steam-boat liable. I may be mistaken in my views, but if so I am glad to know that it is a case which can be appealed to the circuit court, where any errors of mine may be corrected, Decl"ee for the libellant.
(District Court, E. D. PennsylfJania.
November 11, 1881.)
L JURISDICTION-ENFORCEMENT OF DECREE OF FOREIGN COURT.
A court of admiralty may, at the instance ofa party and wit-hout letters of request, enforce a decree in personam for the parment of costs rendered by an admiralty court in another district.
Libel by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company against William Gilhooley, setting forth that in December, 1876, respondent .had tiled his libel in the United States district court for the southem district of ;New York, against the present libellant, to recover damages for injuries to his canal-boat; that the said district court entered a decree in his favor; that this decree was afterwards, upon appeal, reversed by the circuit court for said district, and a decree was therein entered dismissing the libel, with costs, which were taxed at $2,352.05. A copy of this decree was annexed to the libel; The libel further set forth that the said last-mentioned decree remained in full forco and unsatisfied; that neither the present respondent nor anY.of his property could be found within the jurisdiction of the circuit court for'tbe sontherndistrict of New York, but that such property could be found within this district. Libellant prayed for a decree against respondent for the' amount of· the decree entered in the circuit court for the southern district of New York.Respondent filed exceptions to the libel on the grounds (1) that the court had 110 jurisdiction ; and (2) that the record of the suit in the courts of the southern district of New York was not attached to the libel. At the hearing it wal> agreed that these exceptions stand as an answer.
George P. Rich, for exceptions.
A court of admiralty will lend its aid to enforce the decrt>e of a foreign admiralty court only upon receipt of letters rogatory or missive, and not at the instance of a party. 6 Viner, Abr. 512, pl.12; JUl'odo v. Gre,qory,lLevinz, 267; S. C.I Ventris, 82; Godb. 260; 2 Bro. Civ. & Ad. 120; 2Sir Leoline Jenkins, 7141'754,762; 788; La Madonna della Lettera,2 Haggard,'289. The only re:lson that courts' of admiralty interfere to execute each other's decrees is to prevent a failure of justice; but this rellsonis inapplicable to the present case, because an action of debt could be brought upon the judgment at common law . The cases in which admiralty courts have executed foreign decrees are either
*Reported by1f'rauk P. Prichard, Esq., of the P.hila,lelphla bar.
PENNSYLVANIA. RAILROAD CO. V. GILHOOLEY.
proceedings in rem, where the res had come into another jurisdiction from that in which ]1<1t1 been commenced, or cases where a sentence of imprisonment for contempt, against a party for non-compliance with a decree, was asked for, in neither of which cases could relief be obtained at common law.
Alfred Driver and J. Warren Coulston, contra, were not called upon. They presented and relied upon Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dallas, 97; The Jemsalem, 2 Gallison, 191; The Centurion, 1 Ware, 477; Otis v. The Rio Grande, 1 Woods, 279; Wilson v. Graham, 4 Wash. 53. The court, (BUTLER, D. J.) in a verbal opinion, held that it had a general jurisdiction which would enable it in its discretion to enforce the decree of a foreign admiralty court, at the instance of a party, without letters rogatory, and, after directing that the record of the proceedings in New York, duly certified, "hould be attached to the libel, entered subsequently the following decree: "And now, November 11,1881, the exceptions to the libel filed in the above cause having, by agreement of the respective proctors, and by leave of the court, been considered and filed as an answer to the libel, and the above cause having been heard onlibel and answer, and having been argued by the proctors for the respective parties, and due deliberation being had in the premises, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed, by the court, that the libellant recover against the respondent the sum of , $2,352.05, with interest thereon from the seventh day of February, 1880, said interest amounting to $246.96, making in all the sum of $2,599.01, with costs to be taxed by the clerk and that the libellant have execution therefor against the respondent."
THE GENERAL TOMPKINS.
(Circtf,it Court, S. D. Mississippi.
2 REV. ST.
Mo. 1879, § 4225-LIENS. By the provisions of 2 Rev. St. Mo. 1879, § 4225, debts contracted by the owner of a steam-boat on account of stores and supplies furnished for its use, and on account of labor done and materials furnished in repairing, furnishing, and equitJping it, are made liens on the boat. Held, that one who furnishes money with which to payoff such liens has a lien on the boat to the amount of his advances. ' Parts of the same statute may be valid, and other parts void.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 3. LIENS UNDER STATE LAWS.
Liens given by the local law of the state of Missouri at the home port of thel vessel will be recognized by this court.
In Admiralty. On appeal. PARDEE, C. J. The intervenor claims proceeds in the registry of the court resulting from the sale of the steam-boat Gen. Tompkins, on the ground that under the laws of the state of Missouri the intervenor has a lien thereon by reason of having paid, at the request of the owner, debts contracted by the owner on account of stores and supplies furnished for the use of the said steam-boat, and on account of labor done and materials furnished in repairing, furnishing, and equipping the said boat. See 2 Rev. St. Mo. 1879, § 4225. The district court having allowed this claim of the intervenor, the owners have appealed. 1. It is objected that under the law of Missouri the intervenor has no lien, as he furnished nothing himself giving a lien, but only furnished money and paid off existing liens. It will be noticed that the wording of the statute is "for all debts contracted, etc., on account of stores and supplied, on account of labor," etc. Where the labor has been done, and the supplies, etc., furnished, and a lien results, it would seem that money used to payoff such liens would be on account of such labor and supplies furnished, etc. But the decisions cited from the supreme court of Missouri, on this question, leave no doubt. See Bryan v. Pride of the 12 Mo. 371; Gibbons v. Fanny Barker, 40 Mo. 254. In tbis last case the court says: "Money loaned for the specific purpose of enabling a boat to purchase supplies, or to pay wages or debts incurred already, or to be incurred in future, for things which are liens, have been held to be a debt contracted for those things, and therefore a lien also on the boat;" and