company may, its charter, the express b;usiness, and undertake to carry and deliver express packages beyond its line. It is enough fOt the present to say that if it poss-esses the right to engage in at all, it must'do so upon terms of perfect equality with all express companies, and the court will see that it 'does not take to itself any privileges in :,'" this regard that it does not extend to.the complainant.
. The motion to disolve tlle injundtion is overruled.' '.,' 2. What has been said virtually disposes of the questIons raised by' company is bOllnd to carry for the supplemental bill. The the express company for a rea.sonable compensation, and not a discriminate against it. A cot'1rt of chancery has power to cOIn'pliance with this wholesome regulation. This court canribt fora moment sanction the proposition that the railroaa:company by extortion or unjust discrimination, exclude the express comj;lany from the right to conduct its business upon their railroad. I am not prepared now to fix the 'tnaximumrates to be charged for the transportation of express matter, but I hay-e no doubt of ,the power' after investigation, to do so. An order for this purpose shotild not, as a rule, be made until after a: reference to a master, and a repqrt by him after hearing. For the present, the injunction hereinbefore allowed will be modified so as to enjoin and restrain the respondent from charging the complainant for the transportation of express matter, closed packages, more than a fair and reasonable rate; such charges in no case to exceed the rate charged upon similar express matter to itself, or to any other express company, or for similar express matter received from, or delivered to, the Iron Mountain, etc., Railroad Company Express, or the Pacific Express Company. Ordered accordingly.
and others v.
(Circuit Court, D. Iowa.
Where a vendee is insolvent at the time a purchase is made, and does not expect to be able to pay for the goods purchased, the vendor Is entitled to possession as against such a vendee's voluntary assignee.
An action of replevin is brought to recover the possession of goocls alleged to have been fraudulently purchased by Harter & Claus, defendant's assignors. The plaintiffs rescind the sale, and follow the goods, stating in their petition "that when Harter & Claus purchased
804: the bill of goods they were insolvent, and did not expect to pay for the same." The case was tried with a jury, and a verdict rendered for the plaintiffs. Motion is made for a new trial. Barcroft, Gatck, ft· McOaughan, for plaintiffs. Parsons ft Runnells, for defendant. NELSON, D. J. The rule stated,by Hilliard on Sales meets with,my approval, to-wit: ."Wl1ere the purcpa,aer is insolvent,and has. no reasonable .exp,ectations or intention of paying for the goods, he no. title against ,the vendor." It is not necessary to allege or show pretence or other direct artifice. When no questions are. false no artifice resorted to, silence is not fraud; but concealment of insolvency, with no reasonable expectation of. paying, renders a sl;tle See ThonrRson v. Rose, 16. Conn. 71,81; Johnson v. Monell, 2Keyes, 655; Bradlee, 9 Gill. & J... 220, 248, 278; Talcott v. Henderson, 31 Ohio St. 162,52, note, and po. 301. v. Farewell, 93 U. S. 631, is not in conflict with the view expressed i,n this case.. The factlil. fully sustained the opinion annomiced by this court. The point ml;tde, that the defendant was a;n ofl;icer of the state court, and the circuit court of the United Sta,tes h.as no jurisdiction, not.tenable. The assignment was voluntary act of Harter & defendant was their appointee. The,p:,:operty is in, the' ant) custody as the creditors, and thl'l statutory.provisions relat,ive to the exercise of as' ,IL couFt of chancery would apply. The evidence was sufficient to justify the verdict, which the court was authorized to put in proper form. Motion denied, and it is so ordered. Judgment will be entered by the clerk, but without costs.
UNITED STA:TES THE UNITED STATES
SNYDER and another.
(Oircuit Oourt, D. Minnesota.
One who aids and abets a postmaster in committing the offence pro:flded against by the provisions of the act of June 17, 1878, which declares that a postmaster making a false return shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, etc., is guilty of the same offence, and liable to the same punishment. as his principal.
Wm. W. Billson, U. S. Atty., for the United States. O. D. O'Brien, for defendant Bertram. NELSON, D. J. The prisoners, Snyder and Bertram, were arreste4 on complaint, charging"That Snyder and Bertram, the said Snyder being postmaster, did unlawfully and knowingly make to the auditor of the United States, for the postoffice, in said Snyder's name, a false return, * * * for the purpose of fraudulently increasing his compensation as such postmaster, under th'eprovisions of the act of June 30,1879,"
The act referred to declares "that the postmaster making a, false return shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction, '., '. '. punished," etc. '. An application is made for the dis.charge of Bertram, who,. it is ad:r,nitted, is not a postmaster. He was arrested as an aider of ,the postmaster in the commission of the offence. The defendant's counsel insist that 'no person but the can commit the act made' critiliintl by the statute, and be pu.nished under it. The general doctrine that in misdemeanors all with the offence are principals, is cO,Ilc.eded; but ids urged that 'the policy of congress in ;respect to the postal system, as shown by the numerous laws creating offences, would limit this one and the punishment affixed in this statute to the postmaster. I cannot assent to this view of the law. The act of the postmaster being declared a misdemeanor, it was evidently the intention of congress to make it so for all purposes. An employe of the postmaster, or a person not connected with the office, has no right to procure or aid in the commission of this offence, and it is not reasonable to suppose congress intended to change the general principle of the law. If it had. been enacted that the post. master who made a false return should be guilty of a felony, the new felony created by the statute has all the incidents it would have at common law, and an accessory before the fact could be punished,