trade was through the Gulf of Mexico, what necessity was there for the permission to use gulf ports? It might be natural to exclude dangerous ports, but if the vessel was authorized to coast through the gulf, the permission to use ports is unnecessary. Again, if the coasting trade upon the United States Atlantic coast necessarily implies voyages through the gulf, why was the permit given to use any ports not west of New Orleans, when these United States gulf!ports had never been excluded in the printed part of the policy? 'l'he fact that the vessel is to be a coaster on the United States Atlantic coast, coupled with a permit to use certain ports in the gulf, indicates that without the permit the vessel could not go into the gulf. The permit apparently enlarges the ,previous limitation, especially as domestic ports not west of New Orleans had never been excluded. The meaning of the written orandum was that the vessel was to be employed on the United States Atlantic coast, which was the coast of the Atlantic ocean, and not of the Gulf of Mexico j but that, if necessity or occasion required, she was to be permitted to go into the Gulf of Mexico and use the ports not west of, New Orleans, but not that her coasting trade was thereby to be extended through the gulf. When she was engaged in transporting a cargo from Maine to Morgan City, she was not in the Atlantic coasting trade, but upon a voyage outside of the terms of the contract. Let judgment be entered for the defendant.
MILLlNGER and others.
(Circuit Oourt, 8. D. New York. February 2, 1880.)
The court has power to open a judgment rendered upon default for the purpose of correcting errors of fact in the amount of the judgment arising from the inadvertent omission of the plaintiff to give credits and allow payments made by the defendant, or out of his propflrty, upon the plaintiff's claim, which should have been deducted at the time of the assessment of damages.
E. B. Hill, Asst. Dist. Att'y, for the United States. Roger M. Sherman, for defendants. SHIPMAN, D. J. The default in this case was taken in the year 1872, and judgment was thereupon rendered against the defendants. The only tenable reason for opening the judgment is that, in the assessment of damages, credits were omitted from the amount of the plaintiff's original claim, presumably by inadvertence and mistake. The court has powar to open a judgment rendered upon default for the purpose of correcting errors of fact in the amount of the judgment, arising from the inadvertent omission of the plaintiff to give credits and allow payments made by the defendant, or out of his property, upon the claim of the plaintiff, which should have been deducted at the time of the assessment of damages. Crookes v. Maxwell, 6 Blatchf. 468. The defendant is open to the charge of laches, (Avery v. U. S. 12 Wall. 804,) but, under all the circumstances of the case, I am inclined to open the judgment for one purpose only. The judgment is opened only for the purpose of are-assessment of damages, and of allowing the defendant to give evidence of payments made by Millinger, or out of his property, which should have peen allowed and have been deducted from the face of the assessment, but not for the purpose of givingevidence of other defences to the plaintiff's claim than those of payments which had been made by Millinger, or by Millinger's property, upon the assessment prior to the date of the judgment. Let there be a reference to ascertain and report the amount of such payments thus inadvertently omitted in the computation of the amount due at the date of the judgment.
and others v. FLETCHER and another.
(Oircuit Oourt, D. Indiana, May 31, 1881.)
Extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove that a real party in a suit was not a party to the record, but that he prosecuted or defended the suit in the name of a nominal party; and, When so shown, the real party is concluded by the judgment as effectually as if he had been a. party to the record.
X. by fraud induced the plaintiffs to sell him certain goods on time. Plaintiffs afterwards brought an action of replevin against A., B· o and C., then in possession of the goods, and in that action judgment was rendered against the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs brought this suit. against the defendants to recover the value of the goods. Held, that. the judgment in the replevin suit was conclusive against the plaintiffs, it being shown that A., B., and C. were the agents of the defendants, who had appeared and defended the suit in their name.
Gordon, Lamb et Sheppard, for plaintiffs. Rand et Taylor and Baker, Rord et Hendricks, for defend-
ants. GRESHAM, D. J. This suit is brought by Claflin &; Co. against Stoughton A. Fletoher and Franois Churohman, for the value of a lot of dry goods which one George Hazard, by fraudulently representing that he was solvent, when in faot he was insolvent, induced the plaintiffs to sell to him on time. It is averred that Fletoher & Churchman bought the gooQs at .sale on executipn againat Hazard. after being notified of the latter's fraud, and that the plaintiffs had oancelled the sale and demanded possession of the property. The defendants answer that for some time before their purchase of the goods. they had been in the custody of John W. Cottom, Robert S, Foster, and Ellis 'G, Shantlin, as th& ag(')uts of the defendants; that prior to the ma.rshal's sal& the phl.intiffs dema.nded. possession of the. ,goods of such l:i.gents, who, under instructions from the defendants, refused