UNITED STATES V. CULVER.
In our opmlon these arguments and authorities do not apply in this case. This is not a case of subscription to the capital stock of an incorporated company, nor a case of transfer of stock by an ordinary stockholder, but it is a case where the bank as an actor made a fraudulent sale of its own stock, and now by its receiver holds the proceeds thus acquired. In other words, the receiver of the bank holds property that does not belong to the bank, to which neither he as receiver nor the of the bank are entitled in equity and good conscience. Further than this, on counsel's theory of the bill that the stock sold was Winegar's, and not the bank's, it is to be noticed that the scope of the bin covers two distinct subjects for equitable relief,-the one being to restore the appellant to the eCluitable right of which it has been divested, the other to protection from assessments and charges as a stockholder in the First National Bank of Palatka; appellant may be entitled to the one and not to the other. To withhold from the demands of the creditors of:the bank property frauduiently acquired by the bank does not necessarily require a denial of an assessment on the stock ofthe bank, if necessary tQpay debts. And in this view of the case we are clearly of the opinion thatappellant is entitled to a rescission of the sale of stock in question"as against Winegar, the Florida Land & Improvement Company,and the First National Bank of Palatka; and also as against the the vendor's receiver of the bank, at least so far as to restore to lien upon the lands described in the bill for the amount of the purchase price still unpaid, leaving the receiver to collect assessments on stock from such stockholders as under the law may be liable. Considering, however, as we do, that the bill chargps and the demurrer admits that the bank was the real vendor of the stock, we think that in equity the appellant is entitled to have a complete rescission of the fraudulent transaction 'complained of. The decree sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill should be reversed; and it is so ordered.
UNITED STATES V. CULVER
(Oircuit Oonrt, W. D. Arkansas. June 29,1892.)
PuBLIO LANDS-CANOELLATION OF PATENT-MINERAL LANDS.
Section 2318 of the Revised Statutes of the United StateB provides "that in all cases lands valuable for minerals shall be reserved from sale, except as otherwise expressly directed by law." In such case, the title of the lands in defendants could not be held valid because acquired against the law.
If the lands are valuable for mineral, and they were purchased by defendants as agricultural lands, with the knowledge that they were mineral lands, the patent issued by the government wO\lld convey no title, because issued unadvisedly, or by mistake of an officer of the government while acting ministerially. In such a case, the parties purchasing the land are guilty of a fraud. and upon that ground a court of equity will pronounce the patent void. .
P'Et>ERAL' REPORTER, vol. 52.
may be no concealment .by purchasers of. the publio land at cash entry, yet if. under the ·.law. the lands wllre reserved from' sale, it is the well-settled rUle that purchasers obtain no title by ,their purcbase; the sale is absolutely vqid. . lYu,the Qo,!"rt.) . .
GoOD FAlTIt. ..' .
In '..'. .. .' .. Statement by' PARKER, District Judge: This is a suit brought 'by' the United States for the purpost' of procuringthe cancellation of two certain patents issued by the government to the defendants to certain lands named in the complaint. The complaint alleges that the lands are rrlineral, and were known to defendants to be such at the time they wel'e purchased, and that the defendants made the government officetsat the time of the purchase certain false and fraudulent stateIl1ents The lands were purchased by defendtmt Culvel' un'derthe procltittiation of President Hayes, dated OctoherS, 1877; offering them, together with a large quantity of other lands, for sa.le, and were 'purchased by defendant Culver at the Camden land at pi'ivatesale, about July '1', 1878. They were purchased as agriculturallands·. Patents were is.sned on tbe9th day of July, 1878, and on to Culver, and on Mity 11, 1881, Culver, by deed, conveyeli thelarids to his codefendant, Julian S. Rumsey, for a nominal -That' Rumsey 'Yas n,ot an innocent purchaser from CUlver," but thlif Culver 'was simply acting either as partner or agent of Rumsey, that they both had full knoWledge of the mineral characte(ofthe lanas'in questiOn. Claytoni U; S. Dist. Atty. Sa/ndtl8'&HiU, for de'fendants. .. ipkIt:Kll:n(Dlstrict (after 8tating'the farM.) I am,satisfiildthe idence shows that the lands described in the 'complaint are lands valuable for mineral. That they Rre mineral lands, and that Charles E. Culver. the party who actually bought. them by private cash entry, knew their mineral character at the time he bought them, and that Julian S. Rumsey, the ancestor of the other defendants. knew of their mineral character at the time CulVer Mnveyed them to him. In fact, while the lands were in the. name of Culver, they entered for Culver and Rumsey. That they bought the lands because they desired to hold them as mineral lands. , Thattbey both had examined the lands in ques}idn, and them by a mineral expert, who reported to them his belief as to their ,mineral charactel!. Their act in buying them by cash entry as agricultunH 'land,with such knowledge as to their true character, would the government to these parties, andthev would not to hold themnd against the governby the officers of the ·government.!t'is clairiledby. thedefendantsthnt these lllnfls,were thrown open to purchase by theproclatuation of President Rutherford B. Hayes of October 8, 1877. If they were lands' valuable for mineral, they were not so thrown open to purchase by the said proe.
FINN V. HOYT.
lamation, as the same expressly exempted from sale "alliandsappropriatedby law for the use of schools, military, or other purposes." If the lands were valuable for mineral by section 2318, Rev. St. U. S., they had already been appropriated for other purposes, and consequently they were not within the proclamation of the president. Section 2318 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides "that in all cases lands valuable for mineral shall be reserved from sale, except as otherwise expressly directed by law." If these lands were valuable for mineral, the defendant could have no title against the plaintiff, as the lands purchased by defendant Culver were not liable to purchase as agricultural land at time of the purchase. In such case, the title of the lands in defendants could not be held valid; because acquired against the law. Stoddard v. Ohambers, 2 How. 284. If the lands are valuable for mineral, and were knowingly purchased as agricultural lands, the patent issued by the would convey no title, because issued unadvisedly, or by mistake of an officer of the government while acting ministerially. In such a case, a court of equity will pronounce the patent void. U.S. v. Stone, 2 Wall. 525. It is clearly a case where the executive officer had no authority to issue the patent, because the lands were not subject to cash entry as agricultural land; Minter v. OrommeUn, 18 How. 87. If there was, no fraudulent concealment by Culver and Julian Rumsey, but, under the law, the lands were reserved from sale, the rule is well settled that the defendants obtained no title by their purchase; that the sale is absolutelyvoid. Morton v. NebrU8ka, 21 Wall. 660; Sherman v. Buwk, 93 U. S. 216; Stoddard v. Ohambers,8upra. The preponderance of evidence shows that the lands are valuable for mineral, and that the defendant Culver and Julian Rumsey, the ancestor of the other defendants, knew this fact at the time of the purchase of the land. Upon both legal grounds set out above, the patent must be held void, and a decree should be entered for the cancellation of the same, and it is so ordered.
(DtstrkJt Court, D. Alaska. May, 1892.)
COllDllSSIONERS' COURT OF ALA.SlU.-JURISDICTION-MANDAMUs-OREGON STATUTES.
By section 5 of the act of May 17, 1884, providing a oivil government for Alaska, four commissioners are to be appointed, who shall exercise all the duties and pow· ers conferred on Justices of the peace under the general laws of Oregon, which laws in force at that time are adopted as the laws· of the district, so far as appli. cable. Code Civil Proc. Or. 2057, provides that a civil action in a Justice court is commenced and prosecuted to final judgment in the manner pronded for similar actions in courts of' record. Sections 1106 and 007 provide that justice courts are always open for the transaction of business, and that the rules of proceeding and evidence are the same as in courts of record. Section lI40 declares that, when jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial ofllcer, 1P.11 the means to carry it into that, if no method of proceeding is specified,any sui-table e:rrectare , mode or process may be adopted. He/,d, that where a commissioner's oourt has obtained jurisdiction of a. causEl,,1:>ut the ,oommissioner is absent on .the