UNITED, STATES V. SPI1i:L.
UNI1'ED BTATES V. SPIEL,
(District Court, D. Minnesota.
August 15, 1881.)
OF LWl'rATIONS. State statutes of limitations do not run against claims of the United 8tates. 2. GEN. ST. MINN', c. 77, 1, AND c. 53, § 19-JoINT JUDGliENTS. By chapters 77, § 1, and 53, § 19, Gen. St. Minn., a joint judgment against the deceased and others, obtained during his life-time, may, upon his death, be prosecuted against his representative alone. '
,Demurrer to Complaint. H. F. Masterson, for demurrer-. W. W. Billson, U. 8. Att'y, cmttr,a. NELSON, D. J. This suit is brought upon a judgment obtained against David Rohrer, administrator of the estate of Henry Tilden, deceased, J. C. Ramsey, Benjamin F. Hoyt, Louis Roberts, Jame,s McBoal, D. F. Brawley, David L. Fuller, and B. W. Brunson, January 5, 1857. 'The administrator of J. C. Ramsey alone is now sued, and a demurrer is interposed by him to the complaint. The questions in the case raised on the demurrer are whether the action can be maintained against the representative of the deceased debtor alone; and, further, is the action barred by the statutes of Minnesota limiting the time when actions upon judgments can be brought tolO years? The judgment was rendered against all the parties above named, and in the complaint appears to be a joint one. In my opinion (1) the statute of limitations of 'the state of Minnesota does not run again'st the United States whether the claim rests in judglaw, on the death of Ramsey the ment or not; (2) by the suit upon the judgment could be brought only against the survivors. . By the statutes of Minnesota (seechapter 77, § 1, and chapter 53, § 19, Gen. St. Minn.) the estate of Ramsey is liable; and, although the judgment is joint, the liabilitJ' is the same as if tpe judgment had been against him alone. Again, the judgment against the administrator of Ramsey would be de bonis testatoris, while against the sur· viving joint it should be de bonis propriis. It would seem to follow,'then, that the action ,must be brought against the administrator of Ramsey separately, and he cannot be joined with the surviving obligors. It is unnecessary, however, to go to this extent to sustain' the in this action, for the liability of the estate is fixed by the statute. . Demurrer overruled, with leave to anl>wer in 20 days.
(District Oourt, W. D. Pennsl/l1Jallia.
The decree of a district court of the United States, upon a bill in equity filed by an asslgnee.in bankruptcy against an assignee under the bankrupt's deed of voluntary assignment, requiring the latter to deliver to· the former assets of the bankrupt, is conclusive in all collateral proceedings.
The voluntary assignee is entitled to the protection of such decree, notwithstanding, by consent of the parties, he Withdrew his appeal therefrom, and by the like consent the district court modified its decree, it appearing, that he acted in good faith and under the advice of counsel. .. .
But the modified decree having excepted from the order directing the delivery of the assets to the assignee in bankruptcy certain mone.vs which the vol. untary assip:nee had collected and claiIned to have disbursed under the deed of voluntary assignment, hela; that to the extent of the excepted fund he might be compelled to settle an account of his trust in the'state court having jurisdiction thereof.
S. T. Neill, for complainant. John J. Henderson, for respondent. In Equity. Sur application for injunction to restrain the defend. ants from proceeding in the court of common pleas of Crawford county. Pennsylvania, to compel Joseph A. Neill to settle an account as trustee under a deed of voluntary assignment, etc. ACHESON, ·D. J. I agree with the learned counsel of the complainant as to the conclusive effect of the decree of this court (made by the late Judge Ketcham) in the case of William H. Abbott, assignee in bankruptcy of the Titusville Savings Bank, against Joseph A. Neill, in so far as that decree operated upon the assets of the bank. rupts by requiring the delivery thereQf to the assignee in bankruptcy. No opinion having been filed by Judge Ketcham, the ground of his decision does not certainly appear. It is enough, however, that a decree was made by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matter of the suit, and that the decree stands in force. It is true that, by consent of the parties, an appeal from said decree, which the complair ant, Neill, had taken to the circuit court, was subsequently withdrawn, and thereupon this court, by and with the like consent, modified its decree. But it seems to me that the complainant was not thereby deprived of the protection of the decree. There is nothing to suggest bad faith on his part in withdrawing his appeal, and he was acting under the advice of counsel learned in the law. Bradley's