dent Or treasurer. If they are not allowed the privilege of thus suing they cannot be thus sued. The American Express . Company has a capital stock of $18,000,000, with more than 3,000 Its right to sue and its liability to suit in the name of its president or treasurer is a franchise conferred upon it by the laws of New York, which by comity should and does follow it into other states, and William G. Fargo, who brings the suit as president, is a citizen of New York, and the defendant is 'an Indiana corporation and a citizen of that sta.te. For these reasons I think the suit is properly brought, and, without deciding other questions which were argued by coun· sel, the motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction is over·
CHAPIN v. WALKER and others.
(Circuit Court, D· .Arkansas. --,1881.)
AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF IN EQUITY-CROSs-BILL.
Any affirmative Telief sought by a defendallt in an equity suit must be by cross-bill, and can never be granted upon the facts stated in the answer. 2.
BILL TO FORECLOSE MORTGAGE-MORTGAGEE'S TITLE CANNOT BE QUESTIONED.
According to the practice which prevails in the federal courts in a suit to foreclose a mortgage, the. mortgagee's title cannot be questioned: it must be investigated at law.
STATEMENT OF CASE.....:.DECREE.
The answer of a respondent to a bill in equity to foreclose a mortgage denied the complainant's title, set up an adverse title as mortgagee, and prayed that complainant's mortgage be declared void, and that the respondent's lien be declared a first and prior lien on said land. Held, that the title of complainant could not be questioned in the proceedings to foreclose, but .the decree in this case would be modified so as to provide that the decree and sale thereunder should be without prejudice to respondent's right to contest the title to the land in question by an action at law.
This is a bill in equity to foreclose a mortgage executed by respondent Dempsey R. Walker to John C. Burrage, conveying certain real estate to secure the payment of a promissory note. The bill alleg!:ls default in the payment .of said note; that complainant is the holder and owner of the same, and entitled to foreclosure; and that the other respondents, including A. A. Brockway, have, or pretend to have, some claim to or interest in or lien upon said mortgaged premises; but that said claim, interest, or lien is subsequent and subordinate to the lien of complainant. The .answer of respondent Brockway alleges that "on the thirteenth day of January, 1876, the date of complainant's mortgage, as set out in his bill, the said property described in his said mortgage as [describing it] was owned by and the title was in the government of the United States, and that the same was then, and for a long time afterwards, a part of the public ,landsof the United States; and that neither at the date of the said mortgage, nor at any time since, has the said Demp,sey R. Walker, the mortgagor, had any title or interest in said xeal estate, and that neither the complainant nor his assignor took any interest in or lien on said real estate by virtue of the said mortgage set out in complainant's bill." It is further .alleged that on the twenty-sixth day of March, 1877, one Nicholas Walker entered the land in controversy, and received a patent therefor from the United States, and that he afterwards executed to the said respondent Brockway a mortgage upon the same, which he still holds unsatisfied. The prayer of the answer is that complainant's mortgage may be declared void and held for naught, and that respondent's lien be dedared a first and prior lien on said land. Brown If Campbell, for complainant. Webb If Glasse and T. C. Corey, for respondent Brockway. MCCRARY, C. J. There are several objections to granting -the relief sought by the respondent. 1. In the first place, if he were entitled in this case to that relief, it would be necessary for him to seek it by a cross-bill. It is well settled that any affirmative relief sought by a defendant in an equity suit must be by cross-bill, and can never
be granted upon the facts stated in the answer. Story's Equity Pleading, (Redfield's Ed. ) § 398a; McConnell v. Smith, 23 Ill. 611; Armstrong v. Pierson, 5 Iowa 317. 2. It is also well settled, that, according to the practice which prevails in the federal courts in a suit to foreclose a mortgage, the mortgagee's title cannot be questioned. The question of title must be investigated at law. In a foreclosure proceeding the court will not inquire what interest the mortgagee has in the mortgaged premises. 2 Jones on Mortgages, § 148.2; Bull v. Mel<mey, 27 Conn. 560; Palmer v. Mead, 7 Conn. 149 ; Hill v. Meeker, 23 Conn. 592; Williams v. RobinBon, 16 Conn. 517; Dial v. Reynolds, 96 U. S. 340. In the last-named case the supreme court, per Swayne, J., say: "It is well settled that in a foreclosure proceeding the complainant cannot make a person, who claims adversely to both the mortgagor and mortgagee, a party, and litigate and settle his right in that case. Barbour, Parties in Equity, 493, and the cases there cited." In Hill v. Meeker, 8upra, it appeared that the title of the mortgagee to one of several tracts of land embraced in the mortgage was denied. The case was exactly analogous to the one at bar, and the court held that the complainant could take the decree of foreclosure, leaving the parties at liberty to litigate the title in an action at law. The decree in this case will be modified so as to provide that said decree, and the sale thereunder, shall be without prejudice to the right of the respondent Brockway, by proper legal proceedings, to contest the legal title to the land described in the answer as claimed by him.
WALSH V. 101., C. & N. W. R. CO.
WALSR and others v. MEMPHIS, CARTHAGE & NOBTRWESTEBN R. Co. and others.
(Circuit Court, E. D. MiBBouri. March 28,1881.)
JOINDER OF PARTIES.
A corporation is a necessary party defendant to a bill to enforce a judgment against it by compelling contribution from its stockholders.
All the stockholders are also necessary parties in such a suit, if they apply to be heard. 3.
JURISDICTION-WHEN SUIT IS DIFFERENT STATES.
WHOLLY BETWEEN CITIZENS 01'
If A. and C. are citizens of the same state, and B., C., and D. are citizens of different states, a suit. in which A. and B. are plaintiffs and C. and D. defendants, and in which they are all necessary parties, is not one over which a United States court will take jurisdiction, on the ground that the controversy is "between citizens of different states. II To give a United States court jurisdiction on that ground the controversy must be Wholly between citizens of different states.
In Equity. Motion to Remand. This was a suit in equity to enforce certain judgments against the Memphis, Carthage & Northwestern Railroad Company, ,by compelling contribution-from holders of unpaid stock, and for other purposes. It was originally commenced in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, in the state of Missouri, by George W. Walsh, Union Savings Association, a corporation, William Lee, Joseph Shippen, Edward Burges, James J.Marks, and Hiram Driggs, citizens of the state of Missouri, H. R. Beers, A. M. Jay, S. M. Sovern, S. Pitzer, J. F. Pitzer, and Alfred Palmer, citizens of the state of Kansas, agamst Joseph Seligman, James Seligman, Jesse Seligman, John A. Stewart, J. M. Brown, and James M. Hyde, citizens of the State of New York, Memphis, Carthage & Northwestern Railroad Company, St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, A. A. Talmage, C. W. Rogers, W. J. Tower, Ezra Miller, and James Baker, citizens of Missouri, and R. W. Wright, a citizen of Kansas. The petition for removal was made by defendant Jesse Seligman alone, and set forth that he was a citizen of the state of New York; that ,