893 F.2d 1338
NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Robert J. HENDERSON; Anita E. Henderson, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Robert GRUNTZ, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Jan. 12, 1990.*
Decided Jan. 17, 1990.
Before CHAMBERS, FARRIS and NOONAN, Circuit Judges.
On January 22, 1988, appellant filed a motion to set aside entry of default and to vacate default judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.Rules 55(c) and 60(b). The district court's order denying this motion was entered on February 29, 1988. Thereafter, on June 3, 1988, appellant filed what he labelled a "Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default and to Vacate Default Judgment." The district court treated the motion as a motion for reconsideration of its February 29, 1988 judgment, and denied it on June 27, 1988. On July 21, 1988, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the district court's June 27, 1988 order, and apparently from the underlying February 29, 1988 order denying his Rule 60(b) motion as well.
Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the date of entry of the judgment appealed from. This time period is mandatory and jurisdictional. Bird v. Reese, 875 F.2d 256, 257 (9th Cir.1989). The 30-day period, however, is tolled by the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration. If a motion for reconsideration is timely filed, the time for filing a notice of appeal is tolled and does not begin running until the district court disposes of the motion for reconsideration. See generally Saunders v. Cabinet Makers and Millmen Local 721, 549 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir.1977); Clipper Express v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff, 690 F.2d 1240, 1247 (9th Cir.1982).
In this case, appellant appeals from the district court's order denying his Rule 60(b) motion. However, contrary to appellant's assertion, it was the district court's order entered February 29, 1988, rather than its order of June 27, 1988, which effected the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion. The district court properly construed appellant's second motion under Rule 60(b). Thus, appellant failed to file his notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the district court's judgment as required by Fed.R.App.P. 4(a). The running of this 30-day period was not tolled by appellant's filing of his motion for reconsideration, since that motion was not filed until after the 30-day period had run. Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction over his appeal. This appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
It is so ordered.