v;eyed ,20IUlml. It was a,reasonab!ergift to the ehildren of a former marriage.. ' It was not fraudulent in itself, and the evidence nega· OIl the part of the grantor to' defraud the com· plainant,. ;Whom he was about to marry, and the deed ought not now to be set ¥ide. 1 Scrib. Dower,' 589, 590; Tucker v. Tucker, 32 Mo. 464, 468; McReynold's ,Ex'r v. Gentry, .14 Mo. 495; 491; 498; Crecelius v.Horst, 89 MOo 356, 859, 14 S.W. Rep. 510.. ll. The complainants were not entitled to. a decree setting aside the transfer of the bankcapitaJ. and deposi'ts,made April 7, 1883, apd grantb1g. them a share in these or any of the personal estate left by the dooeased. There is plenary proof .that the complainant Sarah knew ot the Jll8,terial facts relating to these matters in 1883, and that they were disclosed to her under oath .by the defendant Webb, July'28, 1884. In the courts of Missouri all right of action to recover any of thispel'Sonal property was barred :five years from her discovery of these facts. 2 Rev. St. Mo. §6775; Huntet v. Hunter, 50 Mo. 445, 451; Bobb v. Woodward, Id. 95, 103. A federal court, sittb1g in equitY,which acts or refuses to act in anology to the statute of Umitations, ought not to be moved to set aside such a transfer, or to enforce such a constructive tru,st, where the complainant has, without excuse, remained silent and supine for a longer time after the discovery of the material facts constituting her cause of actioIl than the time limited by the statutes of the state in which the action is brought for· the commencement of. actions for such relief. Indeed, in view of the great delay of the complainants, the absence of any excuse for this delay, the rapid Imd striking change in the character and value of the· property in question since 1884, and the improvements and expenditures that have'been made upon it since. that date, it would be extremely difficult for the complain· ant to overcome the defense her laches has interposed to this suit, if no other, defense existed. Naddo v. Bardon, 51 Fed. Rep. 493; Lemoine v·. Dunklin County, Id. 487; Rugan v. Sabin, supra. There is no view of this case in which the complainants were entitled tA> any relief, and the decree below is affirmed, with. C081:&
BLINDELL et 81. v. HAGAN et al. (CIrcuit Court,. E. D. Loulslana.
Februar.1 9, ·1893.)
COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAmT OF TRADE-EQUITY JURISDICTION.
The. statute against unlawful restraints and monopolies (Aot 1890, 26 St. p. 209) does not au,thorize the brlnging of inJunction suits or suits In equity by any parties except the government.
The jurisdiction of theclrcuit court to entertamasuit to enjoin a cOmbl· nation of persons from interfering with and preventing shipowners from shipping a. crew may be maintained on the ground of preventing a multiplicity of .suits at law, and fGr the reason that at law for inter· rupting the business a,nd intercept1IJ,g the profits Gt Pending enterprises and voyages must, in their nature, be conjectural, and not susceptible of prooL
8, SAME-INJUNCTION PENDENTE LITE-EVIDENCE. Evidence that, by reason of the action of a combination of persons, the crew left complainants' ship as she was lLbout to sall,and that anGther
BLINDELL ". HAGAN.
orew could not be procured for nine days, and then only with the assistance of the police authorities and the protection of a restraining order, while other vessels in the vicInity had no difficulty in getting crews, Is sufficient to authorize the court to enjoin interference with the business of the complalnants by such combination, pendente lite.
In Equity. Bill by Blindell Bros. againstC. Hagan and others to enjoin interference with their business as shipowners. On application f-or an injunction pendente lite. Granted. Henry P. Dart and F. B. Earhart, for complainants. J. Ward Gurley, Jr., and J. D. Grace, for respondents.
BILLINGS, District Judge. This application is made and submitted on the bill and amended bill of complaint and numerous affidavits and counter affidavits. The substance of the bill, a8 amended, is that the complainants are aliens, being subjects of the kingdom of Great Britam.. and that the defendantBAi'e citizens of the state of Louisiana; that the complainants are owners of the steamship Violante, which they are using in the carrying trade betwoon this port and Liverpool; that they are prevented from shipping a crew by the unlawful and well-nigh violent combination of the defendants; that this combination is so numerous as to make it impossible for the complainants to obtain a crew without the restraining order of this court; that this unlawful interference of the defendants is interrupting the business of the complainants, which is that of persons engaged in the carrying trade between New Orleans and Liverpool, and is doing them an irreparable injUry. The injunction has boon asked for, first, under the act of 1890, (26 St. p. 209,) known as "An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies." This act makes all combinations in restraint of trade or commerce unlawful, and punishes them by fine or imprisonment, and authorizes suits at law for triple damages for its violation, but it gives no new right to. bring a suit in equity, and a careful study of the act has brought me to the conclusion that suits in equity 01' injunction suits by any other than the government of the United States are not authorized by it. This brings me to the second ground upon which the injunction is asked. The citizenship of the parties is such that the United States circuit court has jurisdiction, and the complainants may urge before this court any grievance which they may have in law or equity as fully as they could do in the courts of a state. That the complainants may maintain a suit at law is conceded by the solicitors for the defendants. The prohibition in the statute of 1789 against suits in equity in the courts of the United States, where the plaintiff has a plain and adequate ;remedy at law, has been repeatedly held to enunciate or introduce no new doctrine, but it is enforced rigidly by the courts of the United States, because, if a suit in equity is allowed, the defendant is cut off from the right of trial by jury, which is by the constitution of the United States guarantied to him in aJl common-law cases involving upwards of $20. There cali be equity jurisdiction only when the case in quel!'ltion belongs to one of the recognized cI8BSeS of cases over' which equity has jurisdiction. The
question,therefore, is, dO(Mii.flUs case belong to one of those recognized classes? If it does,it is because the nature of the alleged injul1is lIlu,ch that it would; difficult establish in; a suit. at law the damage of the a:nd because to it would prevent a multiplicity of suits. Undoubtedly, Chancellor Kent lays down the correct rule in Jerome v. 'lfuss, 7 Johns. Ch. 333, that cases of ordinary trespass are notwith.in the- cognizance of equity; but in Livingston v. Livingston, 6 Johns. Ch. 500, 501, he 'adds a qualification which shows the ground. ofdiBcrimination between such trespasses as equity will enjoin arid those .which will not: "There muat be something particular in the case of a trepass, * * * or to make out a case of hTeparable mischief," in order to authorize equity to futer:fere, and .aiL injunction to issue. In La,ussats' notes to Fonblanque's Equity, at page 3, he lays down the principle. wh,ichisthe fundamental one, concurred in by all thEl writers upon eqli!t;y as the basis .of equity jurisdiction in CMes oftrespasB, a,s,follows: "The'toundation of otbisjurisdiction ot eqUity is Jhe irrepaJ.'ltble mischief, the inadequacy of a. pecuniary compensation, and the. prevention pf aIJ;lultiplicity otsuits." . The difficulty been in applYing tbis principle. Where there is a large eombinatiQn of persons to. interfere with a party's by violence, Weeqmty if maintainable at all, is. rilaintMna'ble on eitherQ.f tWQ gfoun,dS,-the na.tu:re of the injury, inclUding the .difficulty ofeatablismng"in a suit at law the amount otactual dariiages s1¥feJ;¢d, or the ,prevention. of a multiplicity of suits. The JPfisdiction, ·..for .these Was maintained in the following cases: Efuaek';;.Y. Kane, 34; Fed. Rep. 47; Casey v. Typo-. graphical Union, 45 Fed. 135, 144; Gilbert v. }fickle, 4 Sandt. Ch. 381, (marg. p. 357;) Sherryv. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. Rep. 307. Bank, 6 Wheat. 845, the coUrt says:
"Ill those cases [wrongful transfers of stockS and other securities] the Injured party would have his remedy' at law; · · · but It Is the province of a court of equity In such cases' to arrest the injury, and prevent the wrong. The remedy Is more beneficial and complete than the law can give."
With reference to· another class of cases, courts ot equity have sometimes taken jurisdiction for the reason. which requires that they should take jurisdiction here, viz. those eases for specific per· formance when there could be no adequate compensation in damages. In Taylor v. Neville, cited by Lord Hardwicke in Buxton v. Lister, 3 Atk. 383, a specific performance was decreed contract of a sale of 800 tons of iron to bedeliveroo.and paid for in a certain number' of years, and by. installments.· Equity enjoins in such cases, because, though the inju,red party :may. have .hissuit at law, his damages must be conjectural. See Adderley v.' Dixon, 1 Sim. & S. 607, 611. So in cases of 'tre$pass, where a busineas Is interrupted, Bind' the profits of pending enterpri$et!l and ,are intercepted, of full for his the party ,injured damages must law belJil,rgely conJecttiral; and for this reason, as well as to a of suits, he. may, by an injunction inequity, arres'G the threatened and. prevent the
TALI,.EY V. CURTAIN.
conse.quent injury.I which. is. irrem. it consists in the lossofpl'ofits whicD.'are not of proof. My co:nclusion,therefore, .is that the. bill of,.complaint in this cause states a case. over which a court of equity must take jurisdiction, in that it is a case where the threatened damages are irremediable at law,aswell as one where the equity suit will prevent a. multiplicity of suits. As to proof upon the question of fact. There have been filed in this case in all 49 affidavits. I subjoin to this opinion a summary of each of tht'i'le depositions. The preponderance of proof establishes that the British steamship Violante arrived at this port from Vera Cruz November 29,1892, and on the 30th the crew was paid oft'. At that time the crew made no complaint regarding the food they received, or their treatment, or the safety of the ship, and continued at their duties until about noon of December 15, 1892, Without complaint, except that some of the crew had agked the captain whether they would be paid before leaving port for the days in which the ship had been lying at the wharf, to which he answered he could not do so, as it would be a violation of all agreements between the crew and the ship. On December 15, 1892, after the ship had been cleared from the custolbhouse, and the pilot had come aboard, the crew, with the exception of the steward and the cook, retired from the ship. thus deprived of its crew, the ship could not leave on December 15th, as contemplated. It is also established that thf' steamer Violante, after her crew left, on the 15th of December, did not succeed in getting a crew until December 24, 1892, after the restraining orders had been issued against the defendants in this cause, and that, during the whole period of nine days, the police authorities were called upon, and went to the assistance of the master and agents of the vessel in getting a crew; that, while other steameI'S in the vicinity had no difficulty in getting crews, the steamer Violante was unable to get a crew to stay on the ves.'lel until they got the protection· of the restraining. orders from this court. I think the evidence establishes that the inability of the ship to retain the crew already shipped, and her inability to obtain another crew, except after the interference of this court by Us restraining orders, were due to the acts of the· defendants. The evidence .fails 'to connect the defendant Dunn with the unfriendly acts of the other defendants. I think the case, upon the question of facts, as well as law, is with the complainants, and that the injunction pendente lite should issue against the defendants, except the defend- ant Dunn. As to him it is refused.
TALLEY et al. v. CURTAIN et al. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. February 7, 1893.) No. 33.
CRlIlDI'1'ORS' BILL CR;EDJTOltS.
tor the benefit of creditors may be maintRined thOugh plalntifl"s claim
WHEN MAmTAmABL1Il ,
ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEVrl' OF