IN BE GOI.DBER.G.
ing,and payment of duties, a. natural construction' 'of the language used would determine the precise date expressed by the phrase, "the day when this act shall go into effect," by the going into effect of the act touching the subject-matter with which the section is wholly concerned. An analysis of the section lends support to this construction. If interpreted as the appellee contends, the act would (by that and other sections) provide for duty as follows: (1) On goods imported and entered prior toOctober 6th, the old rate; (2) on goods imported and entered after October 6th, the new rate; (3) on goods imported prior to October 1st, but not entered prior to October 6th, the new rate; (4) on goods imported subsequent to October 1st, but prior to October 6th, and not entered prior to October 6th, the old rate. It is difficult to see why merchandise included in the fourth of these categories should be privileged over merchandise included in the third. The judgment of the circuit court should be reversed, and case remanded to that count, with instructions to affirm the decision of the board of United States general appraisers.
In re GOLDBERG.
(Circuit Court, S. D. New York. January 23, 1893.)
CUSTOMS DUTIES-CLASSIFICATION-" GLASS-!iEA1)El)'
in length, with more or less ornamental glass heads, some polished and some of a dull black, the articles being commercially known as "lace pins," "hat pins," and "oonnet pins," the glass heads of some of the bonnet pins being In the form of sprays or sprigs, are dutiable as manufactures of glass at 00 per cent. ad valorem, under paragraph 108 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, and not as "pins, metallic," under paragraph 206 of the same act.
Pins of ditrerent sizes, having iron or steel shanks from 1% to 6 Inches
'l'his was an appeal by the importer pursuant to the provisions of the somilled "Administrative Act" of June 10, 1890, from the decision of the collector of customs at the port of New York in relation to the classification for duty of certain merchandise imported into said port In August, 1891, and which was assessed for duty by the collector as manufactures of glass at 60 per cent. ad valorem under Schedule B, par. 108, of the tariff act of October 1, 1800. which is as follows: "108. 'I.'bIn·blown glass, blown with or without a mold, inclUding glass chimneys and all other manufactures of glass, or of which glass shall be the component material of chief value, not specially prOVided for in this act, sixty per centum ad valorem." The importer protested that the merchandise was "pins," and was dutiable only at 30 per cent. ad valorem, under Schedule C, par. 206, of said tariff act, which is as follows: "206. Pins, metallic, soUd·head, or other, including hairpins, safety pins, and hat, bonnet, shawl, and belt pins, thirty per centum ad valoI'em." The case coming before the board of United States gpneral appraisem, pur· suant to the statute, evidence was taken in behalf of the importer, from which it appeared that the articles were pins of various sizes having iron or steel shankS, varying in length from 1% to 6 inches, and all having more or less ornamental heads made of glass, some polished and some of a dull black, and that all of the articles were commercially known as "pins." The board of
the protest, and affirmed the collector's assessment ,of auij-. ,,The importer appealed to the circuit court under the provisions of the' above-mentioned administrative act, and procured from the court an order to 'take further testimony, before one of the general appraisel's as referee. a n)Wlberof trade witnesses were produced in behalf of the importer, and from their evidence it appeared that the merchandise w!1s cOIllmercially known in, trade and commerce as "lace pins," "hat pins," or "bonJ;latplns," and that some 6f the bOnnet pins-those with elaborate and ornamental. glass heads in the form of sprays or sprIgs-were sometimes used for, hat ornaments as well as for, fastening the hat upon the head, but that they., inclul'led in the trade among the, ,class or group known as "pins." This tl'ade was not contradicted by any evidence produced on the part pf the collector or the government; and after the return of the testimony to the circuit court the case came on for hearirig upon the return of the board ofTJnited. States general. appraisers, and the further evidence United States attorney relied solely upon Ule point of taken all above. law that in the.i:t\Jiff act of March 3, 188ll' Schedule C, (Tariff; Ind., New, par. 209,) theprov\.sion forpins,'was in the fQli0'\Ving terms; "Pins, solid-head or other, thirty per 'centum ad'-q-alorem;,t"whereils in the' tariff act of OCtober 1, 1890, (Schedule C, par. 206,) the provision is for "pins, metallic, solid·head, or other," etc.; and contended that the important word introduced atter t;lle noun, In paragraph ,2013 of the latter tariff act, must be giveIl the sigIlificance wIilch it naturally conveyed as limiting the pins covered by the provision to pins entirely '6f metal. ' , After argument, the circuit court delivered the following decision.
Comstock & Brown, for importer. Edward Mitchell, U. S. Atty., and James T. Van Rensselaer, Asst. U. S. Atty., for collector and the government.
LACOMBE,' Circuit Judge. In the tariff act of March 3,1883, Sehedule C, (Tar.itf Ind. par. 209,) the:provision as to pins is as follows: '"Pins, solid-headQr other,' thirty pel' centum ad valorem." In the tariff of October 1, 1890, jll 0, "Metals and Manufactures of," (Tariff Ind. par. 206,) it is found amplified so as to read: "Pins, metallic, solid-head, or other, including hairpins, safety pins, and hat, bonnet, belt pins, thirty per centum ad valorem." The United States attorney contends on behalf of the collector and the government that the word "metallic'" inserted by congress into the present tariff provision, must be given, SOlne significance, and that it should be helq to qualify the noun "pins" so as to covel' only pins consisting entirely of metal, whereas the imported articles in this case are, according to uncontradicted testimony, pins having more or less ornamental glass heads. Upon that one point I am inclined to sustain the view of the board. The word "metallic" is certainly put there for some purpose, and I cannot see any other meaning to give it here than the one it would naturally have. The decision of the board of general appraisers, is affirmed.
In re KRAFT. (Citcult Court, S. D. New York. Janual'Y 23, 1893.)
CUilTO:H8 DUTIEB - DYED PARAGRAPH 24.
Moss - ACT
1, 1890 - CONSTRUCTION 01'
, Dyed moss. ,used by llorists, held to be dutiable at 10 per cent. ad valorem, under paragraph. 24, of ,the a.ct of. October 1, 1890, as
IN RE KRAFT.
At Law. Appeal from decision of United States general appraisers. Reversed.
The imported merchandise in this case consisted· Of moss, cleaned, dyed, sorted, and bOXed, chiefly used by florists, and not used as a. drug; nor for chemical purposes. The collector of customs at New York· assessed duty thereon at the rate of 20 vel' cent. ad valorem, as a nonenumerateci manufactured article, under section 4 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890. The importer duly protested, claiming the same to be dutiable at 10 per cent. ad valorem, under language of the followiDg paragraph of said act: Paragraph 24: "Drugs, such as barks, beans, berries,· balsams, buds; bulbs, and bulbous roots, and excrescences, such as nutgalls,frults, flowers, dried fibers, grains, gums, and gum resins, herbs, leaves, lichens, mosses, nuts, l'OOts, and stems, spices, vegetables, seeds, (aromatic, not garden seeds,) and seeds of morbid growth, weeds, woods used expressly for dyeing, and dried. insects, any of the foregoing which are not edible, but which have been advanced in value or condition by refining or grinding, or by other process of manufacture, and not specially provided for in this act, ten per centum ad valorem." The United States general appraisers decided against the importer, affirmed the decision of the collector, and held that paragraph 24 did not cover the merchandise, because it was not a drug, nor used as a drug. The importer appealed to the United States circuit court, under the provisions of the act of June 10, 1890. It was contended on behalf of the collector that the first three words of paragraph 24, to wit, "Drugs, such as," qualified, restricted, and covered aU of the articles mentioned therein, and that the act of October 1, 1890, had altered the language of the corresponding paragraph of the previous tariff act of March 3, 1883, (paragraph 94 of tlle act of 1883,) by the insertion of the above three words; that there had also been a similar alteration of paragraph 636 of the act of 1883, in paragraph 1\60 of the act of 1890, thus denoting an intention of congress to include in said paragraphs 24 and 560 of the act only such articles therein named as were drugs, or used as drugs. On behalf of the importer it was argued that the words, "Drugs, such as," in paragraph 24, only covered and qualified the succeeding words, "barks, beans, berries, balsams, buds, bulbs, and bulbous roots," and did not cover the other articles named therein, such as "mosses," etc.
Edward Mitchell, U. S. Atty., and Henry C. Platt, Asst. U. S. for collector. Stephen G. Clarke, for importer. LACOMBE, Circuit Judge. The alleged intention of congress to include in parawaph 24 only such articles as are drugs is not shown by the language of that paragraph. As "mosses * * * advanced in value or condition by any process of manufacture" are therein specifically designated, the decision of the board is reversed, and it is directed that the articles be classified under paragraph 24.
Ot1PPL'ES ; 1; ;!
,'.! . : "
(District COurt, E. D. Missouri, E. D. November 28, 1891.)
AtI,.aW. '.· Action by A. Hotchkiss, for bJmself and to the use of the ,United the Samuel Cupples Wooden-Ware Compan;yto'recover penmties under Rev. St. § 4901, for marking certain unpatented articles with the word ''Patented,'' for the purpose of deceiving thepublie. Wm. Eccles, for plaintiff. Goo. A. Madill, for defendant. J:udge. As you are aware, this is a suit his own .behalf and in behalf of the to reco.rell, penalties. inlposed by the. laws of the for unpawnted article with the word "Pa!entep." inteJ;1.t ,Fo deceiv(l, The motIve that msplI'ed congress to enact such a' law was faJdy stated to you by J'vIr. Eccles, in opening the case, and nothing further need be said by me upon that subject. The complaint in this case charges that defendant marked the words "Patented, September 28, 1880," on 1,420 rope reels manufactured between July 1, 1885, and April 5, 1890. But as the case stands at the conclusion of the trial, the evidence will not waITant you in finding that more than 400 rope reels were so marked in this district between the dates ,the
;: -...; (' : . : ! .'
UN1Jl an action,'\U;)d.el.' St. § to 'recover petullties for marking un". ....ttee."*.t tec:ed. OO!1sider cases in which th,.e. m king. .. ll$ 'cr.,O):1 \1vithin five years . .. ' .· ... theOOmmencement of the ,suit, districtfu whi(lli. it Is brought. 2. ' ·.. '!,!a'Qr.lender . tiU/lWe for the. pepal.ty , the m.a.·r.ldp:g.'.must have been ... . · the public, .andltl ,dewrmiuing the exof Jury aJt1:l;ough the articles :were (&afaet uooateJlWd.· they were clll1med to have been manufactured :UJl.QaI' acertain;,patft1ilt) tin<1, that the qUestion were covered bY,moh patentwllll i9llle 1upon which, persons skUle<f llithe patent law micbt"reasonably entel1Wn dl1ferentoplnions. The.ta:ct that defendant ill4Jv.:,b!lve becOliHi conv1JlceQ., some ijIne after the markiDgwlll;I done, that the: aJrt;lcles were not by the patellt, wouI<l Jiotrender it liable. 3.. 'OF Cl>1U>ORATIONB-INTENT OF OFFICEM. ' , .· ,A. may beheld liable under this section when the wrongful 'actll"itfe''Proven to h'a;ve' been committed by some officer Qr agent thereof tlng within the sco . . . of b1s authority, knowing that the articles were .... ..pe ",. ·, lWtWnted, and with ttttfmt to deceive the public. .. I ,)., " 4. OFFENSE. ,. ' rrlifJlllarking of a uumber of separate articles with intent to deceive the PUbIf,Q . W.i,es no.t.,consti.tut.eseparate o.ffenseS.When it is all done on the same ...,. da;y at the same t1Jne, so that the marking Is practiClll.lj' a continuous 'atlCi. in euch case but one offense Is committed, and one penalty is recoverable., ., . .. . . '.'