OAKFIELD tI. UNITED STAn:s.
in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the court to which such suit should be removed; and "that the circuit court of the United States shall, in all suits removed under the provisions of this act, proceed therein as if the suit had been originally cop1menced in said circuit court, and the same proceedings had been taken in such suit in said circuit court as shall have been had therein in said state court prior to its removaL" The proceedings in the supreme court of the state, after the petition for removal, had resulted in that judgment, which was J;'eversed by the supreme court of the United States, and the cause was remanded, with directions to accept the bond for removal, and proceed no further with the case. A taxation of the costs in that court at $108.34 accompanied the mandate. Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. 118, 123, 1 Sup. Ct. 58. The state court thereupon, in form, itself reversed the judgment, and rendered this judgment for costs, with an award of execution. By these provisions of the statute of the United States, these proceedings of the state court came with the case into this court to have given them the same effect as if they had taken place in this court. There was but one case. This taxation of or judgment for costs came with it into this court. In it there could be but one final judgment, which would be that in this court; and into that all the previous proceedings in all the courts in which the case had been pending, including all taxations of costs in each court, would be drawn and merged. These costs in the state court would stand like those in the supreme court of the United States, to be taxed, and, if taxable, allowed, or, if not, disallowed. Whether they were taxable or not is not now material, for they cannot now be passed upon here. No relief can be granted here in respect to them unless the taxation became an enforceable judgment of the state court as a separate thing, which it could not be, and also follow the case, as it had to, into this court No reason is seen why the judgment in the superior court should not be set off against that in this court, nor why the set-off should not be decreed here, but without costs, because, without the other judgment, this court would have no jurisdiction, and in such case costs are not allowed. Rev. St. U. S. § 968. Decree for plaintiff for set-off of the superior oourt judgment, without oosts.
fJAMFIELD et at
(Circuit Court of Appeals: Eighth Circuit. March 18, 1895.)
APPBAL-REHEARINGS BYCmCUIT COURT 01' APPBALS.
The fact that a case decided by the clrenlt court of appeals fa one of great Importance Is not sumclent ground for granting a rehearing, when there fa no suggestion that any consideration or authority entitled to weight has been overlooked; and this Is especially true In cases arlBln. ander the· constitution and laws of the United States, as to which the declalon8ot that court are not made flnal by aecrtlon 6 of tbe judlcla1"1 a4lt otMarch S. 1891 (26 Stat. 826).
18 Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado. This was a proceeding brought by the United States against Daniel A. Camfield and William Drury, under the act of February 1S85 (23 Stat. 321), to compel the removal of an inolosure of publio lands. In the circuit court an exception to the answer was sustained, and, defendants having failed to plead further, a decree was entered against them. 59 Fed. 562. Defendants thereupon appealed to this court, and upon February 20, 1895, the decree was affirmed. 66 Fed. 101. Defendants have now moved for a rehearing. James W. McCreery, A. C. Patton, H. E. Churohill, and Charles W. Bates, for appellants. Henry V. Johnson, U. S. Atty., for the United States. Before CALDWELL, SANBORN, and THAYER, Cirouit Judges. PER CURIAM. A motion for a rehearing has been filed in this (lase, based on two grounds: First, that this court has no jurisdiction of the oase on appeal, because the case involved the constitutionality of an aot of congress; and, seoond, because the case is one of great importance. With reference to the first point, it may be said that the record lodged in this oourt did not disolose any constitutional question. In the cirouit oourt the government excepted to the sufficiency of a oertain defense whioh was pleaded in the answer. The exoeption was sustained, whereupon, for failure on the part of the defendants to plead further, a decree was entered in favor of the United States. The defenda;nts then prayed an appeal to this court, and assigned for error that the circuit court erred in sustaining the exceptions to the answer. The validity of the act of congress of February 25, 1885 (23 Stat. 321 c. 149), was not by the assignments of error, nor by counsel for the appellants, either in their oral or written argument. With reference to the second point of the motion, it will suffice to say, that while the case may..be, and doubtless is, one of much import· ance to the appellants, yet it is not suggested that the court has overlooked any consideration or authority which shou,ld have had weight in the deoision of the cause. Inasmuch as the case arises under the constitution and laws of the United States, and the de(Iision thereof by this court is not made final by seotion 6 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 .Stat. 517), no reason is perceived why a rehearing should be granted, and the motion in that behalf is therefore denied.
LUOKER v. PHOENIX ABSUD.. 00. OF LONDON. (OlrcultCourt, SouthoaroUna. Apl1l 6,
PaAOTICB IK CIVIL OA8E8-PBODUOTION OJ' . Boon AND PAPEBll.
The right given by Rev. at. · 124,to compel the produetfon of .boob and papers In aet!on at law, Is not· Umitedto requ1r!ng their prodnctlOD at the trial, ibutthe coJU1; may. In Its dlscretlon,grant an order for In· spectlon. with permission to eopy, prlorto· the date of, the' triaL .