This cause ought to have been settled, if possible, under the provisions of section 4547; and it appearing that there is a small balance due those seamen, the costs will have to go against the schooner.
REED 11. WELD
- - , 1881.)
(District Court, D. Massachusetts.
DEMURRAGE-SUSPENSION OF VOYAGE.
It is not to be supposed, upon libel for demurrage, in the absence of an express agreement, that a master intended or was expected to suspend his voyage, and wait an illdefinite period of time before proceeding to complete it, while the consignees were engaged in finding a purchaser for the cargo.
2. SAME-LAY DAYS-STIPULATION AS TO TIME AND PLACE.
When parties stipulate that lay days shall count from a certain time, at a certain place, and another place is afterwards the term, as to time, applies to the substituted place, there being no agreement to the pontrary.-[ED.
Libel for Demurrage. Hale, Walcott d; Perkins, for libellant. E. B. Callender, for respondents. NELSON, D. J. This is a libel for demurrage. The libellant is the. master of the schooner Mary H. Stockham, and on the eighteenth of March, 1879, received on board his vessel at Elizabethport, N. J., a cargo of 376 tons of coal, consigned to the respondents at Boston. By the terms of the bill of lading the master undertook to deliver the coal to the respondents or their assigns, "above three bridges, South End, Boston, they paying freight for the same at the rate of $1.50 per ton, and 3 cents per ton bridge money, demurrage as per new bill of lading." The demurrage clause, in what is known in the coal trade as the new bill of lading, is as follows: "And 24 hours after the arrival at the above-named port, and notice thereof to the consignee named, there shall be allowed for receiving said cargo at the rate of one day, Sundays and legal
REED V. WELD.
holidays excepted, for every 100 tons thereof; after which the cargo, consignee, or assignee shall pay demurrage at the rate of eight cents per ton a day, Sundays and legal holidays not excepted, upon the full amount of cargo, as per this bill of lading; for each and every day's detention, and pro rata for parts and portions of a day beyond the days above specified, until the cargo is fully discharged, which freight and demurrage shall constitute a lien upon said cargo." The vessel arrived at Boston, below the bridges, during the night of Monday, March 24th. On Tuesday morning, as she was about to proceed through the first bridge to the South End, she was stopped by an order from the respondents to report to them before going through the bridges. After receiving order the libellant went ashore, and called on the respondents at their place of business, and was then told that their wharf at the South End, above three bridges, was full, and he would have to wait before discharging his cargo until they could sell the coal. The respondents at that time noted upon the master's copy of the bill of lading the arrival of the vessel, as follows: "Captain reported March 25th, 1 :30 A. M.," that being the time of the arrival of the vessel at the lower bridge. On the following day, Wednesday, the respondents sold the coal, and after some negotiations with the libellant it was agreed that he should deliver the coal to the purchaser at Warren's wharf, above seven bridges, at the North End, the respondents agreeing to pay an additional rate of three cents a ton for each of the seven bridges. On the same dlLy the libellant proceeded with his vessel to Warren's wharf, arriving in the evening at about 9. Another vessel was then unloading at the wharf, and it was not until the afternoon of Friday that he finally got in and commenced discharging, and he finished on the following Monday, March 31st, at 11 A. M., using due dispatch. During the negotiations nothing was said by either party as to demurrage. I cannot assent to the view taken by the respondents, that by this arrangement the parties substitutel1 the point above seven bridges, at the North End, as the termination of the v.6,no.3-20
voyage,in place of that fixed by the bill of lading. I am of the opinion that the effect of the transaction was to terminate the voyagEl below the bridges. This is shown by the indorsement by the respondents on the master's bill of lading of the arrival of the vessel on the 25th, at 7:30 A. M., as well as by all the circumstances of the case. It is not to be supposed, in the absence of an express agreement, that the master intended or was expected to suspend his voyage, and wait an indefinite period of time before proceeding to COmplete it, while the respondents were engaged in finding a purchaser for the cargo. The libellant had the undoubted right to complete the voyage, and, if detained after his arrival beyond the stipulated lay-days, to rely upon his demurrage contract for compensation. When parties stipulate that laydays shall count from a certain time, at a certain place, and another place is afterwards substituted, the term, as to time, applies to the substituted place, there being no agreement to the contrary. Mac!. on Ship. (2d Ed.) 498. The lay-days began to run Tuesday, March 25th, at 7 :30 A. M., and expired Monday, March 31st, at 1 :30 A. M. This leaves an interval from the expiration of the lay-days to the time when the discharge was completed, 11 A. M., of nine and one-half hours. By the rule provided in the bill of lading, the demurrage for this detention amounts to $7.74, and this sum the libellant is entitled to recover. l)ecree accordingly.
(District (Jourt, E. D. Pennsylvania. February 21, 1881.)
1. COLLISION-GROUNDING OF SHIP IN Tow OF TUG-LIABILITY OF TuG
FOR ACCIDENT CAUSED BY ITS NEGLIGENCE-DUTY TO ANCHOR IF UNABLE TO PROCEED SAFELY.
A tug, with a ship in tow, was approaching a sharp curve in a river with an ebb tide sweeping across from the east. Seeing another tow ahead going in the same directiol). the tug slackened her pace. The ship shortly afterwards grounded on the western shore. Held, that as it appeared from the evidence that the accident was caused by the Islow pace of the tug, and her failure to keep to the eastern side of the channel, she was liable for the damage. Held, further, that if the vessels ahead could not have been passed at that point, and it was necessary to slow down to a pace not sufficient to afford proper steerage way to the ship, the master of the tug should have considered the propriety of dropping anchor.
Libel by the master of the ship Josephine against the tug Farnsworth, to recover damages caused by the grounding of the ship while being towed by the tug. The accident occurred June 25, 1880, while 'the ship was being towed by the tug up the Schuylkill river. The vessels were approaching a curve in the river, and just ahead was a tow of canal·boats bound in the same direction. The tug slackened her pace and short· ened the hawser with which the ship was being towed, and shortly afterwards the ship grounded. The other facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. The theory of libellant was that the accident was caused by the tug keeping too near to the western shore, and attempting to round the curve with the ship in tow on a slack hawser. The theory of respond. ents was that the accident occurred through the failure of the ship to obey the signals of the tug and to steer in her wake. Alfred Driver and J. Warren Coulston, for libellant. H. C. Brown and Edward F. Pugh, for respondents. BUTLER, D. J. It is not difficult to ascertain the cause of grounding. Approaching a sharp curve in the river, where the ebb tide sweeps across from the east, the tug ran up the western side of the channel a.t a pace scarcely suffiby Frank P. Prichard, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar.