Me. 482,7 AU. 212; Higgins v. Brown, 78 Me. 473, 5 At1.269; Harmon v. Har:tnon, 61 Me. 227; Davis v. Luster, 64 Mo. 43; Sanford v. Sornborger (.Neb.) 41N, W. 1102; Landa v. Obert, 45 Tex. 539; Eddy v. Herrin, 17 Me. 338; Richardson v. Duncan, 3 N. :a 508. We are notuIimindfu:l.Of the fact· that there is a line ·ofauthorities which maintain that a threat made to a wife to obtain the arrest of her husband on a crimin'al c!large, or to a parent to obtain the arrest of his child, does constitute such duress as will serve to vitiate a contract, if the threat in fact overcomes the' will, and occasions a forced assent, without reference to the question whether it was or was not a threat of a lawful arrest for adequate cause. This has sometimes been termed a species of duress. Eadie v. Slimmon, 26 N., Y. 9; Adams v. Bank, 116 N. Y. 606, 23 N. E. 7; Taylor v. Jaques, 106 Mass. 291; Lomerson v. Johnson(N. J. Oh.) 13 Atl. 8; and cases :there cited. But in the case at bar it is unnecessary to attempt to reconcile conlIicting views on this subject, which are perhaps irreconcilable. We entertain the opinion that, under the statutes of SOl1thDakota, complained of in the case at bar did not constitute such: duress' as .will invalidate the deed. If the threat was niade as stated by tile complainant, it was a threat of a lawful arrest, for, beyond all question upon the state of facts disclosed by the present record, the complainant's son was justly amenable to a .criminal prosecution; and the "menace," so termed, amounted to no more that a threat to have the criminal laws of the state executed, which the appellee, under the circumstances, had an undoubted right to demand. Moreover, we do not discover in this record any circumstances of oppression' or fraud, accompanying the alleged threat, which, would justify us in holding that the appellee took an. undue advantage of the appellant, or that his conduct towards him was either harsh or oppressive. Furthermore, after the deed was executed, and his son's debt had been canceled, the appellant rested content with the transaction for nearly three years, before discovering that he had been imposed upon. Under these circumstances, and for the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the bill was properly dismissed, and the decree of the circuit court is therefore affirmed.
DONHAM v. SPRINGFIELD HARDWARE CO. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. No. 371.
JUDGME NT-.rURISDJCTION- EQUITABLE REJ,TEF.
May 1, 1894.)
A judgment of a circuit court, rendered upon personal service on the defendant of a summons not delivered to the marshal until after Act March . 3, 1887, limiting tbe jurisdiqtlon of the court to matters exceeding $2,000, went into force. although the was filed before tbe act, will not be declared void on equity on the ground that the matter In dispute was less than $2,000. : .If erroneous, the remedy is by writ of error.
Appeal from the Circllit Oou,rt of the United State$ fo:r the Western District of MIssouri. .
DONHAM 11. SPRINGFIELD HARDWARE CO.
This was a suit by W. W, Donham against the Springfield Hardware Company to have a judgment against complainant declared void for want of jurisdiction. A demurrer to the bill was sustained. Complainant appealed. Henry C. Young and M. C. Cantrell, for appellant. G. M. Sebree, for appellee. Before CALDWELL and SANBORN, Circuit Judges, and THAY. ER, District Judge. CALDWELL, Circuit Judge. On the 23d day of February, 1887, A. C. Phillips, a citizen of the state of Arkansas, filed a complaint at law against W. W. Donham, a citizen of Missouri, in the United States circuit court for the central division of the western district of Missouri, to recover the contents of a promissory note for the sum of $550. A summons was issued the day the complaint was filed, and delivered to the plaintiff's attorney, who placed it in the hands of the marshal on the 23d day ot March, 1887. The summons was thereafter duly served, and, the defendant not appearing to the action, judgment by default was rendered against him on the 12th day of March, 1888, for $755.14, which was afterwards assigned to the appellee. The appellant filed this bill in equity, praying to have the judgment "declared null and void," upon the ground that the court "had no jurisdiction to render judgment for a sum less than $2,000." The lower court sustained a demurrer to the bill, and the plaintiff appealed. The contention of the appellant is that the action at law in which the judgment was rendered was not commenced until the summons was delivered to the marshal on the 23d day of March, 1887, and that at that time the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. 552), was in force, which declares that the circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance of suits "when the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of $2,000," and that, as the matter in dispute in the action was less than $2,000, the court had no jurisdiction of the cause, and its judgment therein is void. This contention is untenable. The summons in the case was served personally on the defendant. The court, therefore, had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. Having unquestioned jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, it had jurisdiction to determine the question whether the suit was commenced before or after the passage of the act of 1887, and whether the complaint stated a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the court. The decision of any or all of these questions would not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the cause. Its erroneous decision (If these or other questions could be corrected by the appropriate appellate procedure in a court which by law could review the decision. Until corrected in this manner, the judgment is as valid and binding as if the record disclosed on its face a cause of action dearly within the jurisdiction of the court It is well settled that the judgments of the United States courts rendered upon personal
'serVice on the' BettID.darit 'are binding until reversed, though no juri$diction be shown on the record. Skirving v. Insurance' CQ., BC. C. A.241,'59 Fedr742; Foltz v. Railway Co., 8 C. C. A. 635, 60 Fed. 316; Elder v. Mining Co., 7 C. C. A. 354, 58 Fed. 536. Assuming, but not deciding, that the court erred in rendering a judgment on a complaint in which the plaintiff claimed less than $2,000, the appellant has mistaken his remedy to correct that error. His remedy was by writ of errorJ and' not by a bill in chancery. The decree of the lower court is affirmed.
EXCHANGE BANK v. HUBBARD et at. (CIrcuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. May 29, 1894.) No. 112.
Where a promise is made In one state to accept a draft payable In another state, the law of the state where the draft Is made determines the validity, of the contract; and it Is immaterial that, by the statutes of the state where the .draft is payable, a promise to accept must be in writing, to be an actua,l llccceptance, and, If not in writing, can be enforced only by the persoll who draws or negotiates the bill. An action for breach of a promise to accept, drafts, to be made and negotiated to obtain money for a specified purpose, may be maintained by one who has taken such drafts for money furnished by him for said pur. pose on the faith of the promise. Defendants, requestedlI. & Co. to purchase for them certain cotton, and
TO ACCEPT DRAFT.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-ORAL PROMISE TO ACCEPT DRAFT-AcTION FOR BREACH.
PRINCIPAL AND AUENT-MONEY LOANED 'ON AGENT'S DRAFTS ON PRINCIPAL.
this promise, giving their drafts on defendants therefor, and therewith purchased the. cotton, which defendants received, but refused to accept the drafts, ,Held, that defe.ndants were liable to the bank as foc a loan made to them, and for their benefit, through their a'gents.
to' remit currency or to acceptdraftsfQr the amount loaned, at the lende1"8 option. H. & Co. obtained the money from a bank on the faith ot
to borrow the money to .pay therefor on defendants' credit, promising
In Error to therCircuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. . was an action by the Exchange Bank against Samuel T. Hubbard and others, doing business'lwder the :firm name of Hub· bard, Price & Co., for the amount of certain bills of exchange. A pemurrer to the complaint was oyel'l'illed (58 Fed. 530), but at the trial the judge directed the jury to :find a verdict for defend. ants, and judgment for defendants was entered thereon. Plaintiff brought error. John R. Abney (William B. McCarn, C. E. Spencer, and J.B. Abney, of counsel), for plaintiff in error. Sullivan & Cromwell (William J;"Curtis and Edward B. Hill, of counsel), for defendants in error. 'Before WALLACE, LACOMBE, Circuit Judges.
WALLACE, Circuit Judge. The plaintiff in the court below brings th.is writ of error to review a judgment for the 'defendants