859 F2d 149 Anderson v. W Sickels

859 F.2d 149
Unpublished Disposition

Charles M. ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Charles W. SICKELS, Thomas J. Middleton, Bernard F.
Jennings, A. Strode Brent, Jr., Parr Excellance,
Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
Charles M. ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Henry C. MACKALL, Mackall, Mackall, Walker & Silver, Donald
L. Bowman, Law Office, F. Bruce Bach, Jack B.
Stevens, J. Howe Brown, Thomas A.
Fortkort, Claude Hilton,
Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 87-2172 and 87-2176.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 20, 1988.

NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.

Charles M. Anderson, appellant pro se.

Peter R. Messit, Office of Attorney General of Virginia, A. Strode Brent, Jr., Charles William Sickels, Hall, Markle & Sickels, PC, Glenn Hugh Silver, Mackall, Mackall, Walker & Silver, Henry Edward Hudson, United States Attorney, Office of U.S. Attorney, Donald L. Bowman, for appellees.

Before DONALD RUSSELL and SPROUSE, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:


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1

Charles Anderson filed two actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against six state judges, a federal district judge, and several private defendants alleging that they conspired to deny him a fair hearing and deprive him of due process. The district court dismissed the actions and awarded attorney's fees against Anderson. Anderson appealed.

2

The federal and state judges are immune from liability in damages. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). Moreover, the lower federal courts are without jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983). See also Ganey v. Barefoot, 749 F.2d 1124, 1127 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1014 (1985). In his claim against the federal judge, Anderson challenges the dismissal of one of his prior federal actions. As the proper vehicle for Anderson to object to this dismissal is through appeal, which in fact he has done, he has failed to state a claim for which he is entitled to relief. The action was also properly dismissed against the remaining defendants as they are not state actors and Anderson has failed to establish that they conspired with a state official. See generally Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980).

3

Rule 11, Fed.R.Civ.P., provides that where an attorney or party signs a pleading he certifies to the court that he has conducted reasonable investigation and to the best of his knowledge the pleadings represent a proper legal claim. See 5 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1332 (1987 Supp.). A violation of this rule is sufficient cause for the district court to impose sanctions. See Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1987). Anderson's actions in this case demonstrate that a serious question exists as to his competency as an attorney. We cannot say, however, that the record reflects a violation of rule 11.

4

In view of the above, we affirm the district court's dismissal of this action but vacate the order imposing sanctions. Because the dispositive issues have been decided authoritatively, we dispense with oral argument.

5

AFFIRMED IN PART VACATED IN PART.