THE CLA.TSOP calEF;
law; but this caBe,as preserited, does not call' npon the CClurttoexei !lIny Buoh power in behalf of the libellant. See Metcalfe v. Bri" Works,L. R. D. 176. ' The view already'expressed renders it unneceBsaryto consider the seriolls, question presented by the' fact that the qnantityof 'by the bill of lading of the Porter to have been shipped on vessel w.as-never shipped or, delivered to the master for purpose of shipment, and by the act of the master,- signing a bill,of lading known by hini to be false, Perkins'&J6b'hiid beeu indq.ced to advance money to C. H. Harrington & Oo;npon insufficient ', ', J;Uuat be ,a: decree dismissing the libel, and with costs.!
THE CLATSOP CHIEF.
September 8, 1881,)
: - ,:rh.eremep.y, gIven by section 4493 for an injury to ap. employe on a steamvessel is merely cumulative, and does not exclude the right to any other relIledy , for such ihjury which may be given by the general admiralty , ."'
Dell and W.Scott Bebee, for libellant. . 'D. P. Kennedy, for the owner, and claimant. ... " DEADY, J. On August 9, 1881, the opinion was delivered in this case to the effect that the libellant, Emma Kay, could not, under admiralty rule 15, maintain a proceeding in 1'em and in personam in one libel for damages for thE! deMh of ,her husband by a collision, as jireman on the ofIending,v(ilssel-thEl Qlatsop Chief. while It was also then suggested whether the libellant could maintain a suit in rem at all, in view' of the ruling' of Chief Justice Chase in' The H£ghland Light, (Chase's Dec. 151,) in'\Vhich it was held that by section 30 of the steam-boat act of 1852, (10 St. 72,) since become' section 43 of the act of 1874, (16 St. 445,) and now section 44.93 l?f the Revised -Statutes, such remedy, in the case of' an injury caused by a neglect to comply with the law governing 'the navigation of st'lam-vessels, 'was confined to passengers, and that persona mere(y employed thereon were limited to the remedy in personam for such injuries. Upon further argument and reflection I better conclusion is that the provisions in section 4493 of the ':Revised Statutes, concerning remedies, are only cumulative, and therefore do not take away or exclude any right to a proceeding in rem for an
injury to an employe on a steam-vessel, incurred while in the line of his employment, which was given or allowed by the general adriliralty law. See Brown v. The D. S. Cage, 1 Wood, 404. In addition, it appears. that the offending vessel is made subject to a lien by the local law "for damages or injuries done to person or property by such boat or vessel." Or. Laws, 656, § 17, subd. 4. But such lien is thereby postponed to the liens for wages, materials, wharfage, and towage. ld. 657, § 18.. But the conclusion reached upon the first exception at the former hearing must still prevail; for, as has been shown, under admiralty rule 15 the libellant cannot proceed in rem and in per80nam at the same time. But she may amend her libel by striking out the vessel or the owner and proceed against the other accordingly.
(Oircuit Court, 8.
n. New York.
BLATCHFORD, C. J. A careful examination of the evidence in this case leads me to the same conclusion as that arrived at by the district judge, and for the reasons stated by him. The libel must be dismissed, with costs to the claimants in the district court, at $92.20, and with their costs in this court, to be taxed. .'
THE WILLIE. t
(Oircuit Court, 8. D. New York. August 27,1881.)
BLATCHFORD, C. J. I have carefully examined the evidence in this case, in connection with the briefs of counsel, and am of opinion that the conclusions of fact and of law arrived at by the district judge were correct. The reasons therefor are so well and fully stated b, him in his decision that nothing need be said in addition. There must be a decree dismissing the libel, with costs to the claimant in the district court, as taxed, and costs to it in this court, to be taxed
.See 2 FED. REP. 821. tSee 2 FED. REp. 95.