foreclosure IS a means by which the plaintiffs place themselves in proper position to attack the deed. It would be an unnecessary delay to compel the plaintiff to obtain a decree of foreclosure, and then to commence the suit which is to determine the only seriouslymooted question in the litigation. The law's necessary delay frequently causes inconvenience and injury to suitors. Courts should' be careful not to create delay and multiply expenses by unnecessary technicalities. If the questions are severed the severance will unnecessarily postpone the adjudication of the substantial and vital question in dispute, while the union of the questions will subject the defendants to no inconvenience and to no additional expense. The second cause of demurrer is overruled.
UNITED STATES V. HAZARD
and others, Executors.-
(Circ'uit Court, E. D. PennsylfJania. July 8, 1881.)
1. TAX ON LEGACIES-WHEN IT ACCRUED-AcTS OF CONGRESS. By the act of congress of June 30, 1864, relating to legacy and succession taxes, as modified by the act of July 13, 1866, no tax was imposed until the
beneficiaries under the will, or intestate laws, came to the possession or enjoyment of their property.
SAME-SnnLAml'Y OF PROVISIONS AS TO LEGACY AND SUCCESSION TAXES.
The provisions of the act in this respeet were substantially the same with regard to the legacy tax as with regard to the succession tax, and the decision in Clapp v. Mason, 94 U. S. 589, relating to the latter, applies equally to the former.
SAME-LEGACffiS VESTING IN POSSESSION AFTER REPEAl, OF ACT.
The act of 1874, unlike the act of 1862, created no lien or charge until the government was authorized to demand the tax, and hence legacies which did not vest in possession or enjoyment until after the repeal of the act are not liable to the tax.
Motion for judgment in a suit brought by the United States to recover a legacy tax. The jury, by a special verdict, found substantially the following facts:
Erskine Haz lrd died February 14. 1865, leaving personal estate valued at $163,046.42. By his will he gave to his wife the full use and enjoyment of all his estate and property during her life, and he directed that at her death the remainder of his properLY be divided equally in shares among snch of his children as might then be living and the families of those who might have died leaVing issue. He further directed that the shares which should thus fall to two of his danghters (naming them) should be placed with a trus1
*Reported by h'rank P. Prichard, E.'j., of the Philauelphia bar.
company, upon certain trusts, for their benefit. Testator's widow died August. 17, 1874. leaving fiv·e children surviving. If upon the above facts the court should be of opinion that the estate which came into the hands of the executors at the death of the widow was liable to a legacy tax, then verdict for plaintiff for $1,630.44. If the court should be of opinion that such estate was liable not only to the tax, but also to a penalty for non-payment, then verdict for plaintiff for $1,826.04. If the court should be of opinion that such estate was not liable to a legacy tax, then verdict for defendant. . John K. Valentine, U. S. Dist. Att'y, for plaintiff. Samuel Dickson and John C. Bullitt, for defendants. BUTLER, D. J. Judgment must be entered for the defenda.nt on the special verdict. The testator having died in 1865, the claim of the government rests on the act of 1864, as modified in 1866. By this act, thus modified, no tax was imposed until the under the will, or intestate laws, came to the possession or enjoyment of their property. The provisions, in this respect, touching legacies and successions, were substantially the same,-if not identical; and the decision in Clapp v. Mason, 94 U. S. 589, therefore, leaves nothing open to discussion. What is said in that case applies with equal force here. This act-differing from that of 1862-created no lien or charge until the government was authorized to demand the tax. N() right accrued until that time. The legacies here involved did not vest in possession or enjoyment until 1874,-four years subsequently to the repeal of the statute. This view renders an examination of other questions discussed by counsel unnecessary. What is, or is not, a vested legacy or devise, under the decisions in this state, is often a. very difficult question. Here we need not consider it.
BRICE, Executor, etc.July 8, 1881.)
(Circuit COU1't, E. D. Pennsylvania.
Upon facts substantially identical with those of the case of U. S. v Haza1'd. just preceding, a legacy 7wld not liable to legacy tax, upon the principles laid down in that case.
Motion for judgment in a suit brought by the United States to recover a legacy tax. The jury, by a special verdict, found substantially the following facts: Singleton A. Mercer died October 14,1867, leaving personal estate valued at $133,866.08. By his will he gave to his wife, Maria Mercer, his household goods and silver plate, absolutely, and the residue of his estate he gave to a
*Reported by Frank P. Prichard, Esq, of the Pblladelphla bar.