which the decision could not have been reI1l1ered.(r) When it is said, as it often has been said, that a jUdgment is conclllsivc:>, not only of everything necessary to it, but also of everything that might have been litigated, it is clear that this can be true only so far as it relates to particular issues actually joined or necessarily implied. Even in New York, where the courts have gone to a great extreme in applying the rule of necessary facts, it is held that a judgment will not bar a counter-right of action of an independent nature.(s) The real difficulty is in regard to the meaning of .. necessary facts;" but the weight of authority appears to be that facts which constitute a counter-right of action cannot be deemed to be barred by judgment for the plaintiff, unless the defendant put them in issue in the first suit; and this, they are connected with the same sUbject-matter as that upon which the first suit was MELVILLE M. BIGELOW. brollght.(t) B'Jston, January 13, 1882.
(District Court, 8. D. New York.
January 6, 1882.)
In Admiralty. Exceptions to libel. Butler, Stillman ct Hubbard, for libellant. Jas. K. Hill and Wing ct Shoudy, for claimants.
(r)Leonard v. Whitn'y, 109 M."". 265, 268; Crofton v. Cincinnati, 26 Ohio 8t. 671; Dunham v. BOlVer,77 N. Y. 76; Woodgate v. F'I-et. 44 N. Y. 1; Hardy v· Mills, 35 WI·. 141; Hamner v. Pounds, 57 Ala. 348; Bradley v. Briggs. 55 Ga. 354; Supples v. Cannon, 44 Conn. 424; Bigelow, Estoppel, 103, (3d Ed.) (s)BrolVn v. Gallandet, 80 N. Y. 413. (t)See Bodurtha v. Phelan, 13 Gray, 413; Ba..om v. Manning, 52 N. H. 132; Sykes v. Bonner, Cln. Sop. Ct. Rep. 464; Mandel v. Steel, 8 Mees. & W. Si>8; Da.i. v. Hedges, L. R. 6 Q. B. 687; Barker v. Cle"eland. 19 MICh. 230. The New York cases contra al'e Gales v. Pre<lon. 41 N. Y.lI3; White v. Merritt.7 N. Y. 352; Davis v. Tallcot, 12 N. Y. 184; Dunhan, v. Bower, 77 N. Y. 76; Blair V. Bartlett, 75 N. Y.150; Bellinger v. Craigue. 31 Barb. 534; Collins v. Bennett,46 N. Y. 490. See Schwinger v. Raymond.83 N. Y. 193. The subject is fUl'ther considered in the writer's work on Estoppel, pp.
BROWN, D. J. The libel in this case was filed by Thomas C. Campbell, "for himself and for the use and benefit of the Ulster Marine Insurance Company, (limited,) his insurers," against the steamers Anchoria and the Queen. The libel sets forth a collision in midocean between the two steamers on June 13, 1880, whereby goods of the libellant on board of the Anchoria were injured or destroyed to the extent of about $5,000, and that the goods were partially insured by the Ulster Marine Insurance Company, (limited,) whi,:lh had paid to him on account of the insurance the sum of $2,576.18. The libellant seeks to recover the whole amount of damage to the goods, for the use of the insurance company to the extent of the amount paid by it, and the of the damage for the benefit of the libellant himself;: tt'he first exception to the libel is that the libellant, Campbell, is not entitled to maintain this action and recover for the use and benefit of the iusurancecompany as claimed. It is not denied that all persons entitled on the same state of facts to participate in the same relief may join as libellants, (Ben. Adm. Pro § 380,) but it is claimed that in this case the insurance compallY is not joinedas libellant, and that the practice is not allowed of one person suing for the use of another. The claims here represented, it will be observed, grow out of the same transaction, and the rights of the insurance company arise by subrogation to a part of the rights of the libellant. This objection now made seems to be answered by the decision in the case of Fretz V. Bull, 12 How. 466. In that case a flat-boat belonging to Bull & Co., the libellants, had been lost by a collision, as well as goods of the libellants loaded upon it. An insurance company had paid to Bull & Co. the whole value of the goods, but the boat was not insured. The libellants thereupon brought their libel precisely in the form of the libel in this case, to recover for themselves the value of the boat, and, for the use of the insurance company, the value of the goods. The same objection now urged was taken; and the court, Wayne, J., held that "the parties named in the libel have respectively an interest, which is covered by the principle just stated, that the same state of facts which will give relief to one will permit others to be joined as libellants. It is no substantial objection," then, say the court, "that the suit has been brought in the name of Bull & Co. for the use of the Firemen's Insurance Company." The MonticeUo v. Mollison, 17 How. 152, 155; Garrison v. Memphis Ins. Go. 19 How. 312; Hall V. Railroad Gos. 13 Wall. 367. The verification of the libel made by the attorney states that his information is derived in part from the representatives of the insur-
ance company; and it may, therefore, be perhaps inferred .that this suit, in so far as it respects the interests of the insurance company, is iJrosecuted with their concurrence and by their authority. In the case of Fretz v. Bull that fact appeared in the proofs. The libel does not in this case directly state any request or authority from the company for prosecuting this suit in their behalf or for their use. Such an authority should appear in the proofs to entitle to a recovery upon this part of the claim, as otherwise the insurance company would not be bound by the proceedings or by the judgment rendered. No exception, however, was taken on this ground. The exception is to the general want of power in the libellant to Bue in this manner, and that exception, upon the authorities above cited, must be overruled. The nature of the alleged cause of action sufficiently appears by the allegations in the libel. The third and fourth exceptions are that the libel does not set forth with sufficient certainty the agreement of shipment or the consideration for it, and neither the terms nor a copy of the bill of lading; and it is claimed that the description of the goods is not sufficient to enable the Anchoriato identify them. The libel refers to bills of lading, but it does not give either their dates or the description of the goods as stated in the bills of lading. These should be supplied, together with the names of the consignees. The claimants are also entitled to a statement of what godds were "wholly lost," and what were only damaged; and also of the material parts of the contract of the policy of insurance upon which any righk of the parties may depend, including the time and place of the insurance, the persons insured, and their interest in the goods, as claimed by the fifth and sixth exceptions. To this extent the exceptions are sustained j otherwise, overruled.
THE ISAAC BELL.
(Dist1'ict Court, 8. D. New York.
December 22, 1881.)
Vessels at anchor at night in the vicinity of the navigable part of It river are bound to maintain an anchor light. The schooner G. 8. R. anchorcd at sun-down in the .Jamcs river. near the White 8hoallight. The river is there about four m;les wide. 'rhe White Shoal is in the middle of the river. The channel, with from 26 to 16 feet of water, is about half a mile in hreadth along the southerly side of the shoal. , The place of was claimed to be outside of the channel, in about 15 feet of water only ; but the various estimates of distance from the light and com-