,'THE KATE. CANN.
she could to have passed under the stern, instead of aet'Osathe.l;owB, of the ferry-boat, there would not have been any collision. These views' dispose of' the action brought by the ':&J.ter against the Columbia, and compel a dismissal of the 'libeLin,;tbat They also compel a diamissal of the libel of the as against the Columbia, and entitle the libellant Baysen to a decree against the Baxter. The case of the lighter Watson is different, for 'she was lying at the end of pier 2. Still, I am inclined to the opinion that the ferry-boat must be absolved from any liability for the damage done to the lighter. I cannot say, upon the testimony, that the collision with the lighter was the result of negligeno,e on the part of the ferry-boat. The ferry-boat was, by the fault of the tug and driven into very dose quarters, and tum by a few feet, when, in the endeavor to escape from her tow, she brought up against the lighter, which had seen fit :put herself in an exposed position at the end. of pier, any damttge resulting therefrom, if not to be conside-\"ed to bew,ithiu 8.ssumedby the lighter when ahepla.ced ,an eltposed position, muat, in" my opinion, be of the result of the negligence of the, tug, for whicp tJ1e not the ',',. ferry-boat, would, in that case, 1:>e 'The libel oLthe National Freight and Lighterage therefore, be dislDistled. Ul' ; '; ·
TH'E KATE CANN.;:
(Circuit Cow-t, E, D. New York. June 28,18B1.) 1.
PERSONAL INJURy-,NEGLIGENCEIN STOWING CARGO.
The decision in this case, as reported in 2 FEn. REp. 241,
, " C. J. I am entirely satisfied with the arrived at by the district judge in this e/l.se"anil witp. the assigned by him therefor in his decision. The case is one the damage sued for was caused by the wrongful neglect, npon navigable water, of a maritime duty owing to the libellant by the owners of the vessel, and arising out of the employment of the vessel as a carrier of cargo, and for which the vessel herself is liable. The facts and the law are carefully examined by the district judge, and the distinc·
J. J. Allen, for claimant. : Hill, Wing J: Shoudy, for respondent.
tion between the present case and The Germania, 9 Ben. 356, is satis· fc.ctorily shown. There must be a decree for the libellant for $3,000, with interest from November 8, 1880, and his costs taxed in the district court at $325.30, and his costs in this court to be taxed.
See 2 FED. REP. 241.
(District Oourt, S. D. Florida. 1881.)
. Acharty-party gives no 'maritime lien on the vessel unless cargo isladeil . under it.
Libel in Admiralty. a. Malony, Jr., for libellant. W. Bethel, for respondent. LOCKE, D.J. This is an action in rem on a maritime contract, based upon a charter-party, for a non-compliance with its terms. It appears that after the charter party had been duly executed, the master and part owner, who had made the same, declined and refused to obey the instructions given, and neglected to proceed to the port where it was intended to put on board the cargo, so that the libellant was compelled to charter another vessel, to his damage. The first question is whether an action in rem can be sustained. The language of the charter-party no direct or positive pledging of the vessel, but the bi'nding clause is in these words: "And for the faithful performance of this agreement the respective parties do hereby bind themselves, each unto the other, in the sum of $800, United States currency." There being no binding of the vessel by the terms of the charterparty, nor taking of cargo on board, there is no maritime lien or hypothecation which will support an action in rem. Vandewater v. Mill8, 19 How. 82. The libel must be dismissed, with costs.
THIRD NAT. BANK fRiRD NAT. BANK
HARRISON and another.
(Circuit Court, E. D. Missouri.
STATtJTJCS-CONSTRUCTION OF-REPEAL BY IMPLICATION.
An earlier statute is only repealed by a later one when their provisions can· not be reconciled.
A later statute which is general and affirmative in its provisions will not abrogate a former one which is particular or special.
An exposition of a statute which will revoke or alter by construction of gen· eral words 3 previous general statute should not be adopted where the words may have their proper operation without it.
ACT OF MARCH 3, 1875, CONSTRUED.
The act of March 3, 1875, " to determine the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States, to regulate the removal of causes from the .tate courts, and for other purposes," did not repeal chapter 10, § 629, of the Revised Statutes. II. JURISDICTION OF CtRCUIT COURTS IN NATIONAL BANK CASES-REv. ST. §629,IJ.IO. Circuit courts have jurisdiction over suits by or against national banks without regard to the questions in controversy. . 6. Sum-REv. ST. § 740. Where there are two districts in a state a national bank may bring a suit Rot of a local nature in the circuit court of the one in which it is located against two or more defendants, one or more of whom reside in the other district, if one of them resides in the district in which suit is brought.
This is an action brought by the plaintiff, a corporation organized under the national banking act, against the defendants to recover judgment upon a certain promissory note executed by the defendant Harrison his co·defendant Alexander, and by the latter assigned to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is a national bank, located in the city of St. Louis, Missouri, and the defendants are citizens of the state of Missouri, the defendant Harrison being a citizen of the western district thereof. Upon these facts the defendant Harrison moves to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction. Dyer & Ellis, for plaintiff. Alexander Graves, for defendant. MCCRARY, C. J., (orally.) It is insisted by counsel for defendant -First, that this court has no jurisdiction in the case under the act of congress, approved March 8, 1875, entitled "An act to determine the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States, and to regulate the removal of causes from the state courts, and for other purposes," which act, it is insisted, repeals all prior acts upon the subject of the jurisdiction of the circuit courts, including the provision v.8,no.l0-46