idea would not be such prior knowledge or use as, within the statutes, would defeat '8; ;patent.!;'Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477; Coffin v. Ogden, 18, W@. 120. . Upon the undisputed facts of this case as it now stiulds, the orator'seems to be entitled to the preventive'.relief of 'l1preliroinary injunction against the use of this offset intlle. llletallic of this patent. Motion granted.
HENEY v. THE JOSIE et aI. (District Court,D. Rhode Island. . February 9, 1894:.)
ADMIRAL'l'J-LIBEL-JOINDER oFOAUSEs-IN REM AND IN PERSONAM.
A, libel against a, ve$llel she was owned "by J. ,and other persons to the libelants unknown;" 'and It was sought therein to recover money furnished for repairs "on the credit of the owner and said J.," and also ploney advanced upon a J. /llone. Held, that these cla1m:sC()uld not be joined. for the transactions out of Which they severalIYlll'Olle were unrelated, and thejm1:gqlents in rem ltnd in personam upon them. respectively, would not afl'ect the same persons.
In Admi'ralty. to libel. Libel by Archibald T. Heney against the schooner Josie)uld others for advances. :Exceptions sustained. '
This is a libel against the schooner Josie for money furnished to her master by the libelant for repairs and suppU-es, and also against John Jones and William Jones, copartners as Jones Bros., and part owners of the schooner, to recovera. Snm of mQBey ,advanced by the libelant on a consignment of piling over an,ll above the sum for Which, the piling was sold. John Duffy claims the schooner as master and part owner, and to the libelFirst, because, "in said Ubel' a cause of action in rem Is joined; with a cause of aotion in personam in :;thesame suit;" and, secondly, because "in said Josie for repairs and suplibel a cause of action, against the said plies is joined with a cause of action for ,d,ebt against Jones Bros. relating to a cargo of piling, and to pay for the same."
W. G.Roelker, for libelant.
" First. Two' claims in personam may' be joined together. Second. If one of the claims. in personam be also a claim in rem against the vessel and master, the vessel aodall are liable for the debt, and they may .be joined in the same libel, so, far as the claim against them is concerned. The court has entire control of' Its process, and will mold its decree in rem, against the vessel '80 as to apply only to so 'much of the claim as is good against the vessel in rem., That, where the shipmaster and owners are all liable for the debt, they may, on principle, be joined in the action, see Ben. Adm. §§ 393, 397; Betts, Adm. pp. 89, 99; Hen. 'Adm. pp. 330-332; The Enterprise, 2 Curt. 317; The Monte A., 12 Fed. 331; The Clatsop Chief, 8 Fed. 163; The J. F. Warner, 22 Fed. 342; 630 Quarter Casks of Shen'y Wine, 14 Blatchf. 517; The Zenobia, 1 Abb. Adm. 48.
E. P. Carver, for clailnant. QARPENTER, Distric:;tJudge.' The general principle is that se,veral issues may be, ti'ied in one action, when, that course will promote the and conduce to the convenience of 'parties and of and when no considerable inconvenience wUl arise therefrom. '9n this .principle actions are·. sustained
HIGBEE V. NINETY-SIX HUNDRED CASES TOMATOES.
against a defendant for several independent but analogous claims, and also against several defendants for claims arising out of the same transaction, where the claims themselves are analogous. On general principles there is no reason why a libel both in rem and in personam should not be retained in cases where the matter comes within the above definition, and where this practice is not forbidden by the rules of the supreme court. The present case raises a different question. The allegations of the libel are not entirely clear. The libel is entitled against Jones Bros. "and also against all persons lawfully intervening for their interest in the said schooner;" and it sets out that the schooner is owned by persons "who are to the libela.nt unknown," and speaks of Jones Bros. as "owners of said schooner," and refers to supplies furnished to the schooner on the credit of "Jones Bros. and her other owners," and on the credit of ''her owners and said Jones Bros." Reading these allegations together, it appears that the schooner is owned by Jones Bros. and other persons who are to the libelant unknown. There is therefore in this case neither a unity of parties, nor a unity of cause of action, which would justify a joinder of action. The two claims arise from two unrelated transactions; and the only other ground on which the action ought to be maintained would be that the judgment in rem would affect the same persons against whom the judgment in personam would go, so that the persons interested in contesting the two claims would be the same in each case. But here Jones Bros. alone are entitled to be heard on one claim, while they, with perhaps many others, holding, perhaps, nearly the whole interest, must be heard to contest the other claim. It is therefore a case of two wholly unrelated suits combined in one action. An order will be made that the libel be dismissed, with costs, unless the libelant shall within 10 days discontinue as to one action, or so amend the libel as to strike out one of the claims.
HIGBEE v. NINETY-SIX HUNDRED CASES TOMATOES. (District Court, D. Rhode Island. February 3, 1894.)
ADMIRALTY-PRACTICE-PAYMENT INTO COURT-RIGHTS OF LIBEI,ANT.
On libel for freight, where the claimant pleads a tender, and pays the amount tendered into the registry of the court, the libelant is entitled to an order for the pa3'ment of that amount to him before there is any trial of the issue. Mayor, etc., v. Patten, 1 Cranch, C. C. 294, disapproved.
In Admiralty. On motion for the payment of money paid into court. Libel by Harry E. Higbee against 9,600 cases of tomatoes for freight. Motion granted. . W. G. Roelker, for libelant. 8. O. Edwards, for claimant. CARPENTER, District Judge. This is a libel for freight mone:,-, and the claimant, in his answer, alleges a tender, and, in support of