to experiment with this conrt; and, after having had a trial and being defeated, they are now disposed to fall back upon a point which they ought to have raised in the first instance. The motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction is therefore overruled.
FIRST NAT. BANK OF OSWEGO 'V.
(Oircuit Oourt, N. D. New York. July 9,1881.)
1. MUNICIPAL BONDS-AuTHORITy-RATIFICATION.
Whether the commissioners of the defendant complied with the statutory requirements in issuing its bonds or not, the defendant ratified their act by paying interest for six or seven years upon the bonds, and retaining the stock of the railroad company received in exchange for the bonds.
SAME-SAME-REcITALB-BoNA FIDE PURCHASER.
Whether the recital of the bonds, tIiat theywel'e issued" by virtue of an act of the legislature of New York, entitled," etc., warranted a purchaser in assuming without examination that the agents of the defendant had complied with the statutory requirements in issuing the bonds, query.
Rhodes et Richardson, for plaintiff. C. H. Roys, for defendant.
WALLACE, D. J. A question is made in this case whether the recitals upon the face of the bonds issued in the name of the defendant are such as to authorize a purchaser to assume that the agents of the defendant had complied with the statutory requirements in issuing the bonds. If they were not sufficient, it was incumbent upon a pu,rchaser to examine into the preliminary proceedings in order to ascertain whether or not the commissioners had observed the conditions which the statute imposed upon their action. The recital upon the face of the bonds is that they were issued "by virtue of an act of the legislature of the state of New York, entitled," etc. . In Pompton v. Cooper Union, 101 U. S. 196, the supreme· court of the United States held that where the bonds recited.
FIRST NAT. BANK OF OSWEGO V. TO'WN OF WALOOTT.
on their face that they were issued "in pursuance" of an act of tlielegislature of New Jersey, a bonafide purchaser had a nght to presume the power of the agents was properly oised, and was not bound· to look beyond the question of its existence. In that case, as in the present, the recital was of a legal conclusion; but in that case it was a legal conclusion which was not warranted unless there had been a compliance with the statute, while here it might be correct, although there had not been a compliance. A recit(tUhat bonds have been issued by virtue of a certain statute may mean only that the authority to issue them was derived from' the statute, being used as the equivalent of legal efficacy or power. Assuming, however,that the recital is not a sufficient pro. tection to the plaintiff as a bona fide purchaser of the coupons, it must be held, upon the controlling authority of Irwin v. The Town of Ontario, 3 FED. REP. 49, that the defendant has ratified the act of the commissioner in issuing the bonds by paying interest for six or seven years upon the bonds, and retaining the stock of the railroad company received in exchange for the bonds. It is urged that the. town was compelled to pay interest, and that the payments were not the voluntary act of the defendant. Assuming that to be so, it is shown that, upon the delivery of the bonds, the town a of stock in the railroad .company for 1,280 shares in 1871, and has retained that stock, with the right to participate as a stockholder, from that time to this. It was certainly competent for the town, when its agents issued its obligations under circumstances which did not justify them in doing so, to repudiate the act, and upon returning or offering to return the benefits derived, to demand a rescission of "the transaction as between itself and the other original parties to the transaction. Instead of doing this, it has lain by all these years; and, in the meantime, its obligations have been transferred from dealer to dealer in the market, in part, doubtless, in reliance that by the regular payment of interest the defendant recognized its obligations, and by its long acquiescence in what had taken place did not. intend to question its liability. Practically, such
tions would be influential in giving currency and to the 'bond$; and, upon the principle of ratification, ianQw too late to permit the defenda,nt, while the of the transaction, to dispute its obligations. Judgment is ordered for the plaintiff.
July 15, 1881.)
LARCENY OJ!' INDIAN PROPERTY.
The Indilm intel'courseact of June 80, '1834, (4 St. 729,) was ex· tended over Oregon, so 'far as the same was applicable thereto, by act of June 5, 1850, (9 St. 437.) Held, that the provision of said act of 1834, providing for the punishment of a white man for stealing the property of an 'Indian, and 'vice 1J8r8a, was applicable to Oregon, and thereafter in force there; and that, the same was not modified or repealed by the admission of the state into the Union,'Februa,ry 14; 1859. 11 St. 383.
UMATILLA RESERVATION AN INDIAN COUNTRY.
The treaty of June 9, 1855, (12 St. 445,) establishing the Umatilla reservation for the exclusive use of certain Indian tribes, was not modified or repealed by the act admitting Oregon into the Union, and from the date of such treaty, and by reason thereof, such reservation was and is" Indian country," and all laws for the punishment of crimes committed in such country are applicable thereto, and 'may be enforced in the United States courts for the district of Or. egon. 8.
INTERCOURSEWrrH THlll INDIAN TRmEs.
The power of congress to regulate the intercourse between the inhabitants of the United States and the Indian tribes therein, is not limited by state lines or governments, but may be exercised and enforced wherever the SUbject-Indian tribes-exists.
Rufu8 Mallory, for the United States. The defendant, in person.
DEADY, D. J. On July 7, 1881, an information was filed in this court by the district. att0rney charging, the defendant with the larceny of a blanket from an Indian on the Umatilla Indian reservation in this district. The defendant pleaded not guilty, and the case was submitted to the court upon an