SECOND UNITARIAN SOC. v. G RA7\1'I' et aL <Circuit Court, D. :NIaine. February 28, 1808.)
TRUSTS-PURCHASE OF Tnt'ST ESTATE-LIABILITIES OF PURCHASER.
""here a person purclwses the trust estate for the benefit of the cestui que trnst, having actual lmow]edgt· of an existing decree of a competent cuurt that the trustee '.lonveyed to the cestui que tnlst on being reimbursed for his expenditures in udministering the trllst, the purchaser stands in the l:lhoes of tile original trustee, and emmot incorporate in his deed to the ben' eficiary a condition not warranted by the original trust.
In EqUity. Bill by the Second Unitarian Society in Portland against Josephine F. Grant, Mary E. Paine, William E. Greeley, DorotheaiGreeley, and Hugh P. Greeley, to quiet complainant's title to certain real property. Hannah B. Greeley was made guardian ad litem for William E. Greeley, Dorothea Greeley, and Hugh P. Greeley. Heard on amended bill, answer, and replication. Decree for complainant.
'1'he Second Unitarian Society in Portland, ::\le., held the legal title to two, thirds in common and undivided of the land occnpied by it fol' purposes of WOl'l'hip, tlle legal to the remaining one third being in one Samuel ",Vinter, who lwld in trust for the said society. Winter, with two others, had bought the property for the uses of the' society, and given HlPir joint note therefor. The other two pr0misors on note conveyed to the society their interest in consideration of their outlay, and the administrators of Winter were decreed by the sUIH'em'e judieial comi of Maine to do likewise with his interest, on the same terms. William E. Greeley, a memp<\\' of the parish, thoroughly familiar with these facts, was appoiJ;:tted, with the parish committee, to purwhich was accordingly sold to Greechase the outsttlDding one-tllird ley by the administrators of Samuel Winter's estate, acting under license from the probate court. The society thereupon tendered to Greeley the purchase price and charges and costs in making the purchase, and demanded a release of all his interest in the property.. He refused this, but gave a deed conditioned upon the use of tht:! property by a Unitarian society; in case of breach the property to revert to Greeley's heirs. The society accepted this deed with a formal pt'otest, which was entered on the parish records. Ill; the year 1890 the society allowed the. property to bensed' .as a Presbyterian dlUrch. Greeley's heirs. thereupon began an action at law in this court to reCOYeL' the undivided one-thi!'l} interest in the property. The Second Unitarian Kociety now' seeks an injunction to restrain the further prosecution of the aetion at law, and tlIat the heirs of Greeley be decreed to execute and deliver' to complainant a quitclaim deed for their pretended interest in the property.
Thomas L. Talbot, for complainant. Edward D. Rand, for respondents. NELSON, District Judge.. By the decree of the supreme judicial court of Maine, passed in 1837, in, the suit of the present plaintiff against theadministra(ors and heirs la,w of Samuel Winter, it was declared that Winter held tlleestate at his decease, in trust for the plaintiff, and the decree further direct that an absolute cond veyance of the estate should be made by the defendants in that suit to the plaintiff upon the repayment to the administrators of the money disbursed by Winter on account of the trust. Of this decree William E. Greeley. when he took his deed from the administrators·
HEATON PEXINSUJ.AR BUTTON-FASTENER CO .... DICK.
in 1844, had not only the constructive notice arising from the record of the decree itself, but he had actual notice also, as shown by his being a pew holder and member of the society, .and by· his interest in and his general acquaintance with its affairs. It is apparent also for the same reasons, and more especially by his permitting the society to occupy the estate as its own property before his deed to the society, that he bought it for the society's benefit, and with the expectation and understanding on boUt sides that upon repayment of the money advanced for its purchase he would convey the estate to the society in the execution and discharge of the trust. He held the title under the original trust, and evidentlyintended so to hold it, and to stand in V\Tinter's place as trustee. Having been paid the money advanced, with interest, and having accepted it in full discharge of his equitable lien therefor, his deed was manifestly made in pursuance of and in execution of the trust, and for the purpose of vesting in the society all the title he held as trustee, and he had no right to impose upon the estate a condition not annexed to the trust. That the society never assented to the condition is shown by itR lIrotest, entered upon its records immediately after the conveyance by Greeley, and its continual occupancy of the estate as its own under the protest. If the entry by the defendants could have the effect to work a forfeiture, they would still hold the estate under the original trust, and would be bound to convey it to the society without condition. It is therefore decided that the conditional clause in the deed is void, and not binding on the society, and that the defendants acquired no title by their entry for breach of the condition. Decree for the plaintiff.
HEATON PENINSULAR BUTTON-FASTENER CO. v. DICK et al.I
(Circuit Court, N. D. Illinois, N. D. July, 1892.) No. 870.
INJUNCTION - PROCURIi:l\IENT OF BREACH OF FRINGEMENT OF PATENT. COWrRTBUTORY IN-
A bill alleged that complainant, owning patents for button-fastening machines, had sold the patented machines upon condition that they should be used only with fasteners made by complainant from the sale of wWch a profit was derived, and that defendants were manufacturing similar button fasteners, capable of and intended by them for use in complainant's machineS, and were inducing purchasers of those machines to use such fasteners-therein, to the exclusion of complainant's fasteners; and it prayed that defendants be restrained frommajring for sale, selling, or offering or advertising for sale, any fasteners, intended for use or capable of being used in the machines sold by complainant under such conditions, and from persuading or inducing vendees of such machines to purchase or use in such machines any fasteners other than those made and sold by complainants. On the bill and affidavit substantiating its charges, complainant moved for a preliminary injunction. Defendants demurred to the bill, and opposed the motion for injunction, but SUbsequently their counsel Rep. 661.
'ReVised report. Jj'or former ).'eport, see 52