars. as part of the train.
SAME-LIABILITY FOR REFUSING BERTH-AGENTS.
Conceding, however. that he acted as the agent of the sleeping car company, the latter would not be liable for punitive damages. unless the passenger was treated insultingly or with malice. .
LEMON V. PULLMAN PALA(,'E CAR CO.
At Law. Action'by George Lemon against the Pullman Palace Car Company to recover damages for refusal to sell him a sleeping car berth. Verdict for defenflant. E. E. Baldwin, lor plaintiff. Percy Roberts, for defendant.
HILL, District Judge, (orally charging jury.) This is an action for damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of the refusal of the defendant car company to sell the plaintiff a berth in their sleeping car from Chicago, Ill., to Jackson, Miss. The plaintiff also alleges that the agent oLthe defendantwas very rough and rude to him. To these charges the' defendant pleaded' not guilty, which makes it .incumbent upon the plaintiff to sustain the allegations contained in his declaration. Whether they have done that or not is for you to determine frornthe evidence. I will instruct you that the Pullman Palace Car Company is nota common carrier. The Illinois, Central Railroad is a common carrier, and receives, as a part of its train, the cars belonging to the Pullman Palace Car Company, the same forming part of its train, and being under its control, except so far as providing lodging in the Pullman car for the accommodation of those who may pay for it. Its agents also have the right to determine who shall occupy the Pullman car as part of its train. It is to keep and provide cars sufficient for the accommodation of its passengers. The providing of lodging for the passengers belongs alone to the Pullman Car Company asa mere lodger. The charge here is that the agent of the Palace Car Company was also the agent of the Illinois Central Railroad Company, and sold sleeping car tickets as well as tickets for transportation. It was the privilege of the railroad company, by its agents, to determine who should occupy seats on its trains, and that included the Pullman car, and to determine whether a party had paid the proper amount, and was entitled to travel on the train to which it was attached. Thus the agent was then in a dual capacity, as acting for the railroad and for the car company at the same time. It was not the privilege of the agent of the car company to sell a berth to any party unless he had a first-class ticket on the railroad, or a ticket which entitled him to travel in the Pullman car or in a first-class car. The agent who sold the tickets had to determine whether or not he had such a railroad ticket as would entitle him to ride in the first-class car. In deciding that question, I am of the opinion that he acted as the agent of the railroad company, because that question haei to be passed upon before he could sell him a sleeping berth. It is difficult, however, to divide these two duties, but I am of opinion; under the proof, that he acted as the agent of the railroad company. When the agent decided that the plaintiff here did not have such a ticket as entitled him to ride in a first-class car, then he was justified in not selling him a sleeping car ticket. He was then the agent for the Illinois Central Railroad Company, and the defendant here is not responsible for his acts. Admitting, however, that he was the agent of the Pullman Palace Car Company, and he acted in good faith
FEDERAL REPORTER ,vol.. 52.
in passing upon the question asw whether the party was entitled to it, the plaintiff would only be entitled to actual, and not to punitive, ages, unless he was rudely treated by the agent; that is, if he was treated insultingly, or with malice, or something of the kind; willful, wanton conduct on his part. If the plaintiff did not have a transferable ticket, the agent had a right to so determine. A nontransferable ticket is sold at a reduced rate,ahd the party to whom it is given is alot;le permitted to travel 0n it, and, if he then sell it, it would deprive the railroad company of their additional profit. Now, 1 do not know that I can say much more to you. You have the 'case before you, and, unless you are satisfied that the d.efendant was. the agent who passed upon the railroad ticket that was presented, -and· as I have instructed you that he was not the agent in passing upoD,that,-then the plaintitrwould not be entitled to recover, unless it w.as for the conduct of the conductor of the train in refusing plaintiff a berth, and I believe there is no complaint upon that score. You can retire. '
Verdiofreturlleq and jUdgment rendered for the defendant company.
Qf Appeals, Fourth, Oircuit. October 11,1892.)
In an actionagsinst a railroad company for breach of· contract for special train, damages caunot be for disappointment a/ld ,mental suffering resulting from delay in departing to reach the bedside of a sick parent.
The hirer of a special train" who .declined to take it because 9f the refusal of the railroad company to guaranty arrival in time to connect with another train, cannot recover interest and costs on tbe sum paid for such train, where the company tendered such sum at the time of refusal, before suit and in court.
In Error to the Cireuit Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina. Affirmed. Statemer.t by HUGHES, District Judge: This action was commenced in 1890 by the service of a complaint and summons on the defendant in the court of common pleas for Laurens county, state of South Carolina. The complaiut alleges that plaintiff in error was. a physician, attending the sittings of the State Medical Association at Laurens on, the 24th of April, 1890; that at 3:45 P. M. of that day he was informed by telegraph of the dangerous illness of his father at Marion Cop.rt House, S. C.; that at that hou)." he contracted with the defendant 'railroad corporatiQn to convey him to Columbia, S. C., by 10:20 of the night of said day, for which service he then