the 'elaimanfsin'this'case were not 'vlilue, 'and a:re not entitled to the benefit of that rule. ' The taking of a promissory note the not affect their rights to lien. It is established· law that the taking of a .note does not extinguish the lien of the claim for which it was given unless such was the understanding of the partieS.' .' .'. .' , . . ", , The, first Item--f60.Q9-of account is The cla:ixns are allowed, without interest and without costs.
THESHARPEE SHE. BRALEY v. BELL. (DIstrict Court, S. p. New York-March 24, 1894.)
OOLLISION'-:-AlwHORED VESSEIr-BREAKING ADRIFT-INSECURE ANCHORAGE.
WlJen ,.1:ll.e ,owner of an. anchored vessel has reasonable notice of the Insufficiency of his anchorage, and the danger of drifting in a, storm, he takes the risks of such drifting, and a col1lslon caused thereby is due to his negleCt, and cannot be held to be Ineyitable.
Stewarl for libelant. John J,. ROach and Peter S. Carter, for respondent. BROWN, District Judge. During the storm of the night of September 13 to 14,1892, the defendant's yacht Growler;anchored upon the grounds of the Pavonia Yacht Club, at Commu'nipaw, dragged and fouled' the libelant's yacht Sharpee She, causing her some damage. The owners of both yachts were members of. tpe same yacht club. There 'Were no rUles of the club concerning the mode of anchoring;'lUid the sufficiency and responsibility of each must, therefore, be judged by the ordinary rules of law. I must find,upon the evidence, that the anchorage ground was an unsafe one' in storms, by the' usual methods of anchoring, and was known to be so. ' 'The ground was soft mud, beneath which were oyster under which was again mud. Anchors would not take a firm '. hold. Drifting and fouling' in stormS' had been previously frequent ; and the insecurity of the anchors was, I must find, sogenerally':known that reliance upon them in storm was at the risk of the owner that used them. 'Of the yachts were made fast to poles driven from six to eight feet into the mud. The libelant's yacht was made fast in that way, and held both yachts through the remainder of the storm after the Growler had fowed and remained pounding her. The storm in this case was not of any extraordinary severity; and where there is reasonable notice of danger of driftingin storms that are liable to arise, the owner takes the risk of 'reliance on means known to be of doubtful sufficiency. No accident in such cases can 'be held to be "inevitable." Many authorities to this effect are cited in the recent case of The Anerly, 58 Fed. 794. ' Decree for the libelant, with costs.
WILCOX & GIBBS GUANO CO. V. PHOENIX INS. CO.
WILCOX & GffiBS GUANO CO. v. PHOENIX INS. CO. OF BROOKLYN. CHARLES,TON BRIDGE CO. et al. v. FIRE INS. CO. MT. PLEASANT & S. I. FERRY CO. v. HOME INS. CO. OF CITY OF NEW YORK. CHARLES'l'ON BRIDGE CO. et at v. SAME. SAME v. PHOENIX INS. CO. (Circuit Court, D. South Carolina.
April 5, 1894.)
REMOVAL OF CAUSES-TIME OF REMOVAL-EXTENSION OF TIME TO PLEAD.
When the time within which defendant is required by the state statute to answer or plead is extended by special order of the court, a removal may be had under the act of 1888, within the extended period. Spangler v. Railroad Co., 42 Fed. 305, disapproved. When the petition shows that defendant is a corporation of another state, it need not allege that it is a nonresident of the state in which the suit is brought, and of which plaintiff is a citizen. Shattuck v. Insurance Co., 7 C. C. A. 386, 58 Fed. 6.09, followed.
BAME-EFFEOT OF REMOVAL-DEFAULT FOR ANSWER.
An order was entered in the state court February 5th, extending the time for answer to March 10th. The petition for removal was filed February 10th, the ground being diverse citizenship. The state court was not asked to approve the petition and bond until March 20th, when it was immediately done, and the record thereafter filed in the federal court. Held that, as the ground of removal was diverse citizenship alone, the mere filing of the petition and bond worked a change of jnrisdiction, and that, as defendant had allowed the time for answer to expire before filing the record in the federal court, that court must hold him in default for answer. Enlarging the time for answer does not operate as a "stay of proceedings," within the meaning of the South Carolina statute (Code Proc. § 402, sUbd. 6), and hence no notice to the adverse party is required, but the order may be made on ex parte motion and affidavit, under section 405 of the Code.
PRAOTIOE-ExTENDING TIME FOR ANSWER,
These actions were brought in a state court, and thence removed to this court by defendant. They are now heard together on motion to remand. Bryan & Bryan, Ficken & Hughes, and Buist & Buist (Mitchell & Smith, of counsel), for plaintiffs. Trenholm, Rhett & Miller, for defendants. SIM:ONTON, Circuit Judge. These are motions to remand the causes to the state court. In each of them the same question is presented. In the second case an additional ground for removal peculiar to it is suggested. The plaintiff began several actions in the court of common pleas for the county of Charleston, S. C., against the several defendants, by summons and complaint. The complaint of the Mt. Pleasant & Sullivan's Island Ferry Company was served on the defendant named therein on 25th January, 1894. The com· plaints in all the other cases were served on the defendants named in them, respectively, on 27th January, 1894. On 5th FebIllary, 1894, his honor, D. A. Townsend, a circuit judge of the state of South Carolina, out of term extended the time in which the defendants could file their answers in these several cases to 10th March, 1894. v.60F.no.7-59