857 F.2d 1478
NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Paul Burnham PALMER, Jr. Plaintiff-Appellant,
Juanita BRUCK; William M. Jacobs; Robert L. Higgins;
Dennis A. Bird; Does 1 Through 10, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted July 15, 1988.*
Decided Sept. 12, 1988.
Before KOELSCH, KILKENNY and FARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Paul B. Palmer, Jr. appeals the dismissal of his amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We review dismissals under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) de novo. Fort Vancouver Plywood Co. v. United States, 747 F.2d 547, 552 (9th Cir.1984).
The district court's dismissal of Palmer's complaint was not erroneous. Insofar as Palmer is suing employees of the Internal Revenue Service in their official capacities, the action is in reality one against the United States and is barred by sovereign immunity. To the extent that Palmer's complaint is construed as seeking damages against defendants in their individual capacities, it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because it neither alleges nor shows that defendants violated clearly established law. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Nor has Palmer alleged facts which, if proven, would establish a violation of any of his constitutional rights. See Hutchinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir.1982); cf. Carter v. Commissioner, 784 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.1986) (rejecting same theory). And even if there were legal support for Palmer's underlying theory that his wages are not taxable income, defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity for taking actions within the scope of their official duties that reasonable officials could regard as lawful. Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038 (1987).
Because no reasonable arguments may be made in support of Palmer's positions, we conclude that sanctions are appropriate for this appeal. We assess him sanctions in the amount of $500 pursuant to the discretionary authority vested in us by Fed.R.App.P. 38.