lTh'lTED STATES".' MOODY et ali (District Court, S. D. , January 21, .1893.)
PLEADING-AMENDMENT-ADDING. INDIVJDUAL TO
, .At Law. On motion to amend complaint brought against Frank· lin J. ¥cCoy and B. E. Brooks, doing business under. the firm name and style of the Wilson Lumber Cqmpany, by adding the name of "Franklin J. McCoy, individually."·· Denied. . M. D. Wickersham. U. S. Dist. Atty., for the motion: G. L. & H. T. Smith, opposed.
TOULMIN, District Judge. The two defendants, Franklin J. McCoy and B. E. Brooks. are liable for the acts of the of which they were members, and the complaint is against them individually as well as againSt the partnership for the trespass complained of as having been committed by them doblg business under the firm name and style of the Wilson Lumber ,Company. Superadding the name' of Franklin J. McCoy and the word "individually" could not him any more liable therefor, if that is the purpose. The amendment proposed is the,refore use· mere surplusage, and should not. be less and unnecessary, would allowed for that reason. Beavers v. Hardie, 59 Ala. 573. But if the purpose of the amendment is to embrae.e in the same suit an individual demand against :E'ranklin J. McCoy, and a demand against the partnership of which he was a member, itis not permissible. The two separate demands cannot be joined in the same suit. Beavers v. Hardie, supra; 'Miller v. Bank, 34 Miss. 412; Lynch v. Thompson, 61 Miss. 360. . The statute of Alabama authorizes the amendment of the complaint by adding new parties defendant upon such terms and conditions as the justice of the case may require; but this statute is construed to mean that only such parties defendant may be added a8 were liable in the Kiven cause of action at the time of the commencement of the suit. Burns v. Campbell, 71 Ala. 289. The given cause of action. as shown by the complaint in this suit, is a trespass committed by Franklin J. McCoy and B. E. Brooks, doing business under the firm name and style of the Wilson Lumber Company, and is not a trespass committed by Franklin J. M()Coy individually. If the name of Franklin J. McCoy as one of the company had been omitted, it could be added by amendment. But it was not omitted. The amendment proposed .is therefore not allowable, and the motion for leave to makeI the same must be demed." . ·
Reported by Peter J. Hamilton, Esq" of the Mobile, Ala., bar.
Februa.J:'y 6, 1893.)
(Circuit Oourt, S.
ri.· New York.
.·.4 c1rculil.r letter of and concerning an· agent and broker for government sUPPlY· contractors, pUblished,and sent by the secretary of the Interior to Intending biddErrs for'such supplY contracts, and stating that "any Interference on the part of W. R. L., [plaintiff,] a former chief of the ":tlI.t1onery and printlngdiVislon, with the buslness In any way, will to. the Interest of any person or firm represented," is capable of II. U1:ielous Interpretation, and a complaint· wbich properly pleads the same is good as against a demurrer.
TENDING TO INJURE BUSINESS.
. .A.tLaiv. Action by W. R. Lapham against John W.Noble for demv.rs to the complaint. OveITU1ed. Edward M. Groat, for. plai,nti1f. Myers & Anable, for defendant;.
r, ' ' . . .". ·
" . "Department of the Interior, Washington, March 28, 1892. "Sir: In that the.re may be no mi!)llpprehension on the part of persons intending to submit bids for furnishing envelopes and stationery for the use of tb1s department durmg the ensuing year, you are informed that any Inter:ference Wiltbe.:,part of Mr. W'. It,Lapham, a former chief of the stationery and with the business in any way, will not be to the interest ot any person· ot 'firm represented. "Re8l>eet:tul1y, . , . John W. Noble, Secretary."
The defendant's demurrer raises the states facts sufficient to constitute action. T1l.e, action IS to recover damages for the publicati9D.· of .a circular letter the plaintiff, upon the theory itwllS a libel. 'l]le .complaint alleges that at the time of publi.ca,1j,Qh.i$e·,defenda,nt was, and for some time prior thereto had been, of the dePartment of the interior of the United States; that for )nany years 'prior to December 15, 1891, the plaintiff had been anetrlploye in the stationery and printing division of said depSrtwent, and for sometime had been chief of such division; that on December 15, 1891, ,the plaintiff .resigned his position, and entered UJ)on, and haasince continued, in, the business of a government contractor for s1,1pplying the various departments of the government at Washington with stationery and office supplies, and also in that of an or broker for others in that business, employed by them. to arrange their bids, and negotiate and procure the acceptance of .th.e same. The Complaint further alleges that on March 28, 1892, while the plaintiff was still prosecuting his said business, the defendant of and concerning the plaintiff and his .a circular, and, with the intent of injuring the plaintiff in his busineEls, caused it. to ,be sent to all persons who were, or. had been, or were ,likely to be, bidders for government contracts for supplies for the use of the lileveral departmentj;!. The circular is as follows:
WALLACE, Circuit Judge.
The complafnt that. the defendant, meant by the word "interference" in the circular to say falsely that the plaintiff, by the prosecution. of his business, waa meddling with, .matters which
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