86 FlllDERAI, nBlPORTma.
O'DONNELL v. NEE. (OlrcuIt Oourt, D. Massachusetts. No. 636. L
BLANDER-REpETITION OF ACTIONADI,E WORDS.
March T, 1898.)
An admissIon by defendant, ,at plaintiff's request, and In the presence at a third party, that on a previous occasIon he had used the alleged slanderous words, Is no ground ot action; when It does not appear that the language was originally used In the presence of .a third party. A declaration Is defective which tails to set forth the alleged slanderoul words substantially as they were uttered.
This was an action by Francis O'Donnell against Thomas Nee for slander. The case was heard on demurrer to the declaration. E. H. Savory, for complainant. Albert A. Gleason, for defendant COLT, Oircuit Judge. This is an action of slander. The present hearing was on demurrer to the declaration. The declaration alleges that the defendant, on January 7, 1897, in the yard of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, located at Boston, falsely and maliciously accused the plaintiff of the crime of larceny. The alleged slanderous words are a's folloW's:
It doesnof appear that the language complained of wasoriginallJ used in the presence of a third party; but it does appear that subse· quently the defendant, in the presence of the plaintifl' and a third party, admitted that he had used such language. We believe thr sound rule of law to be that the repetition of alleged slanderous wordll ,made in the presence of a third person at the special request of the plaintiff does not of itself constitute a ground of action.. .· Upon the allegations in thededaration, there was no such publica· tion as would entitle the plaintiff to a right of recovery. Heller v. Howard, 11 TIL App. 554; King v. Waring, 5 Esp. 13;SIliith v. Wood, 3 Camp. 323; Weatherston v. HaWkins, 1 Term R. 110. The allegations in the second and third counts of the declaration, more specific than in the first count, quoted in no wayafl'ect the principle of law which we deem controlling in this case. The fourth count of the declaration is defective, in not setting forth the alleged slanderous words substantially as they were uttered. Lee v. Kane, 6 Gray, 495; Clay v. Brigham, 8 Gray, 161. Dt'murrer sustained.
BUFORD V. KERB.
PINNEY v. NEVILLS et al. (Circuit Court, D. Massachusetts. March 4, 1898.) No. 658.
AT'l'ACHMENT-STOCK IN FOREIGN CORPORATION.
In Massachusetts, there being no statute authorizing it, there can be no attachment of shares of stock in a foreign corporation owned by a nonresident defendant.
This was an action, commenced by attachment, by George M. Pinney against William A. Nevills and others. The case was heard on a motion to discharge the trustee. Gaston & Snow, for plaintiff. Charles M. Reed, for defendants. COLT, Circuit Judge. This suit was originally brought in the state court, and removed to this court. The plaintiff is a citizen of Massachusetts, and the defendants are citizens of California. No personal service was made on any of the defendants. The only service which was made was by attachment of certain certificates of stock belonging to the defendants, in the hands of the NationalBank of the Republic, located in Boston. These were certificates of stock of tbe Rawhide Gold-Mining Company, a corporation organized under the laws of West Virginia. The question presented on these motions is whether shares of stock in a foreign corporation owned by a nonresident defendant can be reached by process of attachment under Massachusetts law. The statutes of Massachusetts provide that shares of stock in a corporation organized under tbe laws of the state, or under the laws of the United States, where such corporation has a usual place of business in the state, may be attached. Pub. St. Mass. c. 161, § 71; Id. c. 171, § 45. There is no provision in the Massachusetts statutes that shares of stock in a foreign corporation can be reacbed by attachment, except in the case of a corporation organized under the laws of the United States. The general rule of law is tbat shares of stock in a foreign corporation owned by a nonresident defendant are not subject to at; tachment. Plympton v. Bigelow, 93 N. Y. 592; Ireland v. Reduction Co., 19 R. I. 180, 32 Atl. 921; Denton v. Livingston, 9 Johns. 96; Winslow v. Fletcher, 53 Conn. 390, 4 At!. 250; Smith v. (Ind. App.) 34 N. E. 823. Motions granted. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
BUFORD v. KERR. (Circuit Court, W. D. Missouri, W. D. March 17, 1898.)
COURTS-FoLLOWING STATE COURTS.
'Vhere the supreme court of Missouri held that an estate passed by a will is a statutory estate, and that the effort of the testator to further control the estate was in contravention of the statutes of Missouri, the federal court will follow such decision. In Missouri, a defendant who has held open, notorious, exclusive, continuous. illld adverse possession for more than 10 years after the plaintiff became ot age is held to have acquired title by virtue of the statute of limitations. 86 F.-7
ADVERSE POSSESSION-LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.