Fitzgerald; It wa,a held thatrthe aSi!$ignment conveyed the legal title to the p81tent ,afterwards issued. The court held that, as the assignor possessed the inchoate right to the exclusive use of the invention at the time he made the assignment, and had the discovery, and p;repared the specification of the patent, aud as the was intended to operate upon the perfect legal title which the inventor then had a right to obtain, because it requested that the patent might issue to the there was no sound reason for restraining the assignment to the inchoate interest and requiring of the patent. In the present case, the patent had been allowed and order,ed to issue before the assignment was made, and the assignment refers to that fact, and to the fact tQat the pUrchase is of all the right, title and interest of Heath in the "in consequence of the grant of letters pat(;lnt therefor." The defendant does not set up any right dElrived from Under the above it must be held tnat patent issued to Heath the legal right to the, became vested in the company, on the, recording of the !Lssigpment to it. The, plaintiff is entitled' to usual interlocutory decree for an account and a perpetllal injunction.
THE BROTHERS. ,BEACHAM
Maryland. MaY"20, '1881.)
were put upon a vessel by a firm of ship-builders, of which one of the' part owners was 'a member, ' Libeli'lll personam was instituted by the firm against all the part owners to obtain a decree againstthetnin solido.for the repairs. , ,'lIeld" that suep, ,a libel in personam, in which the same person is 'cirie'of libellants and also one of the' respondents, could not be mMntained. '
Libel in p,-r8onam for repairs.
, TIlE BBOTB:EBS;
'Thoma,s S. Bher, for libellants.' Sebastian Brown, for respbn'dents. MORRIS, D. J. This is il; libel in perSonltm,'brOl1ght by Samuel T. Beacham and another, constituting the mercantile' firm of John S. Beacham & Brother, against the said Sam- ' nel T. Beacham and 11 other persons, part owners of the bark Brothers. In 1878, Hays, one 6f the part owners,was the ship's husband, or managing owner; and, acting on behalf of all the owners, he let the bark for a voyage fiorn' Brunswick, Georgia, to Rio Janeiro. When she 'Was about to enter upon her charter, she was discovered to be leaking and unfit for the voyage, and she was senfby the oWner to the libellant's ship-yard, and. had: neeessaryrepairs . putupon her at a cost of $1;627. She was soon afterwards repairs the libellant's received a;' lost at sea. ,Of the bill small sum from the managing owner, being theba:lance of the ship's earnings in his hands; and reeeived from" him, and also from most'of the bther part owners, including Stimnel T. Beacham, proportions, of the balance of the' bill equal to their respective shares in: the' ship:' 'Certain dthers ' of the owners refused to pay anything, 'and this sui'tis brought against all to recover the unpaid balance of $339. ' As to the defendants Baier Brothers, owners of one-sixteenth of the bark, '1 satisfied from the testimony' that they notified libellants at the'commencement of the repairs that they would not be responsible f6r'any part'of th:e'eost,' and that libellantswentori'with"the work, taking the riskdf getting paid as to,that Ironi the earhirigs ofthe:vessel" to into the h.arids' oftlle 6met Or by the' other owners. As to thetlther' owners who 'have refused to pay, while there is no evidence of express authority from them authorizing these particular repairs to be done, there is no evidence of any dissent; and as it appears that the managing owner had been acting as such for several years, and that during that time all matters connected with the management of the vessel and her employment had been eommitted to him, and that these repairs were necessary to .enable the vessel to perform her charter, I think that prima
facie he was agent of the owners, with authority to bind them for repairs, and that any restriction of this implied authority must be proved by the owners to have been known . to thE1creditor. Maclachlan, 108; Revens v. Lewis, 2 202. There is, however, a defence set up of a technical character which I have not felt at liberty to disregard, l;tnd which I hfl,ve not been able. satisfactorily to answer. It, is the objection that in no suit (except in equity) can the same time one of. person be one of the plaintiffs and, at the defendants. I do not see that in this case the objection could. be cured by amendment. ' The su,it is based and th& libel is framed UpOll' liability of all the. owners to respond. to the creditor jointly and in In such a suit the failuretojoin. all the owners as defendants could objected to Maclachll;tn,117; 2 Conkling.'s Adn;t. by plea in 23; Benedict's Adm. § 387; 1 Ship. The defendants, who have paid their share, are still liable under this libel for ,the residue, (1 Parsons, Ship. and Adm. would 4e a decree in favor of Samuel To 102,) and the Beacham and against Samuel. T. Beacham, and could not be a decree against any of the defendant's separately. Jenks' 'v. pewis, 1 Ware, 51; Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumner, 1. . Courts of admiralty, have no general jurisdiction to adminiilter relief as courts of equity, and will not assume jurisdiction in matters of account between part ownel"s. The 2Curtis, 434; Davis v. Child,'l pavis,.80,; Andrews v. Ins. 00. 8 Mason, 16; Ward v. Thompson, 22 H. 830; Orleam v. Phceb1U, 11 Pet. '175; 1 Parson,s, Ship. and Adm. 116. I am constrained to think that the libel must be dismissed.
DOWELL V. APPLEGATE,
(Oircuit Oourt, D. Oregon. July 8, 1881.)
CONVEYANCE-INSUFFICIENTLY 'STAMPED...-.EFFECT OF.
Section 152 of the interD:al revenue act of June 30, 1864, (13 St. 292,) as amended' by act of July 13, 1866, (14 St. 141,) while it avoids the- recOrd of a deed not duly stamped, or upon which the stamp is not: cancelled, does not affect the :validity o( the otiginaI. Section 156 of said act (13 St. 293) imposes penalty upon the vendor for not cancelling a stamp put upon his conveyance; but does not affect the validity o:f the conveyance itself. Sootion 158 of said act, (13 St. 293,) as amended by the act of July 1866, (14 St. 142,) imposes a penalty upon the maker for not duly stam,lling his conveyance, or omitting to cancel a stamp thereon, anddilclares the same void if either omission was made" with intent" to defraud the· government i but whoever seeks to set aside or avoid a cQnveyance on that ground, must allege and prove such fraudulent intent. ,
OMISSION TO STAMP CONVEYANCE.
An allegation that a conveyance was made and stamped .for less than the aotl1'al consideration, with intent to aid or give color to a former fraudulent conveyance of the same premises to the grantor, or that such conveyance was made !'ond stamped for an "inadequate" consideration, does not show that such conveyance was not duly stamped with intent to evade the stamp act.
CoNVEYANCE TO DEFRAUD CREDITORS.
A purchaser from the grantee in a conveyance to defraud creditors, without notice of the fraud, is, nevertheless, liable to any of such creditors for any portion of the purchase money remaining unpaid after notice of the fraud, and a court of equity will give suell a creditor a lien upon the premises for that amount:
B. F'. DoweU, in propria persona. W. Carey Johnson, for defendants.. DEADy,D.J. This case was commenced in the state circuit court for Douglas' county on October 11, 1879, and after sundry proceedings therein was removed to this court by the plaintiff, on December 23,1880, on the ground that its determination involved the construction of certain provisions of the internal revenue act of June 30. 1864, (13 St. 223,) and the amendments thereto. v.7,no.11-56