OpenJurist

875 F2d 318 Gascon v. Veteran

875 F.2d 318

Unpublished Disposition

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

Belinda GASCON, Adolpho Gascon; Ramona Gascon, Plaintiffs-Appellants.
v.
Craig VETERAN; Delta-Stockton Humane Society; Deborah
Cousyn; Donald Biancalana; Mitch Thiry; Gary Sheridan;
David Bertocchini; Dighton Little, Randy Loh; Scott
Fichtner; John Green; Barbara Cunha; Dale Wilson, Howard
Cotez; William Bayha, Gary McClaughlin; Al Olson; Dan
Guerra; Steven Taylor; San Joaquin County, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 88-2850.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 8, 1989.
Decided May 19, 1989.

Before HUG, SCHROEDER and CANBY, Circuit Judges.

1

MEMORANDUM*

2

Belinda, Adolpho, and Ramona Gascon appeal the district court's final orders in their civil rights action, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982). We affirm the partial summary judgment and the dismissal of the remaining count.

3

Adolpho and Belinda Gascon failed to oppose the County of San Joaquin's summary judgment motion with facts sufficient to merit a full trial. In response to a properly supported summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must produce specific facts showing a genuine need for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). The facts proffered must be material to the nonmoving party's legal arguments and not irrelevant or unnecessary. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The Gascons' response to the County's motion presented only tangentially relevant and poorly documented statements about minor factual issues involved in the animal cruelty case brought against them. It neither raised factual questions about the County's grounds for summary judgment, nor did it advance facts material to the Gascons' constitutional claims underlying their section 1983 complaint. The district court, consequently, properly entered summary judgment against them.

4

Ramona Gascon has no valid reason to contest the dismissal of her remaining claim. Gascon's counsel informed the trial judge that prosecution of Gascon's claim by itself would not be economically feasible, particularly if this court reversed the summary judgment ruling and ordered a trial on the other issues. Apparently in light of this financial concern, Gascon chose not to file a pretrial statement or pursue her claim. The district court, presumably with Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) in mind, accommodated Gascon's money worries by allowing her to drop her claim with the possibility of reopening it should we reverse the summary judgment. The record clearly suggests that Ramona Gascon voluntarily abandoned her claim and that the trial judge cooperated with her in a substantial fashion. She cannot now complain of an abusive dismissal.

5

We affirm the district court's orders in every respect.

6

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3