stinately refused to do, and the respondents were compelled to hire laborers to take their places and perform their work in discharging the cargo. The respondents had a right topursue this course and deduct the necessary sums paid these laborers from the libellants' wages. 1 Conk. 131. After the boat was unloaded a tender was made to the libellants of theirwages, less the reasonable sums paid the laborers who per. formed the libellants' work. The libellants refused the and subsequently filed their libel in this case. Upon service of process the respondents (under protest) paid to the marshal the amount claimed by the libellants, and the costs up to that. time, and the marshal paid the money. into court. It would have been mote regular had the respondents, under leave granted, paid the amount of wages tendered into court -at the time their answer was filed, in support of the tender set up inthelr answer. But, substantially, this was done, for the marshal had paid the money into court before answer filed. Under the proofs in the case, I am of opinion that the libel must be dismissed, with costs.
(DiMice Oourl, 8. D. New York. January 18, 1881.)
PRACTICE-DISHIBBAL OF LmEL-DELAY AFTER
ISSUB. The practice of the court does not authorize the dismissal of a libel for the libellant's delay in bringing the caU8e to a hearing after issuejoined. The claimant has an equal right to mOTe the case. Rules S. D. N. Y. 136, 123.
In Admiralty. The libel was filed in 1866' for salvage, and issue was joined. Both parties noticed the cause for trial, and it was placed upon the calendar. It was reserved generally in 1870, and had not been moved again until 1880. The claimants moved to dismiss the libel for failure to prosecute.
George Oha,e, for the motion. La Roy S. Gove, contra. CliOATE, D. J. I am satisfied that the practice of this court does not authorize the dismissal of a. libel under rule 136- for the libellant's delay in bringing the cause to a heal'ing after issue joined. The claimant has an equal right under rule 123t to move the case. On inquiry as to the practice I learn that such has been the construction put upon this rule heretofo.re. Therefore, although there has been delay which wOllla. long ago have barred the claim for staleness if suit had not been brought, or entitled these claimants to a dismissal if libellant had not taken out process; yet rule 123 has at all times put it in the power of the claimant to put an end to the delay. Though it seems that similar rules have elsewhere been differently construed, and though the libellant's delay is extraordinary, yet it would be unjust to dismiss his libe. consistently with the construction which has hitherto prevailed in this court. Motion denied.
-RULE 136. If the promovent in a libel or information neglects to proceed in the cause with the dispatch the course of .the court demands, the respondent or claimant may have the libel or information dismissed on motion, unless the delay is bj' order of Ule judge, or the act of the respondent or claimant. t RULE 123. So soon as issue is joined the respondent or claimant may notice a cause for hearing on his part, and be thereupon entitled to a decree dismissing the same, with costs, or such other decree as the case may demand, unless the libellant shall also notice the cause for the same time and proceed to trial or hearing, or obtain a continuance by order of the court on proper cause shown.
and 'others v.
(Circuit Court, E. D. Missouri.
April 5, 1881.)
INJUNCTION-INTERFERENCE WITH CONTROL OF PROPER,TY IN Pos. SESSION OF STATE CoURT.
No injunction will be granted by a United States court to interfere with the possession, control, or disposition of property which iii in the hands of 8 state court of co-ordinate jurisdiction,
RECEIVER-POSSESSION OF STATE COURT.
The of a receiver appointed by a state court is the possession of tl;:le court itself, and the disposition of the property by the receiver is a matter to be ordered by the state court, and will not be interfered with by a United States court by injunction. 3.
Where a state court has appointed a receiver. of the llropf,lrty of a corporation, and a fraudulent assignment has been made of the same, a United States court will not enjoin the asSignee from receiving such corporate property from the receiver, in case the state court having controhhereoforders it to be turned over to him.
In Equity. E. T. Allen and J. O. Broadhead, for plaintiffs. James Tau8sig and I. A. Madill, for defendants. TREAT, D. J. The plaintiffs, citizens of Iowa, bring this suit in behalf of themselves and other stockholders who may join against the defendant corporation, of which they are stockholders, and the assignee of said corporation. The pur. pose of the suit is to have the assignment made by the corporation, through its then corpora.te authorities. under the facts and circumstances alleged, adjudged void; and in addition thereto it is prayed that a receiver may be appointed and .an injunction against the assignee granted. The present motion is for a provisional injunction against the assignee. It appears that a petition pursuant to the statutes of Missouri was filed in the state circuit court for the removal of certain directors and the president of the defendant corporation, and such proceedings were thereupon had that said removals 'were decreed; and a special election ordered to fill the vacan" cies thus created in the board of directors. At the same time said court appointed a receiver of the corporate propv.6,no.9-53