(0i1'CUit Court, D. Nevada.' May 9, 1881.)
Section 1300 of the Compiled Laws of Nevada is a rule of decision.
Kirkpatrick If Stephens, for plaintiff. Robert M. Clarke, for defendant. HILLYER, D. J. This is a motion to vacate the satisfaction of judgment entered herein, set aside the sale, and revive the judgment to the extent of $4,000. It is based upon a petition, and by agreement of counsel has been submitted upon the petition and the answer thereto. The petition presented a case of total failure of title, and a demurrer to it was overruled. The answer makes the following case, which is agreed to as true:
The property was sold by the marshal, September 3, 1879, and at that time Withington, the defendant, had entered into a time contract with the state of Nevada, under section 3820 of the Compiled Laws, for its purchase, and had made at least one annual payment. The contract was still in force. MeWilliams bought the property for $4,000, and, on receipt of $2,000 in addition, entered satisfaction of the whole judgment on Octo1880, received the marshal's deed. On November 9,1879, and In ber 17, U"79, no annual payment having been made by either McWilliams or Withlngton, the state, as it had a right to do under the law, sold the lands to other partie3 and issued patents about December 16, 187!J ; so that at the date of the marshal's deed Withington had no interest in the property.
M'WILLIAMS V. WITHINGTON.
The petitioner avers that he has been unable to obtain possession II by f('·ason of the fact that said Withington had no title or interest therein or thereto, and the same was not subject to sale as the property of said Withington. "
The interest which a person has under a time purchase from the state, while the contract remains in force, is, in my judgment, property subject to sale upon execution. It is suoh an interest as the supreme court of Nevada describe in Bame. v. Sabron, 10 Nev. 240, as follows:
II To this land he (plaintiff) has the beneficial estate or interest, as web as the possess,ion, and as such equitable owner and actual possessor is entitled to enjoy all the incidents to the land (a water right) and its owner· ship, as well as the land itself."
And in Page v. Rogers, 31 Cal. 806, it was held that, both before and after the time for redemption had.expired, the purchaser at an execution sale had an equitable estate which could be seized and sold on execution. Lands in the new states have always been held to be taxable by the state before they are patented, if they have been purchased from the United States.
"And, indeed," says :Mr. Justice )IcLean, in delivering the opinion of the supreme court in Carrol v. Saffurd, "in Ohio, under the credit system, lands were taxed after the expiration of five years from the time of their purchase, although they had not been paid for in full." 3 How. 459. Bee, also, People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 648, and cases cited; Witherspoon v. Duncan,4 Wall. 219; Hughes v. U. S.4 Wall. 232 i U. M. It Manul'g 00. v. Dangberg, 2 Sawy. 455.
At the date of this sale by the marshal Withington had entered into a contract with the state of Nevada for the purchase of this land. The price was agreed upon, and he had paid a portion of the purchase money, and was to pay the rest in annual instalments, and to have a deed upon making the last payment. He had the actual possession, and was in receipt of every benefit which would have come to him from full ownership. That he had a valuable interest in the land it needs no argument to prove. He or his successor in inter. est was the only man in the world, so long as he kept the contract in force, who had a right to make the payments and preserve his interest. To the extent of his payments already made he had a pecuniary interest, which would increase each
year until the contract was performed and the patent delivered. At the close, and after he had fully paid for the land, but had not received his patent, he would still have but the equitable title, but it would be such an equitable title as virtually to constitut him the owner. The difference between l his position then and before, while his contract remained in force, was in degree only. He had purchased the land, and had agreed to pay the price in instalments. So long as he lived up to his agreement be was entitled to the possession, and the whole beneficial ownership. Barnes v. Sabron, supra. If Withington had' a vendible interest at the date of the sale, as I think clear, and there was no fraud,-and we canl}.ot, in .the absence of proof, presume any,-the whole matter is narrowed down to this question: whether it was the duty of Withington to continue to make payments to the state after the sale, and, if not, did the right to do so pass by the sale to the plaintiff, MeWilliams? In the absence of any misrepresentation on the part of the defendant as to the 'extent of his interest at the date of the mortgage, I cannot see upon what principle he would be bound to go on with his annual payments. So long as the property remained his under the contract it would be of interest to him to pay the instalments as they fell due; but after the property was sold the case would be different. I do not see that he would be any more bound to continue the payments than in case he had assigned his interest in the contract voluntarily. And clearly, in that case, it would take a new personal contract on his part at the time to enable his assignee to compel him to make the payments. McWilliams purchased at the execution sale his interest in the land, which included the right to complete the payments himself and thus perfect the title. He succeeded to the interest of Withington and nothing more. The right of MeWilliams, the purchaser at the marshal's sale, to go on and carry out the contract with the state seems to follow as a necessary deduction from the finding t,hat the interest of Withington was subject to sale under execution. Wilere there had been a sale of land uncleI' execution by a
mistaken description, of which land the debtor, Bouse, was, and for a long time had been, in possession, it was held that the purchaser had an equity which could be enforced by proper proceedings, and that, whenever a party is in such a situation as to be entitled to call for a specific performance, he then has such an interest as may be transferred by execution sale.
"And as a matter of course," says the court, "when the law once annexes to the debtor's interest in land the incident of transferability, it must manifestly follow that the purchaser will immediately succeed to and occupy the status of him whose estate the sheriff's deed purports to convey; otherwise the statute respecting execution sales would be utterly inoperative, so far as regards equitable interest in land." Morgan v. Bouse, 53 :Mo. 219.
In Hodges v. Saullders, 17 Pick. 470, it was held that the benefit of an agreement, made by the defendant in the nature of a covenant for further assurance, passed with the estate to the purchaser. The sale was an official sale by an administrator for the payment of debts, and the eatate passed solely by force of the statute, and not by reason of any interest the grantor [administrator] personally had in it. An assignee under a sheriff's sale is the assignee of the original party,-as much so as if 'the latter had assigned to him directly. McCrady v. Brisbane, 1 N. & M. 104; Redmine v. Brown, 10 Ga. 811. In White v. Whitney, 3 Met. 81, it was held that the purchaser at sheriff's sale of the equity of redemption of a mortgaged estate buys the whole estate, subject to the mortgage, and a covenant that the premises are free from encumbrances passes to him. For the breach of this covenant hemay have an action.
"It was," says the court, "a covenant incident to the estate made for its security and protection, benetidal to the person to whom the estate should come; but to no other. It was part of the debtor's right, title, and interest in the premises."
The legal effect and operation of the sheriff's deed was t() transfer this covenant to the purchaser. When thecovellant runs with the land it is immaterial whether it pass by deed from the grantee or by a sheriff's deed. The grantee in the
sheriff's deed is as much the assignee of such a covenant as though the conveyapce were made by the covenantee himself. Garten v. Ex'r of Denman, 3 Zab. 271. It seems to me there is a clear analogy between the case at bar and these just cited. Page v. Rogers, supra, at page 306, in illustrating the similarity between a voluntary vendor for cash with a covenant to convey in six months and a defeasance back, and an involuntary sale of a debtor's interest in land with a right to redeem, the court said:
" In the case of the voluntary vendor, as well as of the judgment debtor, other parties, by purchasing his interest under executions or upon voluntary sales, could acquire his interest and defeat the estate of the vendee by performing the conditions, as well as in the case of redemptioners under execution sales."
Thus, whenever it is determined that a debtor has an interest in land which is subject to seizure and sale under execution, then the marshal's certificate of sale transfers the whole of that interest to the purchaser, of whatsoever nature, legal or equitable, it may be. If equitable, the purchaser acquires a right to do those things which are necessary to preserve the estate. In this case, McWilliams purchased a valuable estate in the land, and he got all he purchased at the sale. If he failed to complete the payment and perfect the title it was his own fault. The law (section 3820, Compo Laws) is framed with a view to transfers of interest during the continuance of the contract. It is provided that "when full payment shall have been made patents shall issue to the pUj'chaser, his or her heirs or assigns." I think, then, that McWilliams, after the purchase by him of Withington's interest, was subrogated to him in respect to this time contract, and had an undoubted right to make payments thereon. It is still insisted that the remedy in a case like this ought to be sought by action and not by motion. It is of little importance now, for the motion must be denied. I examined the matter very carefully when the demurrer was decided, and, if the case made here were as stated in the petition, should see no reason to doubt the correctness of my former ,conclusion. This is a proceeding of an equitable character,
SLAVONIAN MINING CO. V. PERASICH.
-the vacating of the order of satlsfaction,-and is between the original parties; no rights of third parties have intervened. 2 Jones, Mort. 1668. I think, too, as was held in passing upon the demurrer, that section 1300 of the Compiled Laws of Nevada, which gives a remedy by petition to the purchaser at execution sale, on failure of title, etc., is a rule of decision, and that we are bound to carry it out so long as the remedy provided is substantially in accordance with the modes of equity prucedure. Motion denied. SAWYER, C. J., concurs.
(Oircuit Oourt, D. Net>ada. May 16, 1881.)
1. MJliIING LAW-AllENDlmNT-SECTION 2324, REv. 1ST., JANUAlty 22, 1880. This amendment does not act retrospectively, so as to save a claim from a forfeiture incurred before its passage.
There cannot be any relocation, before the period within which work is required has expired, which can be made valid a failure to work on the part of the original locators.
3. SAME-RESUMPTION OF WORK. There be a bona fide attempt, at least, to resume. Threats seven miles from the claim, without any act towards carrying them out, are not a sufficient excuse for non-performance. .
Hdd, also, that if the relocators had entered, and were in actual possession after a forfeiture, although they had not relocated, the original locators would have no right to make a forcible entry for the purpose of resuming work.
George E. Harpham, for plaintiff. Walter H. Tompkins and A. G; EJlis, for defendants. HILLYER, D. J. This is ejectment for a mining cla-im in Columbus mining district, Nevada. A jury has been waived by written stipulation. It is submitted to the court mainly upon an agreed statement of facts; the only dispnted facts