846 F.2d 1383
NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Douglas Clayton INGRAM, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted April 6, 1988.*
Decided May 4, 1988.
Before NELSON, NOONAN and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Douglas Clayton Ingram appeals his conviction on one count of mailing threatening communications with intent to extort in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 876, and two counts of transmitting threatening communications in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 875(d). Ingram contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict and that the district court erred in admitting evidence of his prior criminal conduct. These contentions lack merit.
The judgment is affirmed. There was sufficient evidence to establish that the July 1985 postcard and the July 22, 1985 letter received by Ingram's ex-wife Dorothy Deschamps contained "threats" as required to support Ingram's conviction for mailing threatening communications with intent to extort (Count Two), and for transmitting threatening communications in interstate commerce (Count Three). See United States v. Stewart, 770 F.2d 825, 831 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Sirhan, 504 F.2d 818, 819 (9th Cir.1974); United States v. LeVision, 418 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir.1969). Also, there was sufficient evidence that the April 1986 letter was mailed by Ingram in Washington State and sent to Deschamps in Montana as required to support Ingram's conviction for transmitting threatening communications in interstate commerce (Count Four). See United States v. Stewart, 770 F.2d 825, 831 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Oxendine, 531 F.2d 957 (9th Cir.1976).
The district court properly admitted references to Ingram's prior crimes contained in the letters and allowed Deschamps to testify regarding her awareness of Ingram's prior criminal record; such evidence was relevant to establishing Deschamps' state of mind. See United States v. Mehrmenesh, 689 F.2d 822, 830 (9th Cir.1982). Moreover, the district court correctly determined that the prejudicial effect of the evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value. See United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir.1982).