917 F2d 557 Owens-Bey v. L Robinson C
917 F.2d 557
Ronald Mu'min OWENS-BEY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Bishop L. ROBINSON, Secretary of Public Safety and
Correctional Services; Jennifer Burdick,
Executive Director, Maryland-Human
Joan C. Ross, Defendant.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 1, 1990.
Decided Nov. 2, 1990.
NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. William M. Nickerson, District Judge. (CA-89-13-WN)
Ronald Mu'min Owens-Bey, appellant pro se.
George Albert Eichhorn, III, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Md.; Sally Lotz Swann, Assistant General Counsel, Maryland Commission on Human Relations, Baltimore, Md., for appellees.
Before DONALD RUSSELL and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Ronald Mu'min Owens-Bey seeks to appeal the order of the district court dismissing his claims against defendant Ross. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 this Court has jurisdiction over appeals from final orders. A final order is one which disposes of all issues in dispute as to all parties. It "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
As the order appealed from is not a final order, it is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. The district court has not directed entry of final judgment as to particular claims or parties under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), nor is the order appealable under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292. Finally, the order is not appealable as a collateral order under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
Finding no basis for appellate jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.