OHARLESTON IOE MANUF'G 00. v. JOYOE.
(Olrcuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. February 7, 1893.)
No. 34WRIT 011' ERROR-REVIEW-INDElI'INITE OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE.
On writ of error, specific objections to the admlssl.on of evidence will not be considered when the general indefinite objection made thereto at the trial was properly overruled.
In Error to the Oircuit Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina. Action by E. F. Joyce against the Charleston Ice Manufacturing Company for damages sustained because of defendant's refusal to allow plaintiff to remove certain property from the premises of deVerdict and judgment were rendered for plaintiff, and a motion for a new trial was denied. 50 Fed. Rep. 871. Defendant error. Affirmed. , Lord, for plaintiff in error. J., Y. K. Bryan, for defendant in error. Bef.)re BOND and GOFF,Circuit Judges, and HUGHES, District Judgt-.
GOFF, Circuit Judge. This action was instituted by the defendant ill error, E. F. Joyce, against the Charleston Ice Manufacturing Company, plaintiff in error, to recover damages for the refusal after demand made by Joyce of that company to allow him to remove from 'the premises of the company his machinery, tools, derricks, and other implements used by him in his business of boring artesian wells. Joyce claimed that he was entitled to the immediate possesof the property mentioned, which he had placed on the premises of defendant for the purpose of digging a well for it; and that defendant continued for the space of 86 days in its refusal to permit him to remove his machinery and other property, to his great loss and injury in the use of the same, in -the obstruction of his calling, and the enforced idleness of his employes, which wrong· ful acts,plaintiff alleged were done by defendant with intent to injure the plaintiff in his business and calling, to his damage $5,000. The answer' of the defendant below is, in effect, a general denial, though it admits the plaintiff's title to the property, and its location on the premises of the defendant. The case was twice tried before ''it jury. On the first trial a verdict was returned for the plaintiff for the sum of $3,233, which was, on motion of the defendant, set aside by the court, on. the ground that the damages found were excessive. On the second trial the jury found for the plaintiff the sum of $2,500 d&Jllages, which verdict the court refused to set and entered judgment thereon. During the progress of the second trial defendant below objected to a question propounded a witness and to the introduction of certain evidence. The only question before this court is. as found in the bill of exceptions, as follows:
CHARLESTON ICE MANUF'G CO.
That in the progress of this cause platntUrs attorney exhibited to Louis P. Hart. president of the defendant company, and 8. witness for defendant, then under cross-examination by pla.lntl1r,.& buslness eard.u tollows: LOmS P. HART, Pres't Central Ice Company. Incorporated Under the Laws of Alabama, ControlUng Ice Machines at New Orleans, Ala., Crescent City Ice 00. Mobile, Ala., Mobile Ice Co. Savannah, Ga., The Home Ice Mfg. Co. Charleston, S. C., Charleston Ice Mfg. 00. Birmingham, Ala., Avondale Ice Factory. BrunsWick, Ga., Brunswick Ice Mfg. Co. -The following questions being put and answers made: Question. Where weI''' you born? Answer. Brooklyn, New York. Q. Where have you lived? A.. At the age of one year my parentS removed to Cambridge, Massachusetts. I lived there until I was 29. I am now 38. Q. Where have you lived since then? A. In the south; mostly Savannah. Q. You have been in Savannah ten years? A. Nine years. Q. Is that your business card (indicating.) A. Yes. (:\f:r. Lord, defendant's attorney, objected to the last question, which objection the court overroled, and permitted plaintiff to put the question nnd take the answer, and to introduce the card in evidence. Thereupon, Mr. Lord then and there entered an exceptl.on.)
This general, indefinite objection or exception is the only one found in the record. It does not appear that there. WllB any specific ground of objection offered to the evidence at the time the exception was taken. It is now, in this court, claimed by plaintiff in errol." that "the private business card of the witness. should not have been allowed to be put in evidence, because clearly irrelevant, and intended and calculated to prejudice the minds of the jury." The rule is well established that the appellate court will only permit those matters to be assigned fol." error that were brought to the attention of the court below during the progress of the trial, and then passed upon. Springer v. U. S., 102 U. S. 586, 593; Wood v. Weimar, 104 U. S. 786, 795. The supreme court of the United States, in the case of Burton v. Driggs, 20 Wall. 125, 133, speaking by Mr. Justice Swayne, on this subject said:
"It is a rule of law that. where a party excepts to the admission of testimony he is bound to state his objection specifically, and in a proceeding for error he is confined to the objection so taken. If he assigns no ground of exception, the mere objection cannot avail him. In Hinde'll Lessee T. Longworth, this court said: 'As a geiIleral rule, we think the party ought to be confined in examining the admissibility of evidence to the specific objection taken to it. The attention of the court is called to the testimony in that point of view only.'''
The necessity for this. rule is so apparent, and the rule itself is so universally enforced by the courts, that further consideration of the question is not required of us. The following cases show the practice to be 'as we have stated, and demonstrate its wisdom and the importance of adherence to it. Camden v. Doremus, 3 How. 530; Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall 328, 339; Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U. S. 266, 284; Stebbins v. Duncan, 108 U. S. 32, 2 Sup. Ot. Rep. 313; Moulor v. Insurance Co., 111 U. S. 335, 337, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. '466; Burley v.
,Bank, 1U:l:T. S. 2,16,,,', Sup·. at. Jtep. 341; Block v. Darling, 140 U. 8.\234,11 Sup. Ct. ReP; 832; Railroad Co. v: Charless, 51 Fed. Rep. 562, that the court below properly overruled the general objection made during the trial, as recorded in the bill of exceptions, and it is equally as clear that this court cannot, on writ of error, consider the s}>OOifto objections made before it, and not presented to the court below. raised by the assignment of error, There are other but they are not presented by the bill of exceptions, and, as we understand the law, and view this case, we cannot consider them. court below is affirmed.' The judgment
In re SING LEE. In re CHING JO.
CHIN.E.· __ .
W. D. Michigan.
February 28, 1893.)
pl:'QYision ot the. uhlnese exclusion act of May 5, 1892. for summary proceedfugs before·a commissioneJ;' for the depOJ:tation of unauthorized persons, is not, by reason of its failure to allow II. jury trial, open to the objection that it operates a denialof due process of law; and such proceedingsdo constitute due process ot law, inasmuch as they' are those customarily employed Incases of similar character. Tlle, provision of " the exclusion act ot May 5, 1892, that the person charged1t1, presumed tq be guilty without the production of. any evidence against hiIil, and must establish his iImocence by affirmative evidence, 1& not repugnant to any provision of the federal constitution, nor does it violate any common-law rule ot evidence; for the facts constituting a detenseare peculiarly :within the knowledge of the party charged, and the burden is naturally up()n bim. .
DUE PROCESS OF LA.W.·
SAME-EvIDENCE-BuRDEN OF PROOF.
SAME__DENtAL. OF Eq,V,u. PR6TEOTION OF LAWS.
"These acts are In ,,1se repugnant to the fourteentb amendment to the federal constitutioIi, as denying the Chlnl'se the equal protection of the laws; for 'thltt amendment is restrictive of the action of the several states, and has no reference to legislation by congress. The imprisonment provided tor In the act ot May 5, 1892, prior to deportation, Is not a "punishment," In the sense of the criminal law, but 1& merely a means of detention.
&. SAME-NATURE OF PENALTY,
On habeas'Corpus PrQceedings by Chinamen imprisoned by order of the commissioner, his findings of fact are not reviewable by the court; and hence it cannot, . urged as ground for the writ that petitioners are exempt by reason ot their residence here prior to the passage of the act ot 1882.
On Applica.tion for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Denied. D. E. Corbitt, for petitioners. .4 G. Palmer, Dist. Atty., and J!& McMahon, Asst. Dist. Atty., the United, ' who are
,District Judge. The respondents in th.ese cases,. perso:ps, ,being fqund at Petoskey, in this dis·