Bon, 2 N. B. R. 570; Be Poleman, 5 Biss. 526; McFarlalltl v. Goodman, 6 Biss. 111; Be Hinkle, 2 Sawy. 305; Be Hunt, 5 N. B.B. 493; Be Vogler, 8 N. B. R. 132; Be Sinnett, 4 Sawy. 250.
It also finds support in the cases construing statutes of this and other states for the benefit of married women or' their families. Coope'r v. Maddox, 2 Sneed, 135; Lyon v. Knott, 26 Miss. 548; BaM v. Griffin, ld. 579; Stewart v. Boss, 54 Miss. 776; Hatfield v. Sneden, 54 N. Y. 280; Be Winne, 1 Lans. 508; S. O. 2 Lans. 21; ThompBon v. Green, 4 Ohio St. 216, 232; Plumb v. Sawye-n, 21 Conn. 351; Silsbjf v. BuUock, 10 Allen, 94; Staples v. Brown, 13 Allen. 64; Walsh Young, 110 Mass; 396, 309. Upon consideration of these authorities it will be found to be a general principle that, whether the settlement is made by statute, deed, will, or contract, the husband's marital rights are not interfered with further than the terms of the settlement go, and that what remains to him can be subjected by his creditors as if the settlement had not been made; and it is as well seWed as it is possible to be that the circumstance that the wife is to receive the rents or profits or to enjoy the estate during her life, or that the husband is forbidden to convey it except with her consent, or that she may alone or jointly with him convey it or defeat the husband'd estate by appointment by will or (}therwise, will not, nor will any of them combined, alter the construction so as to affect or defeat his marital rights, nor the estate of his assignee or .purchaser, except strictly according to the terms of the settlement. If an estate remains to him after her death as the residuum of what he would have had but for the settlement, his creditors may subject it, and it passes by his deed subjeot to be defeated if she survives or dies without exercising her powers of alienation. Finally, there is an unreported case in this court, in Be Stack, a bankrupt, (June, 1879,) in which the circuit judge, sitting for the district judge,who was incompetent, upon the same principle decided in favor of the assignee. The wife of the bankrupt, un,der a deed from him, held land to her "sole and separate use and benefit, free from the debts, liabilities, and control of her present or any future husband, with power to sell, by joint deed with her husband, for reinvestment on same trusts, and if she should die in the life-time of her husband then to revert to him in fee-simple." The estate of her husband was not mentioned in the schedules of the bankrupt, as in this case, he deeming it secure from the operation of the bankrupt law, and the wife died pending the proceedings in bankruptcy, as here, whereupon the assignee filed a petition, like that in this case,
IN RE M'KENNA.
and the court compelled the bankrupt to surrender the land to the wife had all the protection she the assignee. Under this would have had under this statute, and a larger estate than she would have had if she had inherited the land' or held it by an ordinary conveyance. Besides, the land. itself was, at the date of the petition in bankruptcy, under the protection of this stlttute, hoth as to est of the wife and that of the husband. And, as to his interest, the only difference I can see, is that there he ,had a reversionary estate in fee-simple, contingent upon his surviving his wife, but liable to be defeated also by their joint deed, (leavi:qg out the reinvestment clause,)whilehere the bankrupt had a life estate, Bubject'to the same contingencies. It w'as ruled that this estate wasvested"at the time of the bartkruptcy, and did not vest at the death of the wife, and was, therefore, not subsequently acquired property. Furthermore, tne ruling must have been the samein that case if Stack had had no contingent reversionary interest under the deed, and it had appeared there was issue' of the marriage, for he was, in that event, a tenant by curtesy, notwithstanding this was a separate estate, and would ha'Ve held the land for his unless it may be the words "free from' the debts, liabilities, or control of any future husband" should be construad to antirely cut off his (Stack's) curtesy. I do not see any difference in principle between that case and this, because if Stack had under that deed sllch an interest as passed to his assignee during the life of his wife, subject to her rights undedhe deed and this statute, I do not see why the bankrupt here did not have, by the common law regulating the tenancy by the curtesy, such an interest in his life 'estate as passed, subject to the rights of his wife and his own: 'under the statute. ' The objection, in this view of the case, that the children of the wife affl not parties to this proceeding, is not tenable. only claims the life estate of the bankrupt, and in this the children have no interest. Motion overruled.
,vi'/'cuit (JfJUrt, 8. D. New York.
A case will not be reopened for the introduction of new evidence, unless the new evidence would vary the case, and probably lead to a diffet'ent result.
James A. Whitney, for complainant.
Peter Van Antwerp and Rodney Mason, for defendant.
D. J. This cause has been heard since a decretal order for dismissing the bill of complaint, and before decree signed, upon a motion .of the plaintiff to reopen the case for the introduction of new evidence as to the novelty and utility of the patented trap. It is plain that the motion should not be granted unless the. new evidence would vary the case and probably lead to a different result. The patent is simply for a die-drawn seamless soft-metal plumber's trap, made by forcing the metal through dies at varying velocities on 'opposite sides. It describes nothing to distinguish these traps from others except the mode of. manufacture and longitudinal striations appearing upon them, which are merely the result of the manufacture, and have nothing to do with the quality or operation of the traps. The patent assumed that soft-metal traps were before known and .in use, and, besides, that fact was a matter of common knowledge, of which the court took judicial notice. There was nO evidence as to the quality and characteristics of the die-drawn traps as compared with the cast traps before most in use. The new evidence would tend to show that their walls have greater solidity and more perfect uniformity, and that they are more elastic, and that the quality of the metal is changed and improved by the process of drawing, and that they have largely superseded all others in use. All these differences are due to the process of manufacture, in forcing the metal through dies, all of which effects were before well known. They are the same as the differences between cast and drawn lead pipe, as was shown in Leroy v. TathlJ,m, 14 How. 156. There the testimony was that the drawn lead pipe "was superior in quality and strength, capable of resisting much greater pressure, and more free from defects, than any pipe before made; that in all the modes of making lead pipe previously known and in use it could be made only in short pieces, but that by this improved mode it could be made of any required length, and also of any required size, and that the introduction of lead pipe made in the mode described had superdeded the use